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Overview part 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of two main parts, namely (1) an overview (chapters 1-4) and (2) the 
publications (chapters 5-7). The thesis concludes with a brief discussion (chapter 8). 
The overview chapters aim to provide contextual information in order to understand the 
embedding of the publications into the wider context of research. This is necessary because the articles 
had to be written in a rather focused and concise manner in order to meet the journal requirements. 
The overview chapters comprise an introduction to the field of research (chapter 1), which 
highlights the problem statement and research questions, followed by the main theoretical concepts 
underlying the thesis (chapter 2). Chapter 3 depicts the study area. It focuses on the agricultural 
structure in Hesse, particular environmental challenges faced and current agri-environmental policies 
undertaken. The chapter is followed by a synthesis of the main results (chapter 4). 
The main research outcome of this thesis is presented in the publication part (chapters 5-7), which 
consists of three articles submitted to peer-reviewed academic journals: 
 Article (1): Weber, A. 2014. Do Transaction Costs create Transaction Gains for Farmers 
Participating in an Agri-Environmental Scheme? Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Policy. DOI 10.1080/21606544.2014.886530. 
 Article (2): Weber, A., 2014. How are public Transaction Costs in regional Agri-
Environmental Scheme Delivery influenced by EU Regulations? Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management 57 (6), 937-959.  
 Article (3): Weber, A. 2015. Implementing EU co-financed agri-environmental schemes: 
Effects on administrative transaction costs in a regional grassland extensification scheme. 
Land Use Policy 42, pp.183-193. 
The concluding discussion (chapter 8) highlights the implications of the main findings of this 
thesis and provides outlook on expected transaction cost related developments in the new funding 
period 2014-2020 in a broader context. 
The sequencing of articles follows the chronological order of the research process, not the order 
of their publication. Being separately written journal articles, each of them can be read independently. 
A linear reader will face some redundancies, especially in the description of the agri-environmental 
scheme investigated and the literature overview at the beginning of each article.  
An attached appendix contains the questionnaires and interview guidelines used to obtain 
empirical data as well as a list of further publications produced during the doctorate. 
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1.2 Problem statement and aim of thesis 
Since their first introduction in 1992, agri-environmental schemes (AES) have become the most 
important policy instrument of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to foster the provision of 
environmental goods via agriculture within the European Union (Höft, 2011; Hampicke, 2013). 
Environmental goods or benefits, e.g. enhancing and maintaining biodiversity, or countryside services, 
emerge besides food production as a joint product of agricultural land use; they are a result of specific 
agricultural production techniques, usually characterised by low input (Polman and Slangen, 2002; 
Harvey, 2003; Slangen and Polman, 2002; Hampicke, 2013). AES were primarily established to 
mitigate the negative consequences of productivity increases in agriculture during the second half of 
the 20
th
 century; the increased use of pesticides or mineral fertilisers led to decreases in the provision 
of environmental benefits or even produced environmental hazards such as biodiversity losses, 
groundwater pollution, or soil erosion (Wilhelm, 1999; Höft, 2011). Facing such effects, society’s 
demand for environmental goods increased and enhanced policy awareness (Wilhelm, 1999; Höft, 
2011). Nowadays, policy approaches aim to ensure that non-commodity outputs meet the societal 
demand in quantity, quality, and composition (OECD, 2001; European Council, 2005). 
However, fostering environmental goods’ provision is difficult because they mainly occur as 
externalities of agricultural production (Slangen and Polman, 2002; Lehmann et al., 2009). 
Externalities arise in case the action of one agent influences the utility of another without him being 
compensated (Dahlman, 1979). Moreover, environmental goods often bear public good characteristics; 
they lack excludability and are non-rival in consumption to varying degrees (Hanley et al., 2001; 
Sandberg, 2007; Hasund, 2013). Biodiversity - for example, - is non-rival in consumption and at least 
partly non-exclusive, but its provision typically takes place in the private sphere; i.e. on privately 
owned pieces of land, and the costs of its provision – such as productivity losses due to extensified 
land use - are allocated to the farmer (Smits et al., 2008). As a result of such incentives, farmers tend 
to increase market good provision, which reduces the provision of environmental benefit (Coggan et 
al., 2010). However, underprovision of a socially demanded good reduces social welfare (Samuelson, 
1954; Hasund, 2009). Such market failure is frequently the case in agriculture and makes policy 
intervention necessary and legitimate (Hagedorn et al., 2002; Slangen and Polman, 2002; Smits et al., 
2008). To foster the provision of environmental benefits despite their unsuitability for conventional 
(private) market solutions, governments use policy instruments to set up alternative institutional 
arrangements. Such policy interventions range from regulatory approaches (e.g. establishing nature 
reserves on publicly owned land) to market-based approaches, such as agri-environmental schemes 
(AES) (OECD, 2001; Sandberg, 2007; Vatn, 2009)
1
. AES rely on voluntary, contract-based 
participation, and compensate farmers from public budgets for their losses in productivity resulting 
from the uptake of environmentally supportive management practices (Lockie, 2013).  
                                                          
1 Additionally, suasive or instructional attempts can be used to guide actors’ behaviour (McCann and Easter, 
1999; Pascual and Perrings, 2007). 
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However, given limited public budgets, AES are frequently subject to efficiency concerns (e.g. 
(Bonnieux and Dupraz, 1999; Wätzold and Schwerdtner, 2005). A scheme is considered to be efficient 
if it delivers a (comparative) maximum of a desired outcome at a given level of cost or provides a 
predefined level of outcome at lowest cost (Bonnieux and Dupraz, 1999). 
To properly assess AES-related costs, not only the payments to farmers but also transaction costs 
(TCs) have to be taken into account (Falconer and Whitby, 1999). TCs are defined as “scheme 
organisational costs” (Falconer et al., 2001, p.84) and occur for both administrative agencies (public 
TCs) and farmers (private TCs) (Falconer and Whitby, 1999). On the public side, they depict “costs of 
setting up and running the organizational and contractual structure” of a scheme (Beckmann et al., 
2009, p.694); on the private side, they result from time and money spent by farmers on (extra) tasks 
conducted in order to participate (Falconer and Whitby, 1999).  
Empirical evidence revealed that both public and private AES-related TCs are non-trivial in 
magnitude but vary greatly between different AES
2
. Moreover, privately incurred TCs may hamper 
farmers’ participation (Falconer, 2000; Peerlings and Polman, 2004). Thus, reducing participation-
related TCs by redesigning scheme regulations or even via public reimbursement is being discussed 
(Falconer 2002; European Council, 2005). On the public side, given a general decline in public 
budgets, possibilities to reduce public costs are of major interest. 
Previous research has already explained differences between AES-related TCs with the help of 
actor- and scheme-related factors, the natural environment in which the scheme is designed to act, and 
the institutional environment in which the scheme is designed and implemented (Mettepenningen et 
al., 2009). However, these studies focus on inter-scheme differences in TCs and leave intra-scheme 
variances, although acknowledged (e.g. Mettepenningen et al., 2009), mostly unexplored. Nonetheless, 
understanding reasons for intra-scheme variances in public and private TC is crucial for designing 
AES, hopefully able to achieve efficiency gains on micro-levels. Moreover, prevailing TCs seem to 
depend strongly on the institutional design of a policy (Paavola, 2007; Vatn, 2009). The majority of 
German AES is implemented within the framework of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD), which is a part of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP, Thomas et al., 
2009). Nevertheless, its impact on upcoming TCs has not been investigated despite the fact that an 
influence has been recognised (Coggan et al., 2010; Mettepenningen et al., 2011)
3
. Understanding the 
influence of the CAP framework on regional TCs is also needed in order to assess and eventually 
improve the TC efficiency of AES. Against this background, this thesis aims to explain intra-scheme 
variances in magnitude and composition of public as well as private TCs of an action-oriented AES
4
 
within the regulatory framework of the CAP. To do so, the articles constituting this thesis address 
                                                          
2
A general literature overview on previous findings is provided in section 2.2.3; details are presented in the 
articles. 
3
 Fährmann and Grajewski (2013) assess administrative costs for implementing EU cofinanced measures aimed 
to foster rural development; however, their analysis provides only broad descriptive results. 
4
 Contrary to result-oriented schemes, where farmers are rewarded when specified environmental outcomes 
actually occur, payments in action oriented schemes are granted upon the adoption of specified agricultural 
practices presumed to provide environmental benefits (Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010). 
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different aspects of private and public TCs incurred in a Hessian AES aimed at securing site-specific 
grassland extensification. This case study allows addressing the topic from various angles and thus 
provides in-depth insights (Yin, 2009). Moreover, this approach allows the exploration of 
interdependencies between public and private TCs, which also goes beyond previous studies. In 
particular, the thesis investigates 
 Reasons for differences in private TCs (Article 1, see chapter 5) 
 Influences of the CAP/EAFRD regulations on public TCs and resulting spillovers onto 
private TCs (Article 2, see chapter 6), 
 Differences in local public TCs (Article 3, see chapter 7). 
Overall, the results reveal that a) the EAFRD regulations set the framework for AES design and 
implementation and thus influence the magnitude of both public and private TCs, b) the EAFRD 
causes allocative and distributive effects on both public and private TCs in Hesse and thus affects TC 
composition and incidence, and finally c) the degree of this impact varies subject to foremost actor-
related factors, which d) provides an explanation for intra-scheme TC variances. By this, the results of 
the thesis add to scientific knowledge by complementing and extending existing findings. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis is grounded in New Institutional Economics
5
, and the 
main methodological approach is deductive – empirical. The case study location and scheme were 
chosen for two reasons. First, the State of Hesse has undergone a decrease in its budget for AES in 
recent years due to changes in political priorities, which increased utilising funding possibilities 
offered by the CAP (HMULV, 2006). As a result, in the current funding period 2007-2013, six of 
seven AES are implemented with the help of EU co-funding, which implies compliance with the 
EAFRD funding regulations. This influences the operational framework of the Hessian agricultural 
administration and resulting TCs
6
. Second, the scheme itself was chosen because it is the most 
important AES in Hesse with respect to budget and intended participation (HMULV, 2006). Hesse 
holds a high number of environmental valuable grassland habitats
7
 currently protected by the EU 
Habitats’ Directive and shall be maintained or restored by voluntary AES participation (Kuprian, 
2006; HMULV 2006; 2007). This draws the focus on participation-related TCs. 
However, since this is an individual research project, the thesis is subject to some limitations: 
First, the scope of the study was limited by the time-consuming necessity of obtaining primary data. 
Second, the focus is on the (transaction) cost-side of the scheme, and the environmental outcome of 
the scheme is taken as fixed. Third, the articles analyse TCs of a given structural and political setting, 
and thus depict static TCs (Garrick et al., 2013, p. 198), ignoring dynamic effects. As a consequence 
of these limitations, the study does not provide a comprehensive efficiency analysis but investigates 
differences in the TCs incurred by the main actors. Therefore, the results remain explorative, and 
should be corroborated by subsequent comparative research.   
                                                          
5
 See chapter 2 for a detailed depiction of the concepts underlying the particular analyses. 
6
 See chapter 6 and 7. 
7
 See chapter 3 for a broad description of the study area and references. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
This chapter complements the literature overviews in the articles. It provides an overview on the 
theoretical concepts in which the articles are settled and depicts the field of research. In the first 
subsection, TCs are defined and their sources are highlighted. I discuss two strands of theory – namely 
Transaction Costs Economics and Principal-Agency Theory –which investigate TCs but differ in their 
focus of analysis as well as in some of their assumptions. In the second subsection, AES (as one mode 
to govern particular nature-related transactions) are introduced. I describe specificities of nature-
related transactions, and discuss literature investigating AES-related TCs. This chapter deals with 
general aspects; more detailed depictions of previous results can be found in the particular articles. 
2.1 Transaction costs as costs of exchange 
2.1.1 Information deficiencies, contractual hazards and transaction costs 
Economic exchange or transaction is a fundamental activity to allocate resources according to the 
preferences of the actors involved. While neoclassical economics perceives such an exchange to be 
without cost due to the condition of perfect information (Dahlman, 1979). Coase (1937, in his seminal 
article) withdraws the assumption of perfect information and describes the existence of transaction 
costs (TCs). In particular, transacting induces the following: 
 Information costs to identify trading opportunities and suitable partners, 
 Negotiation costs to specify the agreements of exchange, 
 Monitoring and enforcement costs to safeguard the transaction’s outcome (Dahlman, 
1979). 
Broadly defined, TCs are the “costs of running the economic system” (Arrow, 1969, p.1). 
Niehans (1971) defines them as costs that arise from the transfer of a good from one agent to another, 
apart from production costs. While production costs “depend only on the technology and tastes” 
(Arrow, 1969, p. 14), TCs vary due to changes in the mode of resource allocation (Arrow, 1969). 
Which TCs arise and at which magnitude depends on the nature of the good and the mode of exchange 
that governs a particular transaction (Williamson, 1998a). 
Technically, TCs depict “resource losses due to imperfect information” (Dahlman, 1979, p. 148). 
Imperfect information and resulting uncertainty give way to contractual hazards, such as opportunistic 
behaviour, measurement problems or changing conditions over time which affect the transactional 
relationship (Williamson, 1979; 1998a). TCs result from those actions transactors undertake to manage 
these deficiencies (Coggan et al., 2010). TCs are one of the main research objects of New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), an economics’ research area that deals with the function of institutions in economic 
exchange (see also Furubotn and Richter, 2008). According to NIE, institutions are formalised and 
non-formalised rules of behaviour which structure the economic, social and political behaviour of 
people and thereby reduce the uncertainty surrounding (economic) interactions and resulting 
Theoretical Framework 
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contractual hazards (North, 1990). These institutions facilitate or even enable exchange by affecting 
the relative price (the TCs) of the exchange itself (North, 1990). 
According to Williamson (1998a; 2000), institutions work at four hierarchical levels, where the 
higher level imposes constraints on the level immediately below. He labels them (from macro to micro 
level perspective) social embeddedness, institutional environment, particular institutional 
arrangements (governance structures) and incentive alignment. The three lower levels especially are 
the subject of particular new institutional economics’ concepts8. 
Norms, customs, religions, traditions, etc. are located at the social embeddedness level 
(Williamson, 1998a; 2000). 
The institutional environment consists of the legal, social and political rules that determine the 
context in which any economic activity takes place (Williamson, 1998a; 2000). By that, the 
institutional environment constitutes the ‘rules of the game’ – that is, it limits the choice of 
possibilities (Pascual and Perrings, 2007) - within which the single governance structures operate 
(Williamson, 1998a). This comprises specification and allocation of property rights (Demsetz, 1967) 
as well as those possibilities and rights that enable their legal enforcement (Williamson, 1998a). This 
(initial) assignment of rights to resources also influences their (latter) allocation due to the costs of 
their exchange (Coase, 1960; Paavola, 2007). An example is the EAFRD regulations to co-finance 
regional AES, which will be investigated in the course of this thesis.  
Institutional arrangements - also denoted as governance structures or governance arrangements
9
 
(see Hagedorn, 2008) – depict (discrete) supporting structures for particular transactions (Williamson, 
1998a). They aim to economise exchange in the presence of contractual hazards and resulting TCs 
(Paavola and Adger, 2005; Vatn, 2009). Institutional arrangements are at the analytical focus of 
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE). AES denote such a particular institutional arrangement. 
The lowest level deals with aligning incentives between single economic actors and investigates 
the efficiency of contractual relationships established within a particular institutional arrangement 
(Williamson 1998a). This is the focus of Agency Theory (also known as principal-agency [PA-] 
theory or theory of incentives
10
 (Sappington, 1991). PA-theory focuses on contract design to guide the 
actors’ behaviour efficiently within the transactional relationship in the presence of particular 
contractual hazards. TCs arise to assess, monitor and/or measure the actors’ performance in a 
particular contract-based transaction (Williamson, 1998a; Barzel, 2005) and are also denoted as 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Erlei et al., 2007). Such PA-relationships exist e.g. between 
the EU and the Hessian administration and between the administration and the participating farmers
11
. 
To sum up, the top two levels explore institutions ruling the possibilities of exchange in general; 
the bottom two levels investigate institutions that govern actual transactional relationships. Since the 
                                                          
8 These are property rights theory, TCE and principal-agent theory (Furubotn and Richter, 2008). 
9
 Note that these terms are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
10
 Note that these terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
11
 See article 2 in chapter 6. 
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focus of this thesis is on the latter, the research articles apply analytical concepts derived from TCE 
and PA- theory. Their general features are briefly presented and discussed in the next pages. An 
application to nature-related transactions follows in section 2.2. 
2.1.2 Theoretical approaches to investigate transaction costs 
2.1.2.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
TCE provides a framework to identify institutional arrangements that mitigate contractual hazards 
of particular transactions at minimum TCs (Picot, 1991; Williamson, 1998a; Ménard, 2004; Hagedorn, 
2008; Garrick et al., 2013). Such institutional arrangements range along an axis between the polar 
cases market and hierarchy and differ in TCs and coordination mechanisms (Williamson, 1979; 1985; 
1998b): While markets rely merely on prices as a coordination mechanism; hierarchies use command 
–and-control instruments and thus encompass a wider range of incentivising, monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms (Picot, 1991; Williamson, 1998b). TCE uses comparative efficiency as 
efficiency criterion; for each transaction, specified by its characteristics, an optimum arrangement 
exists that minimises upcoming TCs and is thus comparatively efficient (Garrick et al., 2013). This 
implies that TCs do not decrease to zero. The basic unit of analysis is a (single) transaction, which 
takes place “when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface” 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 1). Its characteristics – expressed as specifications of the dimensions 
uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity – as well as the behaviour of the actors involved constitute 
specific contractual hazards (Williamson, 1979; 1985; 1998b).  
Uncertainty refers to any disturbances to which a transaction might be exposed (Williamson, 
2000). It encompasses future states of the environment (i.e. any external present of future impacts on 
the contractual outcome), difficulties in observing and measuring the contractual outcome (or even to 
specify it at all), and the actors’ behaviour (Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck, 2009; Coggan et 
al., 2010). As a consequence, only incomplete contracts can be set up, and TCs may come up due to 
later (re-)specification, re-negotiation, and enforcement of the contractual outcome (Williamson, 
1998b). In the presence of renegotiation, TCE also investigates adaptation possibilities of an 
institutional arrangement with respect to later adjustments (Brousseau and Fares, 2000). 
Gaps in contracts also affect the degree of uncertainty about the actors’ behaviour (Williamson, 
1979; 1998b). This comprises both bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1985). 
Bounded rationality acknowledges that people are rational but limited in their ability to foresee all 
contingencies that may arise (Simon, 1957). Thus, collecting and analysing information before, during 
and after transaction decisions are made is costly in terms of time and resources; this is also a reason 
to leave incomplete contracts to future specification (Williamson, 1998a; Leiblein, 2003). 
Opportunism suggests that economic actors act self-interested with guile (Williamson, 1979; 
Leiblein, 2003). Such behaviour is facilitated when contracted actions cannot easily be observed and 
high uncertainty about actions and outcomes exists (Coggan et al., 2010). Leeways for opportunistic 
Theoretical Framework 
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behaviour also increase TCs for monitoring. 
On the contrary, frequent transacting induces learning effects on price, quality, and behaviour of 
the trading partners and thus reduces TCs (Coggan et al., 2010; McCann, 2013). Consequently, 
recurring transactions between the same parties reduce marginal TCs due to reduced efforts for 
information and negotiation (Coggan et al., 2010). 
The last and most important characteristic is the specificity of assets needed to generate the 
transactional good (Williamson, 1998a). It is defined by the asset’s applicability in alternative 
purposes and may take a variety of forms – physical assets, human assets, site specificity, dedicated 
assets, brand name capital, and temporal specificity (Williamson, 1979; 1998a). Asset specificity is 
often a result of a prior investment (Coggan et al., 2010). High asset specificity gives rise to a 
condition of bilateral dependency; what may have been a large numbers supply condition before 
contracting gets transformed into a small numbers exchange relation thereafter (Williamson, 1998a). 
As a consequence, contractual hazards emerge; lacking alternative utilisations, the investing partner is 
locked-in (Williamson, 1979; Leiblein, 2003). The other partner may renegotiate the contract terms to 
attain a quasi-rent (hold-up) (Leiblein, 2003). Therefore, the investing partner seeks to devise 
safeguards to protect his investment (Williamson, 1998a). Such safeguards comprise credible inter-
firm commitment options, such as adding penalties into the contract, providing additional information 
disclosure, or agreeing on modes for conflict settlement. To take transactions out of the market and 
organise them within a form of hierarchy is another safeguard (Williamson, 1998a). The higher the 
degree of asset specificity, the more likely a transaction is governed by hybrid forms or hierarchies 
(Williamson, 1998a; Ménard, 2004). Such an arrangement may even enable such transactions in the 
first place (Falconer and Whitby, 1999; Leiblein, 2003).  
The more contractual hazards there are to mitigate in a particular transaction, the more important 
contract design becomes. Such design aspects are the subject of PA -theory, which is depicted in the 
next subsection. 
2.1.2.2 Principal-Agent-Theory 
PA theory focuses on the relationship between the contractors – constituted by a delegation of 
tasks and inherent information asymmetry- as the main source of contractual hazards. By merely 
addressing the contractual relationship between actors, this approach is in principle applicable on any 
governance structure (Slangen and Polman, 2002).  
The PA-setting is as follows: a customer (principal) delegates a specified task to a contractor 
(agent) in return for a payment compensating the agent’s effort or (opportunity) costs (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993). One basic assumption is that both principal and agent are self-interested, rational 
actors
12
 and aim to maximise their individual utility; however, their particular objective functions 
differ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Slangen, 1997). TCs arise as agency costs or costs of delegation 
(see also Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Tirole, 1994; Barzel, 2005; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). 
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Agency costs aim to reduce losses stemming from this preference divergence and comprise monitoring 
expenditures of the principal, which include any expenses to guide the agent’s behaviour, bonding 
expenditures by the agent (i.e., expenses to ensure/guarantee compliance or some form of credible 
commitment on the side of the agent), and the residual loss, which depicts the principal’s welfare 
reduction (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
13
. 
Trade-off relationships may exist between these TCs; residual losses might be lowered by 
monitoring; monitoring might be reduced by credible commitment (Picot, 1991). Thus, contract design 
also encompasses distributional decisions on who incurs these costs. 
The central concern of PA -theory is contract design: contracts shall minimise agency costs in the 
presence of uncertainty, the agents’ attitude to risk and asymmetric information (Sappington, 1991). 
In PA-theory, uncertainty denotes that the contractual outcome not only depends on the agent’s 
effort, but also on some random (external) productivity parameters, such as weather conditions in 
agriculture (Sappington, 1991). Contrary to the notion of uncertainty in TCE, the distribution of this 
random parameter is usually known (Erlei et al., 2007). 
The second feature is the agents’ attitude to risk. Agents are supposed to be risk-averse, which 
means they value a fixed value higher than an uncertain one whose weighted average yields exactly 
the same value (Slangen, 1997). Risk aversion implies that an agent would not bear the whole 
production risk in case of uncertainty, that is, he would not accept a contract which links remuneration 
only to the output (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005).  
The third feature is information asymmetry, which results from delegation per se. The agent is 
supposed to have private (hidden) information on both his ability to perform the task and on the effort 
he is willing to execute (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). Moreover, the principal cannot completely 
observe the actions of the agent (formally: the agent’s effort to fulfil the delegated tasks, Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993). This might induce the agent to behave opportunistically prior to or after concluding the 
contract (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Prior to contracting, the agent may claim that his capabilities and 
opportunity cost are higher than they actually are. This problem is labelled adverse selection, as the 
principal faces the risk to mandate an improper or comparatively expensive agent (Laffont and Tirole, 
1993).  
After contracting - given imperfect observability and an uncertain outcome - the agent may claim 
that exogenous circumstances hampered task fulfilment despite his own decision not to comply. This 
is labelled hidden action or moral hazard (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Heinrich and Marschke, 2010). 
Adverse selection can be reduced via screening or signalling measures
14
 aiming to identify agents’ 
capability and opportunity costs, and to design proper contracts at the expense of TCs (Slangen, 1997; 
Ferraro, 2008). Screening and signalling measures encompass information collection, offering a menu 
of contracts or allocating task delegation through procurement auctions (Ferraro, 2008). 
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 Screening refers to measures where the uninformed party (the principal) acts first; signaling refers to measures 
where the informed party (the agent) acts first (Fraser, 1995). 
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Moral hazard can be reduced in basically two ways: first, by offering a (monetary) incentive to 
the agent; e.g. a share of the residual gain of the principal. However, offering an incentive component 
requires the existence of a residual gain that can be distributed (Moe, 1984). Moreover, the power of 
such an incentive may be limited due to output uncertainty and the risk attitude of the agent. This 
gives way to the second option, which is to mitigate the moral hazard by monitoring or measuring the 
agent’s performance (Sappington, 1991; Heinrich and Marschke, 2010). Monitoring comprises legal 
and technical oversight, defining standards, or prescribing structural and procedural requirements 
(Moe, 1991). However, the applicability of particular monitoring instruments depends on the 
measurability of the output (Huber and Shipan, 2000; Heinrich and Marschke, 2010).  
In light of these features, contract design aims to define payment schedules that provide an 
optimal trade-off between the benefits of risk sharing and the costs of providing an incentive to the 
agent (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Slangen, 1997). Thus, if possible, payment schedules should 
encompass an incentive component to motivate the agent to exert effort, and a fixed wage component 
as risk compensation (Furubotn and Richter, 2008). Furthermore
15
, contracts may specify additional 
built-in mechanisms such as screening/signalling and monitoring measures to meet hazards that cannot 
be eliminated by the payment schedule (see also Ozanne et al., 2001). 
As mentioned above, PA-theory assumes that both the distribution of the random output 
parameter and the agent’s attitude towards risk are known (Erlei et al., 2007). Consequently, and 
contrary to TCE, contracts in PA -theory are assumed to be complete, although suboptimal (Erlei et 
al., 2007). TCs are of concern when weighing the costs to establish safeguards to avoid or reduce 
adverse selection and moral hazard against the welfare losses which arise without safeguards. Thus, 
also in PA-theory, TCs do not decrease to zero. 
2.1.3 Concluding remarks 
TCE and PA theory provide important insights on how to organise transactional relationships in 
the presence of TCs and are perceived as complementary theories (Picot, 1991; Erlei et al., 2007). An 
important insight in both concepts is that TCs can be minimised but never decease to zero. Yet, the 
differences between both concepts, namely the notion of uncertainty in TCE vs. the acknowledgement 
of risk in PA theory and the perception of contractual design (complete vs. incomplete) led to rather 
discrete applications in research (Williamson, 1998a; Erlei et al., 2007). Moreover, the concepts differ 
in their degree of formalisation; while TCE is a non-formalised approach; PA-theory usually uses 
mathematical modelling (Erlei et al., 2007). 
In the following, AES as institutional arrangement to govern the provision of environmental 
goods are introduced. Prior to this, specificities of nature-related goods and resulting contractual 
hazards are briefly discussed, in the light of TCE and PA-theory. Finally, a literature review presents 
previous findings on AES-related TCs. 
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2.2 AES as institutional arrangements to govern nature-related transactions 
AES shall foster the provision of public goods on private property
16
 (Slangen and Polman, 2002; 
Smits et al., 2008) and are an example of the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle (Lockie, 2013). Based on a – 
usually multi-annual – contractual agreement between farmers and the agricultural administration, 
farmers agree on changes in land use towards environmentally friendly practices in return for a 
financial compensation for their loss of productivity (Lockie, 2013). From a NIE perspective, AES are 
a long-term contractual relationship, which is an intermediate between market and hierarchy (Ménard, 
2004). 
Following TCE, any arrangement aims to minimise those TCs necessary to mitigate contractual 
hazards. These, in turn, depend on the properties of the transaction governed by an AES as well as the 
behaviour of the actors involved. These properties are discussed in the next subsections. 
2.2.1 Attributes of nature-related transactions and resulting contractual hazards 
Depending on the good in question, nature-related transactions incur different specifications of 
uncertainty, specificity, and frequency (e.g. Falconer and Whitby, 1999; Rørstad et al., 2007):  
The degree of uncertainty depends on external conditions, the impossibility to foresee future 
states of nature, and other informational limits. 
Agricultural output is subject to stochastic environmental conditions such as the weather, which 
makes environmental good provision generally subject to uncertainty (Falconer and Whitby, 1999; 
Birner and Wittmer, 2004). Uncertainty also arises from difficulties in observing and measuring the 
good in question; therefore, its quality may be difficult to assess, which hampers assessing the actual 
value of an environmental good (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1998; Falconer and 
Whitby, 1999; McCann, 2013). Moreover, some environmental outcomes occur time-lagged (Falconer 
and Whitby, 1999; McCann, 2013) or lack separability and thus accountability (Hagedorn, 2008; 
McCann, 2013).  
Uncertainty is also influenced by the scope of an environmental impact, which may occur at 
local, regional, or global levels (Birner and Wittmer, 2004; McCann, 2013), including the spatial 
scope of externality denoted by the degree to which producer/polluter and beneficiary/damaged 
deviate. This also may reduce accountability needed to properly assess and reward an environmental 
impact. 
Uncertainty also arises from limits in knowledge on input-output relationships (e.g. the efficacy 
of actions), such as to what degree a specific practice actually harms or benefits nature (Hagedorn et 
al., 2002; Hagedorn, 2008). In principle, this accounts for both the administration and farmer.  
Asset specificity in the context of AES primarily refers to specificity in physical assets of the 
production sites (Slangen and Polman, 2002; Birner and Wittmer, 2004; McCann, 2013). 
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Agriculturally used sites are heterogeneous to a large degree; no two sites are identical (Falconer and 
Whitby, 1999; McCann, 2013). This implies that values of the environmental goods may vary widely 
between different types of sites – e.g. cropland, pastures, or field element objects (Hasund, 2013). 
Moreover, its particular location or management practices may affect the quality of a specific type and 
may induce within-type variances in quality (Rørstad et al., 2007). Site-specificity also encompasses 
the location of valuable assets, such as rare species, suitability for special purposes (e.g. creating a 
connected habitat), or when particular inputs create specific conditions for one species but not for 
another (Coggan et al., 2010). In TCE terminology, site specificity denotes a specific investment, as it 
often is an effect of prior land use decisions (Slangen and Polman, 2002). The site-specific grassland 
extensification scheme in Hesse, for example, explicitly aims at pertaining specific grassland habitats 
that have emerged due to extensified land use (see section 3.1.3). Finally, specificity may also refer to 
human resources, for example when farmers gained specific knowledge on environmentally friendly 
land use due to specific training or learning by doing and experience (Birner and Wittmer, 2004).  
Frequency can be distinguished in frequency of ‘nature production’ and frequency of contracting. 
Frequency of nature-production may vary from single resource utilisation, e.g. conversion of arable 
land into grassland, to recurring (seasonal) utilisation patterns, such as pertaining extensive grassland 
(Hagedorn et al., 2002). The frequency of contracting refers to the duration of scheme participation; 
that is, in what time-spans contracting recurs (Falconer et al. 2002).  
The particular specification of these dimensions when providing a specific environmental good 
induces a number of contractual hazards to be governed within the transactional arrangement.  
Site-specificity induces bilateral dependency and may foster opportunism; site-specificity affects 
the quality of an environmental good and the related production costs. Different costs on different sites 
require TCs to identify suitable farmers and to calculate adequate payments, a situation subject to 
adverse selection (Falconer and Whitby, 1999; Ferraro, 2008). Moreover, site-specificity offers an 
opportunity for a hold-up situation. The agricultural administration as a representative for the societal 
demand is in need of ensuring the provision of the desired environmental good (Höft, 2011) and 
depends on (compliant) participation of the farmer
17
.  
Besides a general production risk due to external conditions, uncertainty induces measurement 
and adaptation problems and may foster opportunistic behaviour.  
Lacking knowledge about the efficacy of actions may affect actors’ behaviour by influencing 
farmers’ decisions towards nature-harming practices (Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck, 2009). 
Furthermore, farmers might not be aware of the effects of their management decisions in the case of 
spatial externality. In TCE’s terms, these depict examples for bounded rationality. On the side of the 
administration, a lack of knowledge may lead to the misspecification of schemes. Thus, providing and 
obtaining knowledge, for example in form of agricultural extension services, might be crucial but at 
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the same time denotes TCs (Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck, 2009; Mettepenningen et al., 
2011). 
Lacking observability and measurability requires specifying the contractual outcome via proxy 
indicators (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1998). However, indicators’ accuracy of 
inferences on environmental benefits vary, which affects TCs in terms of monitoring costs and welfare 
losses due to misspecifications (Choe and Fraser, 1999; Zabel and Roe, 2009). The same holds for 
monitoring techniques, which might be imperfect (Choe and Fraser, 1999). Moreover, attempts to 
reduce one uncertainty aspect may increase another; an example is to agree on management practices 
for a defined scope of hectares (so called action-based, area related AES, see Matzdorf and Lorenz, 
2010). Such contracts reduce uncertainty to specify the contractual outcome and mitigate the 
production risk for farmers. However, they increase uncertainty that the aspired environmental 
outcome actually occurs (Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010). 
Lacking observability, measurability, and accountability may also foster opportunistic behaviour 
in terms of moral hazard (Coggan et al., 2010). From an economic point of view, whether a farmer 
behaves opportunistically depends on a cost-benefit reasoning on the gains and costs of (non-) 
compliance (Becker, 1968; Falconer and Whitby, 1999). A precondition is that non-compliance can be 
tracked, which, in turn, is subject to frequency and depth in monitoring (Osterburg, 2008) as well as 
the suitability of the indicators monitored and the monitoring techniques used
18
.  
Opportunistic behaviour is also subject to a number of societal and institutional factors; the 
general legitimacy of actions in the light of social, cultural or legal norms (Hagedorn et al., 2002; 
Krutilla and Krause, 2010), values, beliefs and attitudes of actors (Siebert et al., 2006), the degree to 
which actors/stakeholders are involved in decision making and implementation activities (Beckmann 
et al., 2009) and their social environment and embeddedness (Winter and May, 2001; Pascual and 
Perrings, 2007) tend to foster compliance. Moreover, frequent recurrence of (trans-) actions can reduce 
uncertainty in efficacy and behaviour. Therefore, marginal TCs across all transactions tend to decrease 
due to reduced effort for information and search when transactions between the same parties are 
recurring (Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck, 2009; Rorstad et al., 2007; Coggan et al., 2010). 
This subject is addressed in the discussion on the duration of AES (see also Falconer and Whitby, 
1999). 
Finally, an important aspect associated is the degree to which a contract is subject to adaptation 
possibilities or flexibility; specified agreements reduce uncertainty by specifying the contractual 
outcome, yet at the cost of potential misspecification or reduced adaptation possibilities (Falconer et 
al., 2001), while general agreements rather offer leeways to fill in contractual gaps via re-negotiation.  
To sum up, the features of nature-related goods induce a number of contractual hazards, such as 
difficulties to claim gains from nature production or related investments, leeways for opportunistic 
behaviour, a general production risk, and measurement problems.  
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AES design aims to mitigate such contractual hazards; however, as argued above, contractual 
solutions tend to be incomplete and may even induce trade-offs between different hazards. As an 
example, payments may be granted upon particular environmental results, which reduces opportunism 
but at the same time increases the production risk and thus uncertainty for farmers. Thus, AES design 
may take only part of the hazards into account while ignoring others. In consequence, AES design 
features vary widely
19
.  
A number of theoretical and empirical works investigated AES-related TCs conceptualised as a 
consequence of both differences in contractual design and the environmental good to be provided. 
While theoretical works use principal-agent-based approaches, empirical work is settled in TCE. The 
next subsection presents the existent literature according to their theoretical foundation. 
2.2.2 Transaction costs in agri-environmental schemes 
2.2.2.1 Analytical work based on Agency Theory  
PA-based studies focus on the possibilities of contract design to mitigate contractual hazards 
coming up from information asymmetry and thereby reduce transaction costs. The neoclassical ideal 
serves as a benchmark. Using mostly formal modelling with numerical examples, these studies 
develop ‘second-best solutions’, which minimise upcoming welfare losses (and denote TCs, see 
section 2.1). In contrast to TCE based studies, PA-related studies do not investigate TC magnitudes 
empirically. 
AES participation is perceived as PA-relationship with the administration as the principal and the 
participating farmer as the agent (Slangen, 1997). Information asymmetry stems from the 
heterogeneity of farms and farmers, which influences both their production costs for the environmental 
good and their likeliness to comply with the contract agreements (Slangen, 1997). PA-based studies 
investigate contractual solutions for reducing opportunistic behaviour in the form of adverse selection 
and moral hazard in the presence of risk-aversion, production uncertainty, and measurement 
problems.  
In the context of AES, adverse selection means that a farmer can realise information rents by 
claiming his opportunity costs are higher than they actually are and obtaining a higher payment, which 
induces welfare losses (Slangen, 1997). Moral hazard occurs because the administration cannot 
completely monitor the farmers’ compliance with the contract. Given uncertainty in agricultural 
production, the farmer may claim exogenous circumstances hampering contract fulfilment despite his 
own decision not to comply. In the case of prearranged payments, the farmer generates an extra rent 
due to the difference of his costs (effort) and the level of payment (Slangen, 1997). This also results in 
welfare losses. 
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Studies addressing adverse selection focus on the trade-off between welfare losses due to costs 
for establishing individual contracts vs. the costs for overcompensating farmers in the case of 
standardised contracts (see also Moxey et al., 1999). The analyses model various instruments with 
respect to their capability to reduce adverse selection. Slangen (1997) and Moxey et al. (1999) use 
two- type models with efficient and inefficient farmers and suggest offering different types of 
contracts for these types of farmers (‘screening’). Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1998) 
analyse potential benefits and possible drawbacks of auctions as a self-revealing mechanism. Canton 
et al. (2009) focus on the possibility to reduce adverse selection via spatial targeting of an AES.  
In a non-formal approach, Ferraro (2008) discusses and compares these different instruments, 
namely obtaining information on observable landholder attributes (so called ‘costly-to-fake signals’), 
offering menus of contracts (‘screening’) and procurement auctions. He finds these approaches to vary 
substantially in institutional, informational and technical complexity; nevertheless, the more complex 
approaches screening contracts and auctions are at least theoretically more capable of reducing 
informational rents compared to obtaining costly-to-fake signals
20
.  
Studies investigating moral hazard focus on the trade-off between arising monitoring costs and 
costs (losses of environmental benefit) due to farmers lacking compliance, given that the contract 
cannot fully rely on the use of incentives, as uncertainty prevails (Ozanne et al., 2001, see also section 
2.1.2.2). Farmers’ willingness to comply is perceived as a rational decision from weighing the gains 
against the costs of (non-)compliance (Becker 1968; Ozanne et al., 2001). Reasons for differences in 
compliance are traced back to farm and farmer attributes. The resulting models show a positive 
relationship between compliance and 
- Farmers’ degree of risk aversion (Ozanne et al., 2001), 
- Additional production uncertainty (Fraser, 2002; 2012), 
- Lower compliance costs (Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 2005) and 
- The duration of scheme participation (Fraser, 2012). 
Accordingly, the models suggest that these aspects should be taken into account in AES contract 
design in order to reduce TCs. Yano and Blandford (2011) find these results persist in the presence of 
production uncertainty due to a change/restriction in input use (e.g. pesticides) with a risk-reducing or 
risk-neutral impact on production (output); however, if the input restriction increases the production 
risk, the positive impact of risk aversion on compliance is reduced to a minimum. 
These studies investigate incomplete monitoring (see section 2.2.2.1)
21
, and, by definition, only 
“true“ detections are stated (Choe and Fraser, 1998). In contrast, imperfect monitoring acknowledges 
the existence of erroneous inspection results. Such imperfect monitoring is only addressed by Choe 
and Fraser (1998, 1999). They show that less accurate monitoring increases the social costs and thus 
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 Incomplete monitoring means that not every defection is detected, e.g. due to partial monitoring (Choe and 
Fraser, 1998). 
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lowers the net benefits of scheme implementation due to the costs incurred to correct the failures and 
due to a compensatory payment for farmers as they bear a risk of being mis-detected. As will be 
discussed in the course of this thesis (especially in article 2, see chapter 6), imperfect monitoring is 
actually occurring during scheme implementation, however, rarely addressed in theory. 
2.2.2.2 TCE-based analyses 
According to its focus on comparative efficiency, studies rooted in TCE focus on inter-scheme 
differences in magnitude and composition of private TCs (Falconer, 2000; Falconer and Saunders, 
2002; Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck, 2009; Mettepenningen et al., 2009), public TCs 
(Falconer et al., 2001; Nilsson, 2009; Ollikainen et al., 2008, Mettepenningen et al., 2011), or both 
(Falconer and Whitby, 1999; Rørstad et al., 2007) in order to assess TCs and to identify their drivers to 
improve policy design. Upcoming TCs are distinguished in categories along the transaction process, 
i.e. information, negotiation, and monitoring and enforcement costs, and mostly assessed as 
(monetised) working time (McCann et al., 2005) All studies have in common that they assess TCs 
comparatively and not against the neoclassical ideal of zero transaction costs. 
Their overall approach bases applications of the TCE concept on nature-related transactions as 
depicted in section 2.2.1. Influences on TCs are foremost sought in different aspects of heterogeneity, 
grouped into scheme- and actor related factors, as well as features of the natural and institutional 
environment in which the scheme is implemented (for an overview, see Mettepenningen and van 
Huylenbroeck, 2009). The main overall findings are  
- The existence of fixed and variable TC components which allow generating economies of 
scale foremost in whole-farm approaches (Falconer, 2000), and 
- The existence of learning effects that reduce relative TCs over time for both farmers and the 
administration in the course of scheme implementation (Falconer, 2000; Falconer et al., 
2001). 
Another important result – and in line with TCE - is a positive relationship between TCs and 
scheme specificity (Falconer et al., 2001; Falconer and Saunders, 2002; Rørstad et al., 2007; 
Ollikainen et al., 2008), resulting from higher informational needs to meet the heterogeneity of sites 
and/or farmers. 
In consequence, trade-offs emerge in scheme design between TC efficiency and (environmental) 
scheme precision (Vatn, 2002); moreover, the results highlight the role of (costly) information 
provision for farmers for scheme success (Falconer, 2000; Mettepenningen et al., 2009).  
Further studies assess the comparative advantage of AES as voluntary agreements opposite to 
regulatory approaches in terms of upcoming (public) TCs (Kersten, 2004; Jongeneel et al., 2012). 
Additionally, some studies theoretically and empirically discuss the comparative efficiency (due to 
reduced TCs) of alternative institutional arrangements within particular AES, such as cooperative 
arrangements (Slangen and Polman, 2002; Polman and Slangen, 2002), whole-farm approaches 
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(Falconer, 2000) or auction-based contracts (Groth, 2007). 
In contrast to the - rather formally rigid - PA-approaches, TCE based studies encompass a wider 
range of influencing factors; attributes such as a positive attitude towards nature conservation, 
experience or a common ideology between the transacting parties are discussed to reduce opportunistic 
behaviour, and thus TCs (Falconer, 2002; Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck, 2009; Coggan et 
al., 2010).  
These studies focus on inter-scheme differences in TCs and leave intra-scheme variances - 
although acknowledged (e.g. Mettepenningen et al., 2009) - mostly unexplored. Moreover, the results 
obtained so far are – although highlighting the main influences – far from providing a comprehensive 
picture. However, understanding factors affecting intra-scheme variances in public and private TC is 
crucial for assessing and eventually improving the TC efficiency of AES. Moreover, prevailing TCs 
strongly depend on the institutional design of a policy (Paavola, 2007; Vatn, 2009). The majority of 
German AES is implemented within the CAP framework (Thomas et al. 2009); however, its influence 
on upcoming TCs has not been investigated despite a recognised influence (Coggan et al., 2010; 
Mettepenningen et al., 2011). Understanding the influence of the EAFRD framework on regional TCs 
is also needed in order to assess and eventually improve AES. 
2.2.3 Concluding remarks 
This section provided an introduction in the field of research by discussing the theoretical 
background and presenting the relevant literature. The review reveals that the empirical focus is on 
inter-scheme variances; intra- scheme variances are not thoroughly addressed. Moreover, the studies 
only investigate the relationship between the (local) administration and the farmer; influences related 
to the institutional environment, namely the embedding in the CAP, remained ignored. Nonetheless, 
these findings provide the scope to construct the conceptual frameworks underlying the articles 
constituting this thesis.  
Before the main results of the thesis are presented in chapter 4, an overview of the study area is 
provided in the next section. 
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Figure 1: Administrative structure in Hesse - district level 
Source: HMULV 2006, p.21. 
3 Study Area 
This chapter provides some general, mainly descriptive information about the State of Hesse, thus 
extending the information presented in the articles. It highlights interrelationships between Hesse’s 
main landscape features, the Hessian agricultural structure, related environmental challenges and 
recent counteracting developments in Hessian agri-environmentral policy.  
3.1 General features 
The state of Hesse is one of the 16 German States (Länder), located in its centre. It was formed as 
an administrative and political entity after the World War II as result of a political decision; it was one 
of the three administrative districts of the US occupation zone (Freund, 2002). Therefore, its 
administrative borders were chosen somewhat arbitrarily and the state is characterised by a historically 
grounded cultural heterogeneity (Freund, 2002). Heterogeneity also characterises the Hessian 
landscape; features vary at large and imply heterogeneity in land use possibilities and in the resulting 
agricultural structure (Freund, 2002). However, being an administrative entity, any (agricultural) 
political decisions taken at state level apply 
to Hesse as a whole. 
Below the state level, the administrative 
structure is organised into three hierarchical 
levels (top-down): three higher 
administrative districts (Regierungbezirke), 
22 county districts (Landkreise) and four 
urban districts (Stadtkreise) at the medium 
level – displayed in figure 1 -, and 426 
communities (Gemeinden) (HMULV, 2006).  
In 2011, Hesse covered an area of 
21,114.8 km
2
 and was inhabited by 
6.1 million people (Hessisches Statistisches 
Landesamt, 2012c). Taking the mean, Hesse 
is relatively densely populated with 
284 inhabitants per km
2
, but the population 
density varies strongly between the sparsely 
populated North East (<150 inhabitants per 
km2) and the more densely populated South 
West (> 300 inhabitants/km
2
) (Hessisches 
Statistisches Landesamt, 2012a). 
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Figure 2: Distribution of types of land use in the Hessian 
counties. Author’s calculation based on Hessisches 
Statistisches Landesamt (2012a). 
3.1.1 Landscape and land use 
Hesse is completely located in a mid-range mountain area (Freund, 2002). Only a small 
percentage of area, the Rhine valley, is located at an altitude below 100 metres above sea level (a.s.l.). 
The highest altitudes are located in the east near the border with Bavaria (600-950 metres a.s.l., 
Freund, 2002). Important rivers are the Rhine in the southwest (also forming the border with 
Rhineland-Palatinate), the Werra and the Fulda in the northeast (which both form the Weser at the 
border with Lower Saxony), and the Main, crossing mid-Hesse from east to west. 
More than ¾ of the Hessian total area 
is covered by nature; forest area covers 
about 40% of total area, and 36% of total 
area (766,437 ha) is used for agricultural 
purposes (Hessisches Statistisches 
Landesamt, 2012b). However, contrary to 
the forest area which actually increased 
about 0.9 % from 839,104 ha in 1991 to 
847,240 ha in 2011, the agricultural area 
decreased about 4%; from 927,518 ha in 
1991 to 889,010 ha in 2011 (Hessisches 
Statistisches Landesamt, 2012b). The main 
reason for this decline is that agricultural 
land was converted into areas for settlement 
and circulation. The average land 
consumption was around 4 ha/day between 
1992 and 2006 (Singer-Posern et al., 2008); 
the share of area used for settlement and circulation increased from 14% in 1992 to about 15.5% at the 
end of 2011 (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2013a). 
Figure 2 indicates the land use in the Hessian county districts according to their type of use in 
2012 (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012a). Settlement and circulation area is prevalent in the 
Rhine-Main region (Main-Taunus-Kreis; Offenbach). Forest is prevalent in the Hochtaunuskreis, the 
Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis, and the Odenwaldkreis; all three are located in rather mountainous areas. 
High shares of agricultural area are found in the northern counties (Kassel, Schwalm-Eder), in the East 
(Fulda, Vogelsberg) and in the Rhine-Valley (Gross-Gerau, Darmstadt-Dieburg, see figure 3).  
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3.1.2 Agricultural structure in Hesse 
In 2012, the agricultural sector added a share of 0.5% on average to the Hessian GDP (Hessisches 
Statistisches Landesamt, 2013b). However, this contribution varies widely between the different 
counties and follows the distribution of agriculturally used land (UAA) (figure 3): While the northern 
counties Waldeck-Frankenberg, Schwalm-Eder, Werra-Meissner and Vogelsberg (highest with 2.9%) 
contribute a share of more than 2% to the Hessian GDP; the urban counties located in the Rhine-Main-
region contribute below 0.5% (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2013b). 
In 2010
22
, 62.2% of the UAA was used as arable land (Germany: 70.9%), 37.0% as permanent 
grassland (Germany: 27.9%), 0.4% as vineyards (Germany: 0.6%), and 0.2% for permanent fruit 
growing (Germany: 0.4%, Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012c). The pertinent share of 
grassland of about one third of the UAA (see Freund, 2002, and Elsholz, 2012, for different periods) is 
an indicator of rather low natural potential (Freund, 2002). 
The agricultural use adheres to the heterogeneous landscape features. In the south, especially in 
the Rhine valley, besides crops, sensitive products such as asparagus or strawberries are also cultivated 
(Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012c). Arable land predominates in the low-land regions, e.g. in 
the central north and the south (Elsholz, 2012). Grassland predominates in the sub-mountainous 
regions in the west, east and south east (see figure 4). Accordingly, these areas are characterised by 
grassland-dependent agricultural use (dairy or husbandry farming, Elsholz, 2012). 
Owner-run sole holder farms are the prevalent organisational form; in 2010, 16,514 of the 17,805 
agricultural holdings counted were run as sole holder farms, of which only 5,227 (31.7%) were run 
full-time. This is substantially below the German average of 49.6% (Hessisches Statistisches 
Landesamt, 2012c, see also figure 6). Farms run as legal entities are of minor importance; this referred 
to only 111 farms or 0.6% (Germany: 5,062 or 1.7%) (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012c). 
In 2010, the average farm size was 43.0 ha, which is below the German average of 55.8 ha 
(Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012c). However, the picture changes when a distinction is made 
between farms run full-time part-time; the average size of farmers run full-time is about 74 ha; the 
average size of farms run part-time is about 23.5 ha (HMUELV, 2012a).  
With respect to the number of agricultural holdings, Hesse follows the overall trend in structural 
change; while the number of agricultural holdings is constantly decreasing (from 160,000 farms in 
1949 to 5,000 farms in 2009), the particular mean farm size increased from about 6 ha in 1949 to 43 ha 
in 2011 (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012c). 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of holdings among Hesse. Most farms are located in counties with 
a high share of UAA. However, when comparing figures 5 and 6, it becomes obvious that a high 
number of holdings do not necessarily imply a high percentage of full-time farming. 
This observation is important, as it implies that policy instruments to foster maintaining different 
agricultural landscape features must address both full-time and part-time farmers.  
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Figure 3: UAA as percentage of total area. Author’s 
own depiction based on Hessisches Statistisches 
Landesamt (2012b). 
 
Figure 5: Number of agricultural holdings. Author’s own 
depiction based on Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 
2011). 
 
Figure 4: Grassland as a percentage of UAA. Author’s 
own depiction based on Hessisches Statistisches 
Landesamt, (2012b). 
 
Figure 6: Sole run fulltime holdings (% of total farms). 
Author’s own depiction based on Hessisches Statistisches 
Landesamt (2011). 
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Figure 7: percentage of grassland/total grassland protected 
by the Habitats‘ Directive. Author’s own depiction based on 
Hessen-Forst, Forsteinrichtung und Naturschutz (FENA), 
Giessen (unpublished data). 
 
Figure 8: Percentage of UAA protected by the Habitats‘ 
Directive. Author’s own depiction based on Hessen-Forst, 
Forsteinrichtung und Naturschutz (FENA), Giessen 
(unpublished data). 
3.1.3 Grassland-related environmental challenges 
Agriculture influences the state of grassland
23
 in many ways. Features such as meadows, for 
example, which provide habitats for rare species, were generated by generations of small-scale, 
extensive land cultivation (Wilhelm, 1999). On the other hand, intensification of grassland 
management, e.g. via mineralisation and the use of pesticides, has led to losses in biodiversity 
(Wilhelm, 1999; Slangen and Polman, 2002). Moreover, grassland is an important nitrogen storage 
area and inhibits soil erosion. A reduction of grassland due to ploughing increases the risk of erosion 
and groundwater pollution (Wilhelm, 1999). 
Hesse possesses a substantial number of UAA (arable as well as permanent grassland) considered 
as ecologically important. In accordance with the Council Directive 92/43/EEC Of 21 May 1992 on 
the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora, the so-called Habitats’ Directive, 
639 areas covering 440,000 ha (21% of total Hessian surface area) were declared as area protected by 
the NATURA 2000 framework by 2007 (HMULV, 2008), see figure 7)
24
. Habitat sites amount to 
211,209 ha in total, thereof 47,340 ha UAA, which represents about 5 % of total UAA. Among this 
scope, grassland holds the major share with about 40,854 ha (14% of total grassland). However, in line 
with the depicted landscape heterogeneity, the distribution of protected areas among the counties 
differs. Figures 7 and 8 depict the distribution of protected areas, indicated as a percentage of total 
UAA, or a percentage of protected grassland. 
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 Grassland is picked out as a grassland-preserving AES is in the focus of this thesis. 
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 NATURA 2000 provides the European Framework for both the protection of bird sites (secured by the Birds’ 
Directive) and important habitat sites (secured by the Habitats’ Directive) (European Commission, 2013a). 
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Ecologically valuable grassland is predominately located in the sub-mountainous areas (see figure 
8). As mentioned above, part-time farming prevails there. Thus, managing such grassland areas is 
mainly up to part-time farmers. 
3.1.4 Trends and challenges in Hessian agriculture 
Agriculture in Hesse faces some general trends and challenges. 
First, the demand for settlement and circulation areas constantly increases and results in losses of 
agricultural area (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2013a). As a countermeasure, envisioned land 
consumption has been capped at 2.5 ha per day to maintain a sufficient area for agricultural and 
environmental purposes (HMUELV, 2012a). Moreover, current regional planning aims to counteract 
such land consumption and has established 100,000 ha of agricultural area as a priority area, 
distributed within the higher administrative districts (HMUELV, 2011). 
Next, as mentioned above, Hessian agriculture follows the general trend of structural change. 
Farm size increases continually in order to increase competitiveness, which is also a matter of 
incentives set by policy (HMULV, 2006). Investment assistance programs (e.g. of the CAP, see 
below) provide incentives to increase the capital intensity of agricultural production. Accordingly, a 
substantial increase in labour productivity took place in recent years, especially in counties with a high 
contribution to the Hessian GDP (HMULV, 2006).  
However, such trends towards capital intensive farming endanger the persistence of farming in 
the less favoured areas, especially in the mid-range mountains, where agricultural land use, especially 
of grassland, is secured by a high number of part-time farmers (HMULV, 2006). Land use 
intensification may also induce losses of grassland. As grassland plays an important role not only for 
preserving habitats but also for water protection purposes (see above), preventing such losses is also a 
topic of Hessian agri-environmental policy (HMULV, 2006). Finally, the state of Hesse aims to fulfil 
the goals of the Habitats’ Directive with negotiated agreements such as farmers’ voluntary 
participation in AES prior to regulatory approaches (HMULV, 2006; HMUELV, 2012a). Thus, it is 
important that farming persists in areas containing a high number of ecologically valuable sites (see 
again figures 7 and 8). 
The next sub-section depicts the main approaches of Hessian agri-environmental policy, 
complementary to the details provided in the particular articles. 
  
Study Area 
 24 
3.2 Agri-environmental policy in Hesse 
3.2.1 General features 
The Hessian agri-environmental policy is to a large degree embedded in rural development 
policy, and its main funding sources are the EU (CAP) and the federal government (GAK - 
Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der Agrarstruktur und des Küstenschutzes; Joint Task for 
Improving Agricultural Structure and Coastal Protection) (HMUELV, 2011)
25
. Together with 
contributions of the Hessian state and communal budgets, the total public budget for rural 
development in the period of 2007-2013 was about €715  million, with the ‘second pillar’ of the CAP 
(see below) as the main funding source (HMUELV, 2011).  
Since 1999 (the Agenda 2000 reform), the CAP has been implemented via two “pillars”. The first 
pillar is regarded as the main successor of the initial CAP
26
 and comprises market regulation measures 
and direct payments (Eggers, 2005). It is completely financed by the CAP budget (Eggers, 2005). In 
the funding period 2007-2013 in Hesse, direct payments covered single payments to farms, premiums 
for protein crops, and an additional grassland premium for dairy farmers; market regulation measures 
included structural aid for viticulture, measures within the common organisation of the market of fruits 
and vegetables, aid for the provision of school milk and aid for marketing honey (HMUELV, 2011). In 
2011, the total sum of pillar one payments was €227,724,651, with a share of 99.2% for direct 
payments (HMUELV, 2011). 
In the Agenda 2000 reform, in order to justify the still relatively high payments to farmers, 
environmental issues became more and more important, and the minimum level of environmental 
standards mandatory for receiving direct payments (e.g. by introducing “cross compliance” in 2003) 
has been constantly increasing ever since (Osterburg and Stratmann, 2002; Hespelt, 2004; Elsholz, 
2012). Moreover, as an instrument to explicitly address the structural and environmental development 
challenges in rural areas, the EU Council regulation 1698/2005 established the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), the so-called “second pillar” of the CAP. It aims to promote 
“competitiveness of agriculture and forestry by supporting restructuring, development and innovation, 
improving the environment and the countryside by supporting land management, [and] improving the 
quality of life in rural areas and encouraging diversification of economic activity.” (European Council, 
2005, Art. 4). 
Contrary to the ‘first pillar’ funding, support is not limited to agricultural holdings; communities 
as well as citizens may obtain money for promoting tourism or village renewal, for example. Second, 
while pillar one is implemented homogeneously in the particular member states, pillar-two-related 
funding takes place upon particular rural development plans (RDPs)
27
. Third, measures supported by 
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 Additionally, some cross compliance features serve environmental goals (HMUELV, 2011) 
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 For detailed overviews on the development of the CAP since its beginnings in the Treaty of Rome (European 
Economic Community, 1957, Art. 39), see Eggers (2005) or Elsholz (2012). 
27
 See article 2 in chapter 6 for a detailed depiction of the implementation requirements. 
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the second pillar have to be co-financed at shares between 50 - 75% by the member states (European 
Council, 2005). 
Agri-environmental programmes are supported by the second pillar.
 
Additionally, member states 
can offer wholly self-financed agri-environmental programmes (Hespelt 2004).  
The current Hessian RDP follows four main development axes (HMULV, 2006, HMUELV, 
2010, 2012b) which aim to 
 Enhance the competitiveness of agriculture and silviculture (axis 1, 26% of EAFRD 
budget), 
 Improve environment and landscape (axis 2, 54% of budget) 
 Enhance the quality of life in rural areas and diversify rural economy (axis 3, 6% of 
budget),  
 Use the LEADER approach28 (axis 4, 7.5% of budget) 
In the current funding period, the total Hessian public budget for EAFRD measures contains 
about €480 million (HMUELV, 2012b), of which about €250 million stem from the CAP budget29 
(HMUELV, 2010; 2012b). Additional federal funding from the GAK accounts for about €235 million 
(HMUELV, 2012b). Nevertheless, compared to the previous funding period 2000-2006, a budget 
reduction of about 22% took place (HMUELV, 2012b). 
Within axis 1, agro-investment support has a clear priority with a share of 70% of the axis’ 
budget (HMUELV, 2012b). The second most important aspect is investment in (public) agriculturally-
related infrastructure measures, such as land consolidation (21% of axis 1) (HMUELV, 2012b). 
Within axis 2, compensation payments for farming in less favoured areas holds the highest share of the 
budget (48%) (HMUELV, 2012b). The agri-environmental programme HIAP comprises about 46 % of 
the axis 2 budget. Priority within axis 3 is on village renewal (86% of the axis 3 budget); the focus of 
axis 4 is on improving quality of life/diversification measures (91.5% of axis 4 budget). 
3.2.2 Aim, budget and performance of HIAP 
HIAP provides a general implementation framework for six agri-environmental schemes, namely 
fostering organic farming, winter greening, setting up buffer or flower strips, mulch and direct seeding 
(introduced in 2010), environmentally friendly viticulture and site-specific grassland extensification 
(HMUELV, 2012b). The structural aim of HIAP is to preserve the small scale land use system which 
is typical for Hesse and to withdraw rededication of agricultural land (HMUELV, 2012b). 
Environmental aims include securing biodiversity, soil and water protection, and climate protection 
(HMUELV, 2012b). The actual funding priority is on fostering organic farming with an intended 
participation of 1,850 farms and a scope of 78,000 ha; followed by mulch and direct seeding with an 
intended participation of 3,000 farms or 60,000 ha (HMUELV, 2012b). 
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 LEADER stands for ‘links between actions of rural development’ and is an instrument to mobilise and deliver 
rural development in local rural communities via an explicitly participatory approach (European Commission, 
2013b)  
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 Including modulation shifts after the Health Check and the EU economic stimulus package. 
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The focus of the site specific grassland extensification scheme, which is in the focus of this thesis, 
is to counteract the trends in grassland decline/intensification in order to fulfil the goals of the 
Habitats’ Directive. The scheme is intended to cover 45,000 ha or 9,000 farms, with priority of 
participation given to farmers managing sites secured by the Habitats’ Directive of other nature 
protection laws (HMUELV, 2012b). Buffer/flower strips shall be set up on 6,000 ha (2,000 farms), 
winter greening shall be done on 20,000 ha (4,500 farms), and the viticulture measure on 297 ha (180 
farms) (HMUELV, 2012b). 
Single schemes can be combined to a certain extent (HMUELV, 2012b). All schemes are action-
oriented. Payments to participating farmers are granted upon application and compliance with the 
funding regulations and are calculated as an average compensation for income losses and additional 
effort (flat-rate payments) (HMUELV, 2012b). Compliance is checked by off and onsite monitoring 
(HMUELV, 2012b)
30
. To reach a sufficient participation rate in order to meet the intended scope, the 
payments had to be raised several times during the funding period (HMUELV, 2010).  
The mid-term review of the RDP in 2010 revealed that HIAP only partially met the intended 
goals (HMUELV, 2010). While organic farming and site-specific grassland extensification covered 
60,100 ha and 33,804 ha, respectively, in 2010 and participation meanwhile is considered sufficient, 
winter greening (195 ha) and buffer/flower strips (45 ha) showed a low performance until 2009 
(HMUELV, 2010). For both, payments were increased substantially respectively funding regulations 
were amended in 2010, which raised their acceptance substantially (HMUELV, 2010, see also figure 
9). In 2010, the time of the mid-term review, about one third of Hessian grassland was entered into 
HIAP (site-specific grassland extensification and organic farming); 34% of the total contract area is 
located within the NATURA 2000 area (HMUELV, 2010). Thus, a positive impact on the 
environment is assumed (HMUELV, 2010). However, only 6 % of arable land was covered by HIAP 
(HMUELV, 2010). Figure 9 depicts the participation development for the agriculture-related measures 
within HIAP in the actual funding period, indicated by participating farms; figure 10 shows the 
importance of the particular measures, indicated as participation (ha) in the different counties. 
Participation is highest in central Hesse (Vogelsbergkreis, Lahn-Dill-Kreis, Limburg-Weilburg, 
Fulda), which are rather grassland-dominated, hilly regions and relatively low in the south of Hesse 
(Hochtaunuskreis, Darmstadt-Dieburg, Bergstrasse, Odenwaldkreis). The participation rate indicates 
that the scheme is also currently attractive to part-time farmers (see also article 1). Within the 
measures, organic farming is favoured in the hilly regions of mid-Hesse (Vogelsbergkreis, Lahn-Dill-
Kreis, Fulda). Site-specific grassland extensification is well-accepted throughout all counties, but is 
especially important in the grassland-dominated, hilly counties (Vogelsbergkreis, Wetteraukreis, Lahn-
Dill-Kreis, Odenwald). Meanwhile, with the substantial increase in payments/ha, mulch and direct 
seeding form an important share of total HIAP participation in the particular counties, with a focus in 
northern Hesse (Schwalm-Eder-Kreis, Landkreis Kassel). However, buffer/flower strips as well as 
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Figure 10: Distribution of participation in HIAP (agriculture-related measures) in Hessian counties in 2010. 
Author’s own compilation from data made available by the HMUELV (unpublished).  
 
Figure 9: Participation in agriculture related HIAP measures. Author’s own compilation from data made 
available by the HMUELV (unpublished). 
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winter greening show low performance (HMUELV, 2012c). Interestingly, the participation rates have 
been decreasing since 2012, when farmers first fulfilled the contract period of 5 years and seemingly 
did not re-enter the scheme; which was probably due to a lack of clarity in the future development of 
the scheme regulations in the next funding period. 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
This chapter provided context to understand several environmental aims pursued by Hessian agri-
environmental policy. As Hesse is characterised by heterogeneity in many features, policy faces the 
challenge of meeting the resulting requirements with regulations capable of covering all related 
aspects. Moreover, Hesse strongly depends on EU and federal funding. The next section presents the 
main results of the thesis articles, which highlight how policy implementation affects related TCs.  
 
 
 
ha 
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4 Summary of article results 
4.1 Preliminaries on theoretical and methodological approaches 
The methodological approach of the articles is deductive and empirical; primary data was 
obtained in three different interview approaches. TCs are operationalised mainly as (monetised) 
working time (McCann et al., 2005); article (1) also accounts for mileage. TCs are allocated to the 
stages of the transaction process, taking into account search and information costs, negotiation costs, 
and monitoring and implementation costs (Dahlman, 1979). Testable hypotheses in the articles are 
derived from particularly developed conceptual frameworks. For testing, in each article a set of 
variables was constructed based upon the distinction in scheme- and actor-related factors as well as 
features of the natural and institutional environment. The theoretical foundation of the articles is TCE, 
although a (non-formal) PA- setting is used in articles (2) and (3) to model the influence of the CAP 
framework on regional TCs. Moreover, the TCE approach is supplemented by insights from PA-
literature to hypothesize differences in actors. Overall, the conceptual frameworks are based on a 
functional understanding of TCs, that is, public and private actors incur TCs (in principle) as result of 
a rational cost-benefit reasoning in order to obtain a particular transactional gain. By this, all articles 
contribute in both conceptual and practical ways to a broader notion of TCs.  
4.2 Descriptive summary of articles 
Article (1) examines intra-scheme variances of farmers’ TCs, using quantitative data obtained 
from participating farmers in two Hessian counties. The starting point for the article was the 
observation that a number of TC-constituting tasks is undertaken by the farmers themselves. Since the 
contracts between farmers and the agricultural administration contain some negotiable elements – for 
example parts of the premiums and the specific measures to be carried out to by the farmers - a 
working hypothesis was constructed that states that farmers ‘voluntarily’ incur TCs in order to achieve 
higher transactional gains, i.e. higher per ha payments. Consequently, both absolute and relative TCs 
were investigated, the latter expressed as a payment-per-TC- ratio. Explanations for the differences in 
TC expenses were sought in the heterogeneity of farm attributes and farmers’ particular contract 
specification. These aspects were sorted into the TCE dimensions frequency, asset specificity, and 
uncertainty. Descriptive results indeed reveal large variances in privately incurred TCs. They also 
show that the majority of costs incurred are due to compliance requirements, as one could expect from 
the scheme regulations. Although the results do not support the overall working hypothesis, they 
nonetheless provide explanations for variances in farmers’ TCs: ‘Voluntary’ TC expense especially 
seems to serve as a safeguard for securing the participation-related income, which seems to be valued 
distinctively by farmers depending on their preference for scheme income compared to other income 
possibilities. The main contribution of article (1) is to show how variances in farmers’ TCs can be 
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linked to differences in income risk management
31 
and to point out that TCs might be the monetary 
expression of a “willingness to participate”.  
Article (2) places the Hessian scheme implementation process in the context of the CAP funding 
denoted by the EAFRD regulations. In particular, the article qualitatively investigates the effects of 
structural and procedural requirements of EAFRD regulations as impacting occurrence and 
composition of regional public TCs. The analysis relies on a conceptual framework that combines 
principal-agent approaches as applied in (economic-) political science with findings from AES-related 
TC approaches. By that, I -non-formally- modelled regional scheme implementation - the transaction 
between Hessian administration and farmers - as nested transaction (Williamson, 2000) within the 
superposed transaction between EU and the Hessian administration. 
Data was obtained from qualitative interviews conducted with the main Hessian administrations 
involved. Results show that upcoming (public) TCs can a) be allocated to the different transactional 
relationships and b) be distinguished in scheme-related costs/tasks necessary to pursue environmental 
policy goals and reimbursement-related costs/tasks necessary to prove compliance with the co-
financing regulations. Results also reveal that EAFRD-based structural and procedural requirements 
shape the operational regional implementation process towards reimbursement-related tasks and may 
even induce a trade-off between scheme/environmental- and reimbursement-related issues that could 
endanger the environmental goals of the SSGES. Moreover, the EAFRD framework induces spill-
overs onto farmers’ TCs, which increase both public and private TCs. The main contribution of article 
(2) is to – qualitatively - identify budgetary, allocative, and distributive effects on regional public - and 
partly private - TCs induced by the EAFRD framework.  
Based on this distinction between scheme-related and reimbursement related tasks, article (3) 
investigates the existence of such a trade-off between both task blocks by quantitatively examining the 
working time allocation of Hessian agricultural administrations in the counties (ALRs). The 
background for empirical analysis is provided via the insights of multi-task principal-agent models 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Multitask PA-models state that incentives - respectively monitoring 
or performance measurement - must be balanced across competing tasks in order not to induce a 
crowding out of one task by the other. As argued in the article, the incentives offered in actual scheme 
implementation are biased, which makes the existence of a crowding out likely. Hypotheses to 
investigate the ALRs’ time allocation are built upon differences in structural county features, 
administrative features and scheme performance-related issues in a deductive approach by utilising the 
results from article (1). Descriptive results show that reimbursement-related effort requires the major 
part of working time; EAFRD regulations indeed have a guiding effect. Nevertheless, regression 
results reveal that particular county-related, scheme performance-related, and ALR-related drivers 
partly outweigh these effects. The major contributions of article (3) are a) to make a multi-task PA-
framework useful for investigating TC expenditure as trade-off decision and b) – together with the 
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findings of article (2) - to critically assess the impact of the EU compliance regulations on AES-related 
TCs. This is especially important in the light of presumably increased monitoring duties in the 
upcoming funding period 2014-2020. 
Figure 11 provides a comprehensive picture of the areas of investigation allocated to the 
particular articles. Arrows in light grey denote intuitive exploration. The next two sections summarise 
the particular findings of the articles.  
4.3 Synthesis of article results 
4.3.1 Descriptive results 
The results obtained in articles (1-3) show that both farmers’ TCs for SSGES participation and 
public TCs for carrying out the SSGES are non-trivial; in monetary terms, farmers expend 171.96 € 
per contract for informational issues, 126.84 € for negotiation tasks and 1,141.69 € for implementation 
issues on average, yet with a substantial variance (Art. 1). TCs/ha for the whole contract period are 
95.33 € on average, farmers’ average TCs - expressed as a percentage of payments - are about 7% 
(Art. 1). Higher TCs generally go in line with a lower payment/TC ratio; moreover, during the 
transaction stages, no evidence was found that TCs in early transaction stages cause TC savings at 
later stages for farmers (Art. 1). Thus, ceteris paribus, farmers’ TCs serve neither to obtain gains 
during the transaction stages nor to maximise the overall net gain. 
On the side of the implementing administration, quantitative results for TCs (Art. 3) reveal that 
Figure 11: Operationalisation of the areas of investigation and their allocation to the particular articles 
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negotiation costs and administrative checks require the highest share of weekly working hours, similar 
also in the average percentage (24% respectively 29%). Acquisition costs (9%), costs for post-
processing on-site checks (11%) and coordination costs (10%) require the least share of working time; 
effort on stating the ALRs own compliance with EU regulations requires about 16% of working time 
on average. After sorting these costs into the two task blocks, the findings show that reimbursement-
related costs form the major share of overall TCs. However, akin to the results for farmers’ TCs, the 
quantitative results reveal that both weekly working hours spent on particular tasks as well as their 
relative share varies at large between the particular county administrations (Art. 3). 
To sum up, the descriptive results reveal that the majority of both public and private TCs incurred 
during actual scheme implementation refer to monitoring issues (Art. 1-3). Thus, concluding from TC 
magnitude to importance, the potential moral hazard of both the administration (being an agent of the 
EU) and the farmers (being agents of [EU and Hessian] administrations) is the major contractual 
hazard addressed in contract design. However, the results also exhibit large variances for both public 
and private TCs, which aggravate developing AES with reduced TCs in a lump sum approach. In the 
next subsections, the article results on factors causing these variances are presented in a synthesised 
manner according to the categorisation depicted above.  
4.3.2 Institutional environment 
The institutional environment, as conceptualised in this thesis, is constituted by the EAFRD 
regulations which specify the structural and procedural requirements necessary to obtain the 
reimbursement for SSGES payments. The regulations mainly aim to prevent a misuse of funding 
(which denotes a form of moral hazard) and are the root of most monitoring requirements (Art. 2).  
Structural requirements of the EAFRD require TCs to due to implementing additional 
administrative units, due to additional interactions and increased co-ordination. Procedural 
requirements of the EAFRD influence SSGES regulations, e.g. due to minimum contract duration 
requirements, criteria for application and eligibility, payment calculation and caps, and required 
administrative and onsite checks (Art. 2). Thus, the EAFRD sets the framework in which AES design 
and implementation takes place and influences TCs and the transactional outcome through its impact 
on the terms of exchange. Moreover, the regulations do not account for variances in compliant 
behaviour, neither on the side of the administration nor of the farmers; thus welfare losses occur (Art. 
1-3). Besides its effects on magnitude and composition, the EAFRD framework also causes 
distributive and allocative effects. Its main influences are as follows: 
1. The institutional environment shifts an important share of TCs to implementing 
administrations and causes distributive effects between the EU and local level (Art. 2 and 
3). 
2. Procedural requirements influence scheme-related factors (see below) by determining the 
regulatory framework for AES design and implementation (Article 2).  
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3. The institutional environment affects actors’ behaviour and induces allocative effects 
between the particular TC categories (Art. 2 and 3); the prospect of losing (part of) the 
reimbursement seems to have a deterrent effect on the application of rules in public 
administrations (Art. 2), and financial dependency on the reimbursement shifts the 
workload of ALRs from technical to compliance issues (Art. 2 and 3). Both result in a 
priorisation of reimbursement-related tasks (Art. 3). Moreover, the monitoring focus is on 
procedural correctness and not on environmental results.  
4. The EAFRD regulations concerning the ALRs’ own compliance generate fixed costs and 
thus induce allocative distortions; ALRs with less contract area are relatively more 
affected by EU checks, despite the fact that their share of the total reimbursement is 
lower. As a result, the total administrative costs per ha under contract are higher in such 
counties. However, these costs are paid from the Hessian budget, while the benefits of 
these checks occur at the EU level (Art. 3). 
4.3.3 Scheme-related factors 
As pointed out above, the procedural requirements of the EAFRD influence SSGES design and 
implementation, which in turn affects performance-related public TCs. This influence can be 
summarised under the following aspects:  
First, the majority of private and public TCs occur as a consequence of the highly specified 
monitoring requirements of the EAFRD (Art. 2 and 3), which also include farmers’ documentation 
duties (Art. 1). Prescribing a 100% scope of administrative checks and documentation by farmers 
limits the exploitation of economies of scale and time for both administration (Art. 2 and 3) and 
farmers (Art. 1), which denotes welfare losses, as scheme implementations remains relatively costly 
over time. However, the results of article 3 show that only some of the monitoring regulations can be 
avoided by designing part of the payments as top-ups, which reduces per/ha costs for spatial 
monitoring. 
Second, the methods and procedures to measure compliance prescribed in the EAFRD affect 
public and private TCs; compliance statements rely mainly on spatial indicators as references (Art. 1-
3). However, monitoring (as currently practiced) tends to produce unintended non-compliance and 
sometimes even delivers erroneous results (Art. 1 and 2). Correcting such errors causes substantial 
effort, which depicts additional TCs for farmers and administration (Art. 1-3). 
Third, scheme regulations inhibit economies of scope for farmers participating in several 
schemes; the reduced premium organic farmers receive seems not to outweigh their additional TC 
expenses (Art. 1). Also, keeping the pasturing log as in the case of contracting on a grazing agreement 
induces additional documentary effort, which is not outweighed by the higher basic per/ha premium 
(Art. 1). However, farmers incur lower per-ha TC and obtain a higher payment per TC the more of 
their grassland is managed under the SSGES agreements (Art. 1).  
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Fourth, scheme regulations cause private and public TCs due to limited adaptation possibilities 
and may even induce losses to farmers in the form of sunk costs once a contract is concluded (Art. 2). 
In the case of a contract extension, a farmer may work under different regulations, which leads to 
different treatments of the same facts and causes additional effort in the ALRs and inconsistencies for 
the farmers (Art. 2). On the side of the administration, economies of scale and learning effects for 
reducing implementation costs cannot be achieved with frequent changes in regulations (Art. 2 and 3). 
Finally, the results of article 3 also reveal interrelationships of TCs within the implementation 
process of the administration; the more area is under contract, the less time is spent on acquisition and 
negotiation; at the same time, effort for administrative checks increases. 
Summarising the main impacts of scheme-related factors on both public and private TCs reveals 
the following:  
1. Scheme design and implementation regulations hamper obtaining economies of scale, 
scope, and time.  
2. Scheme-related factors cause spill-overs onto farmers’ ‘TC-efficiency’ subject to the 
choice of management agreements, participating in the SSGES as top-up, and the share of 
their grassland they are able to enter into the scheme. 
Both aspects highlight the role of policy design on resulting TCs. Nonetheless, actors respond 
differently to this set of rules in terms of incurred TC magnitude and composition, as will be depicted 
in the next subsection. 
4.3.4 Actor–related factors 
Actor-related factors as investigated in the articles comprise ALR features, denoted as the level of 
staffing (Art. 2 and 3) and business and management characteristics of farms (Art. 1) indicating 
foremost a) a volatility in production output and b) dependency on farm income.  
As pointed out above, dependency on reimbursement to enlarge the regional budget provokes a 
rather risk-averse application of rules and a prioritisation of reimbursement-related tasks on the side of 
the administration, which is also tightened by the regulatory focus of the EAFRD (Art. 2 and 3). This 
effect is intensified in the case of staffing shortages, which exist throughout all administrative units 
(Art.2). The more personnel are available, the less reimbursement-related tasks are prioritised (Art.3). 
Higher TCs incurred by farmers reduce their gain from scheme participation. Results reveal that 
the volatility of production output and a consequent uncertainty about the resulting market income are 
important factors for incurring both voluntary and mandatory TCs (Art. 1). In order to obtain a 
‘secure’ SSGES income even a comparatively lower payment/TC ratio is accepted. Thus, TCs rather 
serve as a safeguard for securing participation-related income.  
Surprisingly, full-time farmers expend substantially more TCs throughout the whole transaction 
process than their part-time colleagues (Art 1). Ex ante, fulltime farmers prefer an individual, bilateral 
setting for discussing scheme particulars with the ALR, which is more time consuming (Art. 1). 
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Interestingly, if the share of full-time farmers in a county is high enough, this even influences the time 
share of ALRs spent on negotiation tasks (Art. 3, see also below). One explanation is that the high TC 
expenditure is due to the importance of calculable and stable income for full-time farmers; alternative 
explanations are that full-time farmers may have a) lower opportunity costs of time, b) obtain 
economies of scope due to frequent interaction with the ALRs, or c) incur lower total costs due to 
lower production costs. 
Finally, as pointed out in the subsection on scheme-related factors, organic farmers (ceteris 
paribus) have a substantial disadvantage; the reduced premium they receive seems not to outweigh 
their (additional) TC expenses. This is also true for farmers expecting higher opportunity costs due to 
changes in management.  
To sum up, actors respond differently to the framework created by the EAFRD: 
1. How restricting the necessity to prioritise reimbursement-related tasks in the agricultural 
administration is depends on the personnel available. Thus, EU co-financed schemes 
seem to require a certain degree of staffing. 
2. Differences in farmers’ TC expenses seem to resemble differences in valuing the income 
obtained via scheme participation. Both voluntary and mandatory TCs seem be an 
investment to secure part of the farm’s income via (calculable and stable) payments for 
AES participation, preferred to income from market goods’ production in case this is 
highly volatile or farm income is the most important source of income. 
3. Interestingly, results on both public and private TCs allow linking factors indicating 
aspects of uncertainty to the magnitude and composition of TCs incurred, which 
highlights TC expense as a mode of risk management. Thus, these results both confirm 
and extend prior theoretical findings (Fraser 2002).  
4.3.5 Natural environment 
Investigating the role of the natural environment with respect to its influence on public and 
private TCs is important mainly for two reasons: on the one hand, ALRs face different levels of 
necessity to pursue environmental goals due to differences in the scope of protected grassland in the 
counties. Moreover - as mentioned above – different groups of farmers may value income from 
scheme participation differently, which influences related TCs. If a particular group of farmers is 
prominent in a county, this causes spillovers onto the ALRs working time allocation (Art. 3). 
Furthermore, the natural environment as taken into account refers to county characteristics in terms of 
environmental features (share of protected grassland) and factors depicting the importance of 
agriculture in the particular county (magnitude of UAA) and professionalism in farming (share of 
fulltime farmers).  
Results show that county characteristics are the most important drivers for the ALRs working 
time allocation (Art. 3). Interestingly, the number of full-time farmers shows the largest impact, while 
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the impact of the magnitude of protected grassland is lowest. Therefore, the ALRs’ working time 
decisions seem at least partly to be requested by farmers rather than be induced by environmental 
concerns. This implies that, without this incentive, ALRs rather work ‘by the book’, that is, they 
respond to the incentives set by the regulations. 
County characteristics also cause shifts between acquisition and negotiation costs in the ALRs; a 
high share of acquisition in counties with less professional farming seems to be induced by the ALRs’ 
attempts to secure the desired participation rate. In contrast, a high share of individual negotiation in 
counties characterised by a high degree of professionalism in farming seems to be a spill-over effect 
from farmers’ time expenses to ALRs’ time expenses (see above). Moreover, relatively high 
investments in negotiations lead to fewer failures found in the on-site checks, as the need for post-
processing is low in such counties. This seems at least partly to outweigh the mandatory effort related 
to the administrative checks in such counties and may reduce (public) TCs. Moreover, this result 
(again) highlights the role of information provision for farmers on scheme success. However, these 
findings also imply that ALRs in counties with no such structural features are at a disadvantage with 
respect to environmental compliance by farmers. Because Hesse has to rely on part-time farmers to 
maintain ecologically valuable grassland, this is an especially important issue to be addressed (see 
chapter 8). 
To sum up, ALRs allocate their time between both scheme-related cost categories in order to 
respond to particular county circumstances and as a result of spillovers of farmers’ TCs. 
4.4 Concluding remarks  
The articles identify magnitude and composition of public and private TCs in SSGES 
implementation. Moreover, they identify important drivers and interdependencies between public and 
private TCs occurring as spillovers, cost shifts and distributive effects. Using the terminology of the 
conceptual framework, features exist that lower or raise the costs for TC inducing tasks within a 
particular setting. Investigating and highlighting such aspects is the major contribution of this thesis to 
this field of research. 
The results of these findings are briefly discussed with respect to their implications for future 
scheme design and implementation in chapter 8. Prior to this, the following three chapters present the 
articles in full. 
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5 Do Transaction Costs create Transaction Gains for Farmers 
Participating in an Agri-Environmental Scheme?
32
  
 
Anja Weber 
Abstract 
Participating in agri-environmental schemes (AES) induces transaction costs for farmers, 
originating from time and money spent on tasks related to participation. High transaction 
costs may inhibit scheme participation, which would endanger the environmental goals 
aspired. To date, farmers’ transaction costs have been investigated from a cost-
minimising perspective, implying fixed gains from participation. Nonetheless, 
participation contracts may contain negotiable parts. In such a case, especially, cost-
constituting tasks undertaken by farmers’ own attempts could serve gain-maximising: 
Farmers can utilise additional information to increase their transactional gain, namely the 
payment. This paper addresses this question by investigating transaction costs of farmers 
participating in a site-specific grassland extensification scheme in Hesse, Germany, 
which contains negotiable features. Upon insights from information economics and 
transaction cost economics, the study discusses possible gains and tests the impact of 
farm and scheme-related features on both absolute and relative transaction costs, the latter 
conceptualised as payment/total transaction costs ratio. Results reveal that a higher 
transaction costs expense goes in line with a lower payment/transaction costs ratio; 
however, higher transaction costs expense predominates for particular farms features 
indicating dependency on AES income. Thus, voluntary transaction cost expenses seem 
to serve as a safeguard for securing participation-related income.  
Keywords: transaction costs; agri-environmental schemes; Germany 
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Introduction  
In the last two decades, society’s expectations of agriculture have been changing. Besides the 
production of food and fibre, society’s demand for environmental benefits has constantly increased 
(OECD 2001). In the European Union (EU), agri-environmental schemes (AES) have become a 
prominent policy measure for enhancing the provision of such agriculture-related environmental 
benefits (European Council 2005). From a governance perspective, AES are a contractual mechanism 
for transacting environmental goods or services between the farmer (seller) and an agricultural 
authority as the representative consumer (Hagedorn, Arzt, and Peters 2002). Farmers receive payments 
when they carry out agri-environmental commitments. However, besides a proper design, a sufficient 
participation rate is crucial for providing the expected environmental outcome (Falconer 2000; 
Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck 2009; Mettepenningen et al. 2013). 
According to contract theory, a farmer will agree on a contract if the resulting gains at least cover 
his opportunity costs (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). In case of AES participation, these comprise 
forgone profit/income, for example, due to reduced production yields because of extensification, extra 
effort due to fulfiling the management agreements, and participation-related transaction costs (TCs) 
(Falconer 2000; Mettepenningen, Verspecht, and van Huylenbroeck 2009). TCs are ‘scheme 
organisational costs’ (Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby 2001, 84) and occur for both administrative 
agencies (public TCs) and farmers (private TCs) (Falconer and Whitby 1999). Private TCs originate 
from time and money spent by farmers on tasks conducted in order to participate and consist of a fixed 
part due to participation per se and a variable part due to the duration and scope of the scheme 
(Falconer and Whitby 1999; Falconer 2000). Private TCs reduce the farmers’ net premiums (Falconer 
2000) and may even inhibit scheme participation (Falconer 2000; Peerlings and Polman2004).  
Empirical evidence reveals that farmers’ TCs are non-trivial but vary greatly between different 
AES (Falconer 2000;FalconerandSaunders 2002;Rørstad,Vatn,andKvakkestad 2007; Mettepenningen 
and van Huylenbroeck 2009; Mettepenningen, Verspecht, and van Huylenbroeck 2009).  
Falconer (2000) investigates certification costs for participating in organic farming schemes and 
finds that TCs form a minimum of 5% of compensation payments. She also finds that farm size 
reduces relative TCs due to high initial fixed costs in whole-farm approaches.  
Falconer and Saunders (2002) compare scheme-related TCs – specified as negotiation and on-
going costs and conceptualised as timely effort – of individually negotiated and standard management 
agreements. The authors assume that individually negotiated schemes are more targeted and provide a 
higher level of environmental benefits than standardised agreements. They find negotiation costs for 
standard agreements to be substantially lower than for individually negotiated schemes. However, 
standardised schemes are more expensive in terms of annual on-going costs. Besides the difference in 
upsetting the contracts, the authors reveal that learning effects reduce TCs over a scheme’s life cycle. 
Establishing a new scheme turns out to be relatively costly.  
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Within a study of public and private (total) TCs of different agri-environmental policy measures 
in Norway, Rørstad, Vatn, and Kvakkestad (2007) also investigate farmers’ TCs for several AES. 
They investigate TCs according to the policies’ specificity and frequency, and find private TCs range 
from 2.3% of payments in an AES fostering reduced tillage up to 9.1% of payments in an AES 
preserving cattle breeds. While frequency reduces TCs, they find scheme specificity, expressed by the 
degree of precision and the quality of the environmental benefit aspired to substantially increase TCs.  
The most detailed investigations of farmers’ TC in AES are presented by Mettepenningen, 
Verspecht, and van Huylenbroeck (2009) and Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck (2009). 
Mettepenningen, Verspecht, and van Huylenbroeck (2009) investigate magnitudes and composition of 
total TCs (measured in terms of working days) found in several AES from 10 European regions. They 
find mean TCs (including wages) of 40.20 € (std. 77.3), ranging from0 to 1.006 €.  
In a complementary study, Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck (2009) test several scheme-
related, contract-related and farmers’ socio-demographic factors on their influence on total and 
particular TCs by comparing upcoming TCs with those of a reference scheme. They find search and 
negotiation costs – but not monitoring and enforcement costs – significantly influenced by the region 
in which they are implemented. The authors also find a positive influence on search costs (effect size 
yet below the reference) when farmers obtain some professional training apart from AES participation. 
Specific investments necessary due to scheme participation affect search, negotiation and monitoring 
costs positively (compared to the reference scheme). Search and negotiation costs also increase with 
the area under contract. Farmers participating in several AES incur higher monitoring costs. This also 
holds true for farmers stating that they do not trust the administration, for older farmers, holdings with 
a higher income, and when farmers had obtained financial advice from the Ministries of Agriculture.  
These studies have in common that they discuss TCs from a cost-minimising perspective. They 
(implicitly) assume that the gain from participation is fixed and that particular factors may help to 
decrease the costs (conceptualised as time) necessary for obtaining participation-relevant information. 
However, a number of schemes contain negotiable agreements, which affect premium as well as 
related effort (e.g. Thomas et al. [2009] for German AESs).In case of a negotiable outcome, additional 
information may be gathered to generate transactional gains, like a higher premium per hectare (ha). 
Moreover, these studies rather explain inter-scheme differences in TCs than intra-scheme variances 
and do not explicitly address the high number of ‘voluntarily’ conducted TC constituting tasks.  
To address these gaps, this study investigates farmers’ TCs and their influencing factors from a 
gain-maximising perspective with the help of an explorative case study on an EU co-financed site-
specific grassland extensification scheme (SSGES) in Hesse, Germany. This scheme was chosen 
mainly for three reasons. First, its regulations contain a number of negotiable aspects but the scheme 
itself aims at a comparatively fixed environmental outcome (HMULV 2006). In an (non-EU co-
financed) AES with completely free negotiable agreements, potentially higher payments/ha would 
have to be assessed to a potentially higher environmental gain. Second, at least in Germany, the EU 
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co-financed AES form the majority of AES (Osterburg and Stratmann 2002; Thomas et al. 2009). 
Third, the EU regulations provide relatively tight prescriptions with respect to payment calculation, 
which is limited to cover calculated opportunity costs without any further income generating 
possibility (European Council 2005). Although the EU allows for integrating a compensation of TCs 
into the payments (European Council 2005), at least in Germany, in most AESs payment calculation is 
still limited to covering the foregone income and additional effort (Thomas et al. 2009)
33
. Nonetheless, 
farmers frequently undertake TC generating activities even on their own initiative although they are 
not compensated (Beckmann et al. 2003; Weber and Nuppenau 2010).  
To explore potential TC-related gains, the study investigates both absolute and relative TCs. 
Relative TCs are conceptualised as output/input relationships, namely payment/ total TCs. The TCs 
are measured as effort (time and mileage) to gain information during the stages of transaction. 
Particular informational and transactional gains are delineated by applying the scheme regulations to 
the actual Hessian setting. A number of farm-and contract-related factors are tested for their influence 
on total and relative TCs of participating farmers with the help of bootstrapped General Linear 
Models.  
Results reveal that a higher TC expense mostly occurs for particular farm features related to 
production uncertainty and goes in line with a lower ratio of payment to TCs. Instead of maximising 
the premium/ha, voluntarily expended TCs rather seem to serve as a safeguard for securing 
participation-related income.  
The paper is organised into six sections. In the next section, scheme details are depicted, followed 
by a description of data and methods. The subsequent section develops the conceptual framework and 
delineates testable variables. Then, results are presented and discussed. A brief conclusion completes 
the paper.  
Scheme details  
Hesse is one of the larger German states, located in its centre. In 2010, agriculturally utilised area 
covered about 36% of total area, one-third being permanent grassland, which was managed by 17,805 
agricultural holdings, one-third of them run full time (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt 2012). The 
majority of Hessian farmers (76%) are livestock holders; owner-run sole holder farms are the 
prevalent organisational form (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt 2012).  
Especially in the sub-mountainous areas of Hesse, structural change leads to a continuing 
decrease in the number of farms. These areas are characterised by marginal productivity and small 
section land use, but at the same time account for a substantial share of environmentally valuable 
grassland sites protected by the Habitats’ Directive (HMULV 2006). Farmers tend to intensify land 
use by ploughing up suitable grassland or completely refrain from using it agriculturally due to 
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(Thomas et al. 2009).  
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marginal productivity (HMULV 2008). However, abandoning the grassland leads to increased soil 
erosion, decreased water protection and a loss of biodiversity (HMULV 2006).  
To counter this downward trend, the state government of Hesse aims to secure grassland by 
voluntary participation in a SSGES (HMULV 2006, 2008). The scheme aims to support small section 
land use to prevent grassland from being abandoned and to preserve ecologically valuable grassland 
habitats (HMULV 2006). It was established in 2007 within the overall Hessian Agri-Environmental 
Programme ‘HIAP’ (HMULV 2006), offered within the ‘second pillar’ of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the EU (HMULV 2006, 2008). The scheme is a synthesis of two antecessors; a site-
specific landscape pertaining programme based on individual agreements (state financed) and a 
standardised grassland extensification scheme encompassing the total grassland of a farm(EU 
cofinanced)(HMULV 2006). The regulations differ substantially from the antecedent ones.  
Participation is based on a management contract between farmers and the particular county’s 
agricultural administration, Amt für den ländlichen Raum (ALR). According to EU co-financing 
regulations, the contract period is five years and 45,000 ha were intended for enrolment (HMULV 
2006). The general eligibility of sites depends on a confirmed ecological value. As the Hessian 
government aims to fulfil the goals of the EU Habitats’ Directive34 by voluntary AES participation, 
habitats specified by the Habitats’ Directive are given priority. Sites protected by State environmental 
protection laws or inventories are also eligible, in case the SSGES agreements go beyond the 
mandatory management restrictions (HMULV 2009). Actual eligibility is subject to a scoring system 
(Weber 2013). If eligible in principle, the sites applied for are rated according to their ecological value. 
The ALR sets a cut-off point when its budget is exhausted; however, in recent years, the budget 
exceeded the sum needed for the sites applied for (personal communication).  
The scheme is action oriented, which means that payments are granted upon the adoption of 
specified agricultural practices presumed to provide environmental benefits (Matzdorf and Lorenz 
2010). These management agreements comprise both mandatory and negotiable parts (HMULV 
2009). Mandatory agreements include prohibiting grassland conversion, the use of chemical or 
synthetic pesticides and surface irrigation or melioration. Agricultural use has to take place at least 
once a year; a second or third use may be agreed upon due to habitat characteristics. The choice for 
either a grazing or a mowing agreement on each site is negotiable (HMULV 2009). A further 
mandatory requirement is to keep a detailed field log and, in the case of a grazing agreement, also a 
pasturing log. Furthermore, farmers have to allow the administrative audit team to conduct on-site 
checks on the farm (HMULV 2009).  
In addition, particular contract specification refers to premium composition, which likewise 
consists of both a fixed and negotiable part. The state-wide basic premium for each type of agreement 
is fixed; grazing agreements are paid more than mowing agreements (200 and 110 €/ha, respectively). 
Premiums denote an average compensation for income forgone and additional production costs; TCs 
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 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora.  
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are not compensated (HMULV 2009). A top-up payment for exceptional effort (ecologically valuable 
special services, EVSS)is negotiable. The EVSS premiums are calculated as presumed extra effort due 
to specificities of the contract site such as slope, wetness, difficult accessibility or special technical 
requirements. They are predefined in three levels of intensity, linked to three levels of additional 
payment (25/50/75 €), and are also calculated as average extra effort (HMULV 2009). Specifying 
EVSS does not necessarily take place after a site inspection, but are often decided by ALR staff at a 
desk (Weber 2013).  
Including payments for EVSS, a sum of 360 €/ha/year must not be exceeded. Double funding is 
strictly prohibited. Thus, farmers also participating in the organic farming scheme only receive a 
reduced payment for the SSGES, from which the premium for organic farming had been subtracted 
(HMULV 2009). 
Because the scheme is EU cofinanced, farmers have to apply annually for the payment within the 
application for the CAP income subsidies (so-called single farm payments); payments are granted after 
the administrative units have checked farmers’ compliance (HMULV 2009). Checks comprise off-site 
(administrative) and on-site checks. Off-site checks comprise annual checks of the spatial data 
rendered by the farmers within the payment application and cover 100% of data and thus 100% of 
farmers. Main monitoring outcome is the verification of the contract area; this spatial information 
constitutes the calculation base for the payment to farmers; these payments, in turn, form the basis for 
the latter EU reimbursement (Weber 2013). On-site checks are carried out on a randomly selected 5% 
sample of total participating farmers. They consist of area-related checks via field inspections or 
satellite pictures as well as management checks via field inspections and review of the field and 
pasturing log (see Weber [2013] for details). Monitoring outcome is the verification of both spatial-
and management-related compliance (Weber 2013).  
Data and methods  
Data collection  
Since information on farmers’ TC expenses is not recorded, data was obtained directly via ex post 
interviews with farm heads (McCann et al. 2005). According to the aim of the study, the selection of 
interviewees was limited to participating farmers. Moreover, to capture the whole range of 
implementation costs, only farmers who had already participated for at least one complete contractual 
year were addressed. To control for distortions due to different habitat management necessities, their 
contract had to refer to the specified habitat of hay meadows.  
Data was obtained with the help of a closed questionnaire that contained qualitative and 
quantitative aspects measured in nominal as well as in metric scales. The main part of the 
questionnaire referred to estimating frequency, time and travel costs spent on tasks related to scheme 
participation, and were requested as a discrete statement for the first year of participation. Telephone 
costs were not requested due to commonly used flat rates; postal charges were requested but left out of 
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the analysis due to marginality. A single task-related approach was chosen to capture the actual 
composition of TCs and to be able to distinguish between voluntary and mandatory tasks. This level of 
itemisation detail leads to more valid answers, for it alleviates the potential measurement errors of 
stylised ex post time reports where farmers may not recall their actual effort correctly (Juster and 
Stafford 1991; Juster, Ono, and Stafford 2003; McCann et al. 2005; Mettepenningen, Verspecht, and 
van Huylenbroeck 2009). This approach has been widely used to capture private TCs (e.g. McCann 
and Easter 1999; Falconer 2000; Beckmann et al. 2003; Mettepenningen, Verspecht, and van 
Huylenbroeck 2009; Mettepenningen, Beckmann, and Eggers 2011; Widmark et al.2013).  
TC constituting tasks referred to in the questionnaire were identified from previous studies 
(Falconer and Whitby 1999; Falconer 2000; Falconer and Saunders 2002; Beckmann et al. 2003; 
Mettepenningen, Verspecht, and van Huylenbroeck 2009) and adjusted to the SSGES setting by 
examining the regulations and by consulting ALR staff. Special emphasis was given to those tasks not 
prescribed, but nonetheless undertaken by the farmers. This especially refers to the methods of 
gathering information. An overview is in Table1.  
Table 1: 
TC-constituting tasks. Italics indicate voluntarily conducted tasks. 
Source: Own compilation based on Beckmann et al. (2003). 
A clear assignment of tasks to either the information or negotiation stage is somewhat difficult, 
and both are often summarised as ex ante costs (Falconer and Saunders 2002). For the purpose of this 
Step in implementation process Effort for specified tasks 
Information 
Time effort: 
- on internet search 
- on official or professional press 
- on information meetings from ALR 
- on private consultancy 
- talks to other farmers 
- on meetings with officials in the ALR 
- on telephone calls with the ALR 
- on calculation of profit margins 
Mileage 
Negotiation 
Time effort: 
- on the decision of which plots to put in contract (e.g. discussions with 
family members) 
- to fill in and  
- submit the application form 
- meetings and telephone calls on negotiation with ALR on contract 
details 
- to make corrections in case of mistakes or amendments of the 
application 
Mileage 
Implementation: Contract 
Adjustments, 
Documentation/Monitoring, 
Control 
Time effort: 
- for adjustments on changes in farm specifics: time effort on calculation 
of new profit margins, meetings/calls with ALR due to contract 
adjustments, own effort, travel expenses 
- for keeping the field and pasturing log for each business year (9 
months) 
- for the annual payment application 
- for control visits and post-processing 
Mileage 
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study, information and negotiation costs are distinguished according to the kind of information 
obtained; during the information stage, general, rather nonfarm-specific information on scheme 
conditions is acquired. Tasks conducted at this time were explained by the interviewer as 
‘information-gathering tasks as long as you were not sure whether to participate at all’. Consequently, 
the negotiation stage begins when the farmer decides to participate – usually when he begins to fill out 
the application form – and individual contract specifics were considered and discussed with the ALR.  
Apart from these task-related aspects, the questionnaire also contained sections referring to the 
characteristics of the contract area, contract details, changes in production and resulting opportunity 
costs, information on the farm structure, business indicators and socio-economic characteristics of the 
farm head in order to obtain testable variables.  
The face-to-face interviews (60–90 minutes) took place in April and May 2010 on the farms. The 
interviewer filled out the questionnaire. Data was collected in a one-point approach in the 
Vogelsbergkreis and Eastern Wetteraukreis, two sub-mountainous Hessian counties with large shares 
of ecologically valuable grassland, a focus on grassland dependent agricultural use yet threatened by 
increasing abandonment of farming (HMULV 2006; Landrat des Wetteraukreises 2008; Amt für den 
ländlichen Raum des Vogelsbergkreises 2008). In one county, the ALR provided a list of about 50 
participating farmers meeting the prerequisites to become part of the sample who were then asked to 
participate in the survey by the interviewer. In the other county, no such list was provided, so farmers 
meeting the prerequisites were requested by contacting the representative of the farmers’ association; 
further interviewees were gathered via snowball sampling. While only a minor number of farmers 
addressed refused to be interviewed at all, arranging dates became more and more difficult due to the 
advanced season; farmers initially willing to participate in the study later cancelled arranged dates. 
This led to a relatively low total sample sizeof29; however, it represents7%of total SSGES participants 
in both counties. However, the low sample size makes the results somewhat explorative.  
A pre-test contained 16% of the sample; as a result, some questions were omitted, and the 
intended calculation of opportunity costs as percentages was replaced by dichotomous statements. The 
pre-test sample became part of the analysis; the revised questionnaire was re-addressed to them. 
Contract details were directly derived from the contract, business indicators from tax records. A 
description of the sample is provided in the Appendix.  
Data analysis  
The calculation of TCs follows prior studies (Falconer and Saunders 2002; Beckmann et al. 2003; 
Mettepennningen and van Huylenbroeck 2009). First, the frequency of the single tasks was multiplied 
by their duration, and the resulting time values were summarised. Mileage was calculated based on the 
reported kilometres, multiplied by 0.30 €/km as practised for tax purposes. To obtain total TCs, time 
effort was monetised by the average wage rate for agricultural workers in order to be able to add it to 
the mileage. A wage rate of 16.86 €/hr was derived from the net wage rate and an additional 70% for 
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ancillary wage costs (KTBL 2008). Although a wage rate for agricultural workers may not reflect the 
actual income of the farm heads interviewed (which would be the farm’s net gain) and does not 
resemble any differences in efficiency, it was used due to a lack of other income information. 
Moreover, use of the wage rate should not affect the analysis as the monetary expression is to a large 
degree a transformation of timely effort.  
Costs for information and negotiation were treated as one-point ex ante costs (McCann et al. 
2005); implementation costs (ex post costs) were extrapolated into the future by multiplying the first 
year costs by the contract duration of five years (Falconer and Saunders 2002). Costs indicated by 
particular farmers but likely to occur only once during the contract period (e.g. effort due to contract 
adjustments) were divided by five and distributed as a 20% share on each year of the contract period. 
Costs due to inspection visits were treated similarly when they occurred35. Extrapolation inhibits 
exploring possible economies of time, like learning effects (Falconer 2000); such an investigation 
would require a perennial survey, which was beyond the possibilities of this study.  
Because the premium is not explicitly stated in the contracts, it had to be calculated from the 
contract details (scope, management agreements, number and intensity level of EVSS). A basic 
payment of 160 €/ha (HMULV 2009) was subtracted for farms managed in accordance with the 
organic farming scheme (see above).The calculated payment was multiplied by 5 according to the 
contract duration.  
Statistical analysis was conducted with SPSS. The TCs and other metric variables were partly 
transformed into their natural logarithm to correspond to normal distribution. An initially conducted 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed no significant differences between both counties despite the 
different sample strategies.  
For analysing absolute TC expenses, TCs per contract were chosen instead of TC/ha, because the 
particular contract scope is determined when the ALR has checked the eligibility of all plots applied 
for and approves the application. Thus, farmers end up expending ex ante costs without regard to the 
final scope of their contract. To keep results comparable, TCs/contract were also chosen as dependent 
variables for implementation costs. To investigate metric as well as binary variables together, a 
general linear mixed model (GLM) approach is applied. Due to the low sample size, all variables 
could not be included in one model. Variables were tested group wise, each with one factor and two 
covariates. Additionally, the regressions were bootstrapped. Bootstrapping is a method for assigning 
measures of accuracy to sample estimates by resampling (Efron 1979; Davison, Hinkley, and Young 
2003), for example, when the specific sample may not be fully representative of the population due to 
a small sample size (Raudys and Jin 1991). Bootstrapping bases standard errors in a statistic upon the 
empirical distribution arising from repeated sampling from the researcher’s data-set and is appropriate 
for GLM use (Moulton and Zeger 1991; Garson 2012).  
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inspection costs were not included in the total costs. 
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Conceptual framework: linking TCs, informational gains and the gain from 
participation  
TCs arise due to imperfect information and result from those actions transactors undertake to 
manage the resulting uncertainty (Dahlman 1979; Coggan, Whitten, and Bennett 2010). Imperfect 
information exists because the characteristics of the goods to be exchanged are heterogeneous, because 
exactly estimating future transaction outcomes is impossible, and the behaviour of transacting partners 
in the presence of opportunism varies widely (Williamson 1979; Falconer and Whitby 1999; Leiblein 
2003). TCs arise along the transaction process as (1) search costs in order to find an adequate 
transaction partner, (2) bargaining and decision costs in order to agree on the transaction terms and (3) 
monitoring and enforcement costs in order to make sure that each transaction party complies with the 
agreement (Coase 1937; Moxey, White, and Ozanne 1999). However, potential gains from gathering 
information have to be weighed against the related expenditures (Stigler 1961; Arrow 1996); in other 
words, information costs should be weighed against the costs (losses) due to lacking information.  
In the next subsections, TCs occurring in the Hessian scheme are depicted and linked to particular 
informational gains
36
 obtainable in specific transaction stages, followed by the delineation of testable 
variables.  
TCs and informational gains along the transaction process  
Search and information stage  
At the search and information stage, contract parties aim to identify potential trading possibilities 
and partners, here given as scheme participation. If both transaction partners benefit from the 
transaction, it is reasonable for both of them to spend on search and information (Alchian 1969). In 
this study, this applies to both administration and farmer.  
Besides, how a search is conducted by one party may induce search costs on behalf of the other 
party as well. If information is provided, for example, via information meetings, then this is time-
consuming for both organiser and visitor.  
The AES participation offers a transactional gain by providing a farm income alternative upon 
agreeing to a contract at the expense of opportunity costs. These opportunity costs vary according to 
particular structural factors and make the transactional gain obtainable via scheme participation more 
or less attractive (Falconer 2000). Thus, prior to participation, farmers have to obtain costly 
information about the (financial) consequences of scheme participation as well as non-participation in 
order to make a decision (Wätzold and Schwerdtner 2005).  
In general, search costs are determined by the scope and duration of the search/ selection process, 
which in turn depend on the heterogeneity of the trading good or the trading partners (Dahlman 1979; 
Falconer and Whitby 1999; Birner and Wittmer 2004). However, subsequent long-term transactional 
                                                          
36
 Note that the terms transactional gain and informational gain refer to distinct subjects. Transactional gain 
refers to the payment per TCs. Informational gains refer to benefits obtainable due to the expense of particular 
TCs. Conceptually, informational gains are an input factor which may increase the particular transactional gain. 
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relationships and/or the scope of the search might enable fixed cost effects, which reduce the search 
costs per ha (Falconer 2000; Coggan, Whitten, and Bennett 2010). Moreover, interrelationships 
between search cost expense and latter reductions in implementation costs – especially related to 
monitoring – are frequently discussed (e.g. Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck 2009).  
As the SSGES regulations specify neither amount nor methods of providing information, the 
administrations’ and farmers’ actions are voluntary. Consequently, under the premise of acting 
rationally, farmers can be assumed to expect gains as long as they spend on information gathering. 
Action like reading additional publications or addressing the administration personally may help them 
to assess the value of the transactional gain per se; i.e. to assess the AES payment in relation to 
alternative income possibilities. Farmers may also utilise additional information to negotiate on better 
contract terms later on and/ or save time during the application process (Mettepenningen and van 
Huylenbroeck 2009). Resulting lower per ha TCs might offset the initial investment in the search. 
Such fixed cost effects were indeed found with respect to the latter contract scope (Falconer 2000; 
Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck2009).  
Negotiation stage  
The output of the negotiation stage is the participation contract specification. In this setting, this 
comprises the elicited plots which constitute the contract scope, and the management agreements and 
optional EVSS which constitute the per-ha premium the administration is willing to pay and at which 
the farmer is willing to participate. Negotiation is also frequently discussed as instrument to reveal 
farm-specific information to avoid welfare losses due to adverse selection; that is, farmers may claim 
their costs to be higher than they are and generate a producer surplus (Moxey, White, and Ozanne 
1999; Wätzold and Schwerdtner 2005;Ferraro2008). In case of individually negotiated payments, 
farmers may obtain such rents directly by claiming higher costs than the actual ones (Ferraro 2008). In 
case of flat rate payments, such rents can be generated by putting unproductive land into contracts 
(Canton, De Cara, and Jayet 2009; Quillérou and Fraser 2010)
37
. 
The SSGES includes flat rate as well as top-up premiums. Besides simply filling in and 
eventually correcting the formal application, they could make additional efforts to negotiate via talks 
with the administration and thus try to maximise the premium. As the scope of the contract can only 
be influenced by the farmers to a limited degree, farmers may try to obtain higher per-ha premiums to 
generate rents by claiming an additional or a higher intensity level of EVSS. This is facilitated by the 
fact that EVSS payments are often granted from desk instead upon a site-inspection (Weber 2013); 
moreover, farmers do not have to provide a calculation concerning their effort.  
In this perception, if initiated by the administration, negotiation costs depict ‘costs of rent 
circumvention’ (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005, 94); if initiated by farmers, they could depict rent-
constituting cost. In any case, they are borne by both administration and farmers, as both are involved 
in negotiation; if the farmers realise rents, this should be resembled in a higher net payment.  
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However, rent generating may not be the only reason for farmers to invest in negotiation, due to 
the market structure established by the scheme. The local ALR is the only contractor for a multitude of 
farmers which establishes a monopsonistic market structure. As an effect, the ALRs could exert 
monopsonistic power and pursue a ‘cost-dumping’ strategy. Restricted by budget constraints, the 
respective ALR could offer contracts on terms that secure site preservation at the lowest cost, i.e. at 
the level of the basic premium. The administration could push those farmers with a certain need to 
participate – for example due to income securing – into low-compensation participation. This situation 
represents a kind of lock-in, meaning it has the potential to generate extra rents when one transaction 
partner has few alternative contracting possibilities (Leiblein 2003). The other partner can make use of 
this situation by applying pressure and improving the contract conditions to his own benefit 
(Williamson 1985; Leiblein 2003). In such a case, agreeing on EVSS payments would not lead to 
higher net payments for farmers.  
Implementation stage 
The primary informational gain at implementation stage is to reveal whether farmers comply with 
their contractual duties in the presence of ex post opportunism, labelled moral hazard (Slangen 1997; 
Ozanne, Hogan, and Colman 2001). In principle, farmers could maximise their income by not 
complying with the agreements, receiving an unrestricted market income while at the same time being 
paid the prearranged compensation payment (Wätzold and Schwerdtner 2005). To avoid and/or detect 
moral hazard, the administration has to undertake costly monitoring (Ozanne, Hogan, and Colman 
2001). Monitoring costs vary with the modes of monitoring and the monitoring frequency (Moxey, 
White, and Ozanne 1999).  
In the SSGES, the documentary obligations shift a part of the burden of proof and the related 
monitoring costs to the farmers and thus induce distributional effects (McCann 2013). When entering 
the scheme, farmers have to anticipate these costs, especially as they have to bear them regardless of 
their particular willingness to comply. Farmers might be willing to bear these costs, for example, in 
case they value scheme participation more than their income alternatives. Further, this valuation may 
enforce compliance (including bearing its costs) in order not to risk the payment entitlement (Fraser 
2002; Yano and Blandford 2009). Complying with documentation duties with a high degree of 
accuracy then serves as a kind of risk management even if this increases their costs (Fraser 2002; Yano 
and Blandford 2009). This also corresponds to the argument raised by Mettepenningen and van 
Huylenbroeck (2009), who find that farmers who do not trust in the local administration spend more 
on monitoring costs.  
While the documentary effort is related to the contract scope and can thus be approximated 
roughly by the farmers, costs resulting from (unintended) infringements detected cannot be 
approximated precisely. Weber (2013) highlights that the monitoring techniques used may produce 
incorrect non-compliance statements. Especially, on-site checks via satellite surveillance tend to 
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produce erroneous statements, shadows of cows or forest mistaken for non-agricultural features lead to 
reductions of the contract area and thus of the payments (Weber 2013). Such errors induce 
enforcement costs for the farmers due to formal complaints; related costs also have to be anticipated. 
As a counteracting strategy, farmers may expend costs on information and negotiation in order to 
make as few mistakes as possible.  
In the following section, factors are discussed that were either empirically found or can be 
theoretically argued to increase TCs in this specific setting. Their impact on the transactional gain is 
derived inductively from the regression results, by comparing absolute TCs with relative TCs.  
Delineation of variables  
According to Transaction Cost Economics, the major theoretical strand to investigate TCs, TCs 
depend on the properties of the particular transaction – constituted by the dimensions frequency, 
uncertainty and asset specificity – as well as on the behaviour of actors involved (Williamson 1998b). 
In the following, these aspects are presented as discussed in the agri-environmental context. The focus 
is on those features which vary among the farmers within the fixed setting of the SSGES. 
Consequently, the delineated variables are either farm or contract related. Variables are presented in 
parentheses.  
Frequent transacting induces learning effects on price, quality and behaviour of the trading 
partners and thus reduces TCs (Coggan, Whitten, and Bennett 2010; McCann 2013). Frequency is 
related to the duration of a scheme (Hagedorn, Arzt, and Peters 2002; Falconer and Saunders 2002). 
Re-participation, for example, may reduce upcoming search costs, as frequent transacting induces 
learning effects on price, quality and behaviour of the trading partners, also during the lifecycle of a 
scheme (Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby 2001).  
Because the scheme was established for the first time, and its recommendations depart strongly 
from its predecessor (HMULV 2006), effects of repeated participation (frequency over time) cannot be 
tested here. However, frequency aspects were taken into account in the form of economies of scope 
and scale. Farmers can participate in the SSGES as top-up to participation in the organic farming 
scheme (ORGANIC). Economies of scope might reduce additionally incurred marginal TCs 
(Hagedorn 2008; McCann 2013) and might even offset the losses due to the reduced top-up premium.  
Economies of scale were found to reduce per ha TCs in case of high fixed TCs (e.g. Falconer 
2000; Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck 2009). To test such effects, the scope of the area 
enrolled in a particular contract (HASSGES) is taken into account, as well as the share of the contract 
area per total farm grassland (SHCONTRACT).A higher share implies that less area is managed 
outside the scheme, which might reduce TCs for coordination, like considering distinctive 
management strategies on plots within and outside the contract.  
Uncertainty raises TCs due to the necessity to provide safeguards to meet contractual hazards like 
opportunistic behaviour, measurement problems or changing conditions over time (Williamson 
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1998b). Uncertainty encompasses both outcome and actor-related aspects (Falconer and Whitby 1999; 
Coggan, Whitten, and Bennett 2010). Outcome related aspects refer to the circumstances of 
agricultural production, such as natural variability and erratic weather conditions (Falconer and 
Whitby 1999; Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck 2009). Actor-related aspects comprise bounded 
rationality and opportunism (Williamson 1985). Bounded rationality acknowledges that people are 
rational but limited in their ability to foresee all contingencies that may arise (Simon 1957) In the agri-
environmental context, for example, knowledge about the effectiveness of measures might be difficult 
to acquire due to difficulties in measuring and/or observing because of time-lagged outcomes and 
other hindrances (Falconer and Whitby 1999; McCann 2013).  
Uncertainty may also foster opportunistic behaviour, in case such features aggravate observing 
compliance (Falconer and Whitby 1999; Coggan, Whitten, and Bennett2010). Hessian farmers face 
uncertainty primarily in farm production, for example, due to volatility in production yields and 
resulting income insecurity. Scheme participation, in contrast, provides a calculable alternative in the 
farm’s income portfolio, especially as the payments are action-related and do not demand a specified 
(and probably uncertain) outcome. Indeed, farmers were found to participate in AES in order to reduce 
risks from a volatile production of market goods (Wilson and Hart 2000). Fraser (2002) finds that 
uncertainty in farmers’ production income enforces compliance with AES in order not to risk the 
payment entitlement. In such a case, farmers value the secure income more, although it might be lower 
than the actual, yet uncertain production income (Yano and Blandford 2009). Thus, farmers stating a 
high volatility in production yield (VOLATILITY) presumably spend more TCs and probably 
receive/accept a lower net gain. This effect might even be more severe when farm income is the most 
important household income source, that is, for full-time farmers (FULLTIME). However, a contrary 
effect is also possible; professional farmers might benefit from information comparatively more due to 
competence and obtain a higher payment via TCs expenditure.  
A related argument is that securing income becomes more important if the farm business is in 
financial need due to its general business situation. Battershill and Gilg (1997) find that low income, 
such as on marginal farms, usually makes it necessary to generate alternative income sources. Hence, 
such farmers might also invest in compliance in order not to jeopardise the payments. In this study, the 
share of total CAP payments (including the income support from the single farm payments) per total 
farm revenue (CAP) serves as an indicator for financial dependency.  
The last but most important dimension influencing TCs is asset specificity. Asset specificity is 
defined by the asset’s applicability in alternative purposes and may take a variety of forms – physical 
assets, human assets, site specificity, dedicated assets, brand name capital and temporal specificity 
(Williamson 1998b). In the agri-environmental context, a substantial positive relationship between 
physical assets, namely site specificity (usually indicated by production-related opportunity costs), 
specificity of human resources (in terms of technical knowledge level or experience), and scheme 
specificity (e.g. the degree of targeting) and participation-related TCs is thoroughly found (Falconer 
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and Whitby 1999; Hagedorn, Arzt, and Peters 2002; Vatn 2002; Birner and 
Wittmer2004;Hagedorn2008;Rørstad, Vatn, and Kvakkestad2007).  
To participate in the SSGES, specialised technical knowledge is not required. However, 
production-related opportunity costs may vary between the farmers and influence TCs. For testing, 
these opportunity costs are calculated as the sum of management changes due to scheme participation 
as indicated by the interviewee (OPPORTUNITY COSTS). To control for influences of different 
contract specifications, both the weighted sum of EVSS/ha
38
 (EVSS) as well as the scope of the 
grazing agreement per contract (GRAZING) are included in the analysis. Both features increase the 
premium; moreover, they might be a negotiation result. At the same time, they may go along with 
higher TCs, for instance, due to keeping a pasturing log. Therefore, it is of interest if the additional 
TCs are outweighed by the higher premium.  
Results and discussion  
Descriptive results  
TCs found for SSGES participation are substantial, and result from a number of tasks conducted 
even on a voluntary basis. On average, farmers spent nine hr on informational and six hr on 
negotiation tasks. Implementation tasks for the whole contract period required 67.41hr on average and 
thus the majority of time (and costs), probably due to the substantial reporting duties. TCs/ha for the 
whole contract period is 95.33 € on average, albeit with a substantial variance. Average TCs expressed 
as a percentage of payments are about 7%, also with a wide range. Table2 depicts the main descriptive 
results.  
Table 2 
Total TCs of farmers in scheme participation. 
 
First year Total contract period 
mean std. mean std. 
TC/contract (€) 527.10. 432.70 1440.48. 1667.44 
TC/ha contract area (€) 33.85 48.63 95.33 202.82 
TC/plot (€) 51.87 57.66 133.98 176.23 
TC per € payment 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.14 
Information costs/contract (€) 171.96 142.44 171.96 142.44 
Negotiation costs/contract (€) 126.84 127.32 126.84 127.32 
Implementation costs/contract (€) 228.34 317.33 1,141.69 1,586.65 
Information costs (%) 40.7 24.6 24.6 23.4 
Negotiation costs (%) 27.5 19.7 15.0 13.6 
Implementation costs (%) 31.8 22.4 60.5 27.1 
Productivity: Premium/TC (€) 18.10  17.97 46.30  50.67 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
At the search and information stage, farmers obtain information from a variety of sources with a 
preference for face-to-face communication. The most important informational sources are reading 
official brochures (82.2% of farmers), commercial or advisory journals (69% of farmers, 14.7% 
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reading more than one) and attending informational meetings provided by the ALRs (69% of farmers); 
6.8% of farmers even attended more than three meetings. Additional informative talks to ALR staff 
via telephone or bilateral meeting are frequently undertaken. Sixty-nine percent of farmers phoned at 
least once (24% of farmers phoned more than five times), 49% of farmers arranged at least one 
meeting (10.3% arranged more than three meetings) and 52% of the interviewed farmers also reported 
at least one conversation with other farmers as an information source (24% of the interviewees 
reported more than three talks). Only a small number of farmers gathered information from the 
internet and from consulting private extension services (14% of interviewees for each).  
Farmers also conduct a number of negotiation activities. Besides filling in the application form, 
73% of the farmers had at least one negotiation meeting at the administration (37.9% reported more 
than two meetings) and 55% of interviewees phoned the ALR at least once for negotiation purposes 
(20.6% reported more than three phone calls). In addition, most of the farmers (76%) reported that 
they submitted the contract personally to the administration to discuss last minute details.  
At the implementation stage, TCs are mainly constituted by documentary effort. However, the 
interviews revealed that the frequency and duration of log keeping varies greatly. Some farmers 
simply make daily notes on a calendar and fill in the log once a week; others use professional software 
and keep their log daily.  
Due to different TC categorisations and measurements, the results cannot be directly compared to 
previous findings; thus, a comparative statement is not possible. Even so, in line with earlier findings 
(e.g. Falconer 2000; Falconer and Saunders2002), ex ante costs comprise the highest share of TCs in 
the first year of participation, and the share decreases over the whole contract period, even though no 
further degressive effects could be taken into account due to the extrapolation (see ‘Data and methods’ 
section). This highlights the important effect of scheme duration on relative TCs.  
The next section discusses explanations of the variances in TCs, which were derived from the 
regression results.  
Regression results  
Table 3 shows significant results for a number of variables. However, since the sample size 
limited the number of variables to be included into each regression, the impact of the intercept is 
highest with respect to significance level and effect size in all regressions. This indicates that a number 
of important variables exist that are not explicitly addressed in the particular regression
39
.  
The regression results reveal that higher TCs generally go in line with a lower payment/ TC ratio 
(fourth and fifth columns of Table 3); moreover, during the transaction stages, significant variables 
show no changes in sign, which would have indicated TC savings due to prior TC expense. Thus, with 
all else being equal, TCs serve neither to obtain gains during the transaction stages nor to maximise 
the overall net gain.  
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Interestingly, however, the regression results reveal significant impacts mainly for factors related 
to uncertainty and asset specificity; frequency-related factors show a minor impact. Overall, farm-
related factors were prominent. This deserves a closer look. The remainder of this section depicts the 
GLM results in detail
40
.  
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Table 3: Results of GLM regressions 
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Factors related to frequency  
The results do not support the existence of economies of scope and indicate only limited 
economies of scale. ORGANIC has a substantial, negative impact on the payment/TC ratio as well as 
on information costs; impacts at the other TC stages are not significant. Given that organic farmers 
expect a reduced premium, they have a relatively high demand for (general) information. This is also 
reflected in the low payment/TC ratio. Instead of obtaining economies of scope, using the SSGES as 
top-up for the organic farming scheme seems to be relatively costly in terms of TCs. Compared to 
conventional farmers, organic farmers ceteris paribus have a substantial disadvantage. The reduced 
premium they receive seems not to outweigh their (additional) TC expenses.  
A significant impact of the contract scope on any TCs, which could indicate economies of scale, 
was not found. This is somewhat contrary to the findings of Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck 
(2009), who find a reducing impact on information and negotiation costs due to fixed cost effects. The 
absence of such effects here might be a result of the eligibility criteria of the SSGES, probably as a 
result of the farmers’ lack of discretion in determining the final contract scope. Weber (2013) reports 
that some farmers even apply for all their sites and leave the decision of which sites to enter into the 
scheme up to the ALRs. Obtaining economies of scale in that case would instead be a result of chance. 
Moreover, as the documentary effort refers to all plots, economies of scale at the implementation stage 
are also unlikely(Weber 2013).  
However, farmers managing a high share of their grassland under the SSGES are able to achieve 
some economies of scale. The significant positive impact of the share of contract area on the 
premium/TC ratio probably results from the substantial negative effect on information costs. Farmers 
managing most of their grassland in areas eligible for scheme participation thus seem to reduce their 
effort in considering alternative decisions.  
Factors related to uncertainty  
Surprisingly, full-time farmers expend substantially more TCs throughout the whole transaction 
process than their part-time colleagues. The effect size is largest at the implementation stage and 
smallest at information stage. Full-time farmers also obtain a lower payment/TC ratio. Since 
maximising income can be considered important when farm income is the most important income 
source, these findings (especially the negative effect on the payment/TC ratio) are rather puzzling. 
However, some explanations are possible: first, the high impact on implementation costs may result 
from more professional modes of book-keeping in terms of frequency and accuracy.  
Second, the impact at the information and negotiation stage may result from frequent interactions 
with the ALRs, especially since these are also contact agencies for matters concerning other aspects of 
agricultural policy. Agricultural policy in recent decades – especially in the EU – has made public 
support a regular part of farmers’ income; information gathering and interacting with agricultural 
administrations is thus likely to form a regular part of (professional) farm management. This may have 
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led to overestimating the effort in the interviews. Moreover, farmers may achieve economies of scope 
through frequent interaction with the ALRs, that is, information gathered might also be used for other 
purposes besides scheme participation.  
Finally, full-time farmers may have lower opportunity costs of time; part-time farmers are 
employed elsewhere and have to conduct their informational tasks in their leisure time
41
.  
The impact of VOLATILITY is more straightforward. Reported volatility goes in line with higher 
total TCs and the coefficient for the payment/TC ratio is negative, although just below significance. 
Volatility also hasa significant positive impact at the information and negotiation stage with a 
considerably high effect size. At the implementation stage, the effect size is even higher yet just below 
significance. Obviously, uncertainty is an important factor on voluntary as well as mandatory TC 
expenses. Especially the latter supports the role of risk aversion on compliance (Fraser 2002; Yano 
and Blandford 2009). Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck (2009) argue in a similar way; they find 
that when farmers have low trust in administrations, they increase their implementation effort. The 
authors argue that farmers probably spend more time on paperwork because they fear penalties. 
However, in this study, the positive impact is not only found at the implementation stage. It seems that 
farmers facing production uncertainty are willing to expend substantial TCs in order to obtain a secure 
income, even when they obtain a comparatively lower payment/TC ratio.  
In line with this, the dependency on subsidy income (CAP) was also found to have a significant 
increasing effect on total TCs, corresponding to a lowering effect on the payment/TC ratio. A 
significant positive effect exists particularly for negotiation costs; effects on information and 
implementation costs are positive but just below the significance level. However, the effect size of the 
variable is rather low.  
Factors related to asset specificity  
In line with earlier findings, total TCs increase with higher opportunity costs (e.g. Falconer and 
Whitby 1999; Vatn 2002; Rørstad, Vatn, and Kvakkestad 2007). With respect to the particular cost 
categories, opportunity costs have a positive impact on information costs, the effect on the 
payment/TC ratio is slightly negative but not significant. Obviously, farmers invest more in 
information collection, the more the changes in management they expect. However, the particular 
effect size found for the significant results is rather small. This might be due to the location of the 
study area, which is characterised by marginal farming. Opportunity costs seem to play a minor role 
for TC expense in comparison to regions where farming is more intensive.  
The weighted sum of EVSS as a possible negotiation result has a significant (negative) impact 
only at the information stage yet with a comparatively low effect size. Agreeing on (additional) EVSS 
is either not subject to the farmers’ discretion or not utilised as instrument to increase the premium.  
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secure a sufficient participation rate. In that case, it might be the ALRs who were locked in and face additional 
effort in order to carry out the transaction.  
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In contrast to the results for EVSS, farmers expend substantially more total TCs the higher the 
scope of the grazing agreement per contract is, denoted by GRAZING. This negatively affects the 
payment/TC ratio. A high impact on total TCs probably results from substantial efforts at the 
implementation stage. Keeping the pasturing log seems to induce substantial additional documentary 
effort, which is not outweighed by the higher basic per/ha premium.  
Implications  
Although the findings do not support the general hypothesis of the study and their interpretation 
is explorative due to the case study approach, the findings provide some interesting explanations for 
intra-scheme TC variances. Interestingly, the causes for variation (voluntary) TC expense lie in farm 
attributes rather than, in particular, contract specifics. For some farmers, TCs seem to play the role of 
an investment to generate a part of the farm’s income via (calculable and stable) payments for AES 
participation, preferred to a rather uncertain income from market goods’ production.  
Under the current scheme regulations, both full-time and organic farmers were better off with 
respect to TC expenditure if they participated without much effort to obtain information in order to 
realise a maximum transactional gain. The fact that especially full-time farmers do not ‘economise’ on 
TCs raises the question on their actual opportunity costs of time; a topic which should be addressed in 
further research.  
However, an important caveat is that both types of farmers may have advantages when compared 
to their counterparts, which might outweigh the TC-related disadvantages. For one, full-time farmers 
may mitigate the low payment/TC ratio via savings in production costs due to economies of scale in 
agricultural production. This might also apply to organic farms; they might face fewer opportunity 
costs and possible production-related economies of scope. For an overall evaluation, it is thus 
important to consider the total costs of participation (Falconer and Saunders 2002).  
Another interesting fact is that, ceteris paribus scheme features do affect the individual 
benefit/cost ratio of the farmers. Farmers obtain a higher payment/TC ratio when they have a high 
share of their grassland in the contract. Other scheme features affect the payment/TC ratio negatively. 
First, the higher premium for the grazing agreement does not outweigh the additionally incurred TCs. 
Next, economies of scale – although usually found for scheme-related TCs – seem to be unachievable 
within the existent monitoring regulations (cf. Weber 2013). Obviously, whether a factor is influential 
seems to be context specific. This highlights the role of policy design on resulting TCs (Krutilla and 
Krause 2010; Weber2013). To better control for such effects, AES-related TCs should be investigated 
with regard to the particular scheme regulations in a joint approach.  
Apart from such practical implications, the most interesting result is the general impact of 
uncertainty related factors on farmers’ TC expense. Farmers stating volatility of output expend 
substantially more TCs throughout the whole implementation process. A preference for a stable 
income seems also to influence the related TC expense. The secure (yet comparatively lower) 
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payment/TC ratio seems to be preferred compared to the uncertain market income. In that case, TC 
expense could be perceived as ‘willingness to pay’ for participation, somewhat in the sense of revealed 
preferences (Samuelson 1938; Varian 2006). While a number of studies have investigated 
participation motives of farmers (see e.g. Siebert, Toogood, and Knierim [2006] for an overview), 
little is known about whether such motives are mirrored in participation-related TC expenses. Further 
research should take this into account.  
Finally, taking the SSGES as an example, the findings reveal that assessing a TC component 
within the premium calculation remains difficult. The study revealed that – foremost at the 
information and negotiation stage – the number and frequency of TC constituting tasks varies greatly 
between farmers and is often subject to their own decision. Especially the latter offers incentives for 
farmers to overstate their effort, which would result in new informational deficiencies of the ALRs and 
probably additional costs documenting the information-related effort. Within the example of the 
SSGES, it seems more appropriate to amend the payment calculation for organic farmers and/or either 
increase the premium for the grazing agreement. However, the prohibition of double funding actually 
inhibits a premium re-calculation for organic farmers.  
Moreover, the related documentary duties could be reduced to increase the payment/TC ratio. 
However, the documentary duties mainly originate in the EU co-financing regulations, which at the 
moment hampers any attempts at state level to reduce them (Weber 2013).  
Conclusion  
This case study investigated farmers’ TCs in a regional SSGES with negotiable components. Its 
main attempt was to explain intra-scheme variances in TC expenditure under the hypothesis that TC 
expense serves at maximising the per ha premium. Although the results do not support a gain 
maximising role of TC expenditure, they nonetheless provide some explanations for intra-scheme TC 
variances. Higher TCs expense predominates for particular farms features indicating dependency on 
AES income. Thus, (voluntary) TC expenditure seems to serve as a safeguard for securing 
participation-related income. Moreover, the results suggest that participation motives might be related 
to the expense of TCs, a subject that should be addressed in further research.  
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Appendix  
Table A2: Description of the sample 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
mean std. min/max 
Organic farms (%) 31.00    
Fulltime run farms (%) 69.00    
Arable land (ha) 49.92  83.53 0 - 300 
Grassland (ha) 86.34 63.14 4.63 – 250.00 
Volatility in output = yes (%) 
 
41.40   
Subsidies CAP/ total revenue (%) 38.40 23.28 9.20 - 87.70 
Farm head’s strategic focus (%):    
Suckler cow husbandry   37.90    
Dairy farming    31.00   
Arable farming    13.80    
Others 17.20   
Scope of contract (ha) 30.90 30.5 3.46 - 115.49 
Total number of plots /contract  19.72 27.86 4.00 – 148.00 
Contract area/total grassland (%) 41.00 0.28 3.00 – 100.00 
Weighted EVSS/ha (%) 3.27 3.41  
Annual premium (€) 7.610 7759.34  
Annual premium /ha (€) 273.89 61.30  
Age farm head (yrs.) 48.70 10.39  
Sex of farm head (%):  male 89.70   
female 10.30   
Farmers’ professional 
degree (%): none 37.90 
 
 
Traineeship 13.80   
Advanced training 31.00    
University degree 17.20    
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6 How are Public Transaction Costs in regional Agri-Environmental 
Scheme Delivery influenced by EU regulations?
42
  
 
Anja Weber  
Abstract 
Implementing agri-environmental schemes (AES) induces private and public transaction 
costs (TCs). To date, research has investigated TCs stemming from the relationship 
between (regional) administrations and farmers. However, implementing AES within the 
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) offers partial reimbursement of payments but 
implies an additional transaction and TCs. This paper investigates the effects of EU 
regulations on occurrence and composition of regional public TCs qualitatively by using 
Hesse, Germany, as a case study. Using insights from political science theories, I present 
results from interviews with administrative units: EU-required structural and procedural 
prerequisites shape the regional implementation and draw the focus towards expense of 
EU-based TCs. Moreover, there are spillovers onto farmers’ TCs. Thus, the CAP 
framework is an important influencing factor, and resulting TCs may reduce the 
budgetary benefit obtained from the reimbursement.  
Keywords: Transaction costs; institutional environment; agri-environmental schemes; policy 
implementation; Germany  
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1. Introduction 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) are a widely used policy instrument for fostering the 
provision of environmental benefits via agriculture. Farmers are paid in return for carrying out agri-
environmental commitments. Conceptually, AES are contractual mechanisms between a farmer/seller 
and and agricultural administration as a representative consumer (Hagedorn, Arzt, and Peters 2002). 
However, in addition to the payments, AES require transaction costs (TCs) on behalf of farmers and 
administrations. On the administration’s side, they are “costs of setting up and running the 
organisational and contractual structure” (Beckmann, Eggers, and Mettepenningen 2009, 694), and are 
labelled public TCs or administrative costs (Falconer and Whitby 1999). TCs as part of the gross costs 
reduce the benefit obtained from payments (Falconer and Whitby 1999). TCs in general owe their 
existence to imperfect information in market exchanges (Dahlman 1979) as well as in exchanges in the 
administrative or political sphere (Paavola and Adger 2005). Imperfect information exists due to 
heterogeneity of the characteristics of the good to be exchanged and, in the presence of opportunism, 
due to heterogeneity in the behaviour of the transacting partners (Falconer and Whitby 1999). 
Transaction costs arise as results of those actions transactors conduct to manage these information 
deficiencies (Coggan, Whitten, and Bennett 2010). Along the transaction process, it becomes 
necessary to expend: (1) search and information costs to find an adequate transaction partner; (2) 
bargaining and decision costs to agree on the terms of the transaction; and (3) policing and 
enforcement costs to make sure that each transaction party complies with the agreement (Coase 1937; 
Dahlman 1979).  
Empirical evidence identifies various factors that influence public TCs in AES (Falconer and 
Whitby 1999; Falconer and Saunders 2002; Vatn 2002; Rørstad, Vatn, and Kvakkestad 2007; 
Ollikainen, Lankoski, and Nuutinen 2008; Nilsson 2009; Mettepenningen, Beckmann, and Eggers 
2011; Jongeneel, Polman, and Slangen 2012). Mettepenningen, Beckmann, and Eggers (2011, cf. for a 
broader discussion) synthesised them as actor-and scheme-related factors, the natural environment in 
which the scheme is designed to act, and the institutional environment in which the schemes are 
designed and implemented.  
These studies focus on the interaction between a regional administration and farmers. However, 
many member states of the European Union (EU) offer AES within the European Agricultural Fund 
for Rural Development (EAFRD). The EAFRD is part of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and provides a partial reimbursement of national AES payments upon compliance with funding 
regulations. By this, the EU pursues its own environmental policy goals and at the same time eases the 
member states’ budgetary constraints. In Germany, where design and implementation of AES is a duty 
of the Länder (states), especially those with difficult budget circumstances make extended use of this 
possibility (Osterburg and Stratmann 2002; Eggers, Laschawski, and Schleyer 2004). However, 
offering AES within the EAFRD establishes a further transaction, namely between the EU and the 
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member state’s administrative level in charge, and the regional administration acts as an agent for 
implementing EU policy goals. As the CAP has one of the highest degrees of regulation amongst the 
EU’s policies and leaves only little discretion for EU member states (Franchino 2004; Swinnen 2010), 
this transaction is likely to be superimposed creating a general institutional environment (IE) 
(Williamson 2000) for the transaction between regional administration and farmer. As a consequence, 
first, extra TCs due to this additional relationship are likely to occur that affect the composition of 
public TCs at the regional level. Moreover, second, the IE constituted by EU regulations may have an 
influencing effect on those factors previously identified to influence public TCs. EU-related TCs may 
thus reduce the budgetary benefits obtained from the co-financing.  
This paper investigates these assumptions with the help of a qualitative case study in Hesse. 
Hesse is one of the larger Länder and has had to cope with severe budget cuts in recent years 
(HMULV
43
 2006). In the current EU funding period (2007–2013), Hesse has been implementing AES, 
such as organic farming, intertilling, buffer strips etc., via the Hessian Integrated Agri-Environmental 
Programme ‘HIAP’ with a total budget of €140M and a 50% EU co-funding share44. The most 
important AES with respect to intended participation and budget is site-specific grassland 
extensification (SSGES), an area-based scheme consisting of a basic agreement and negotiable extra 
services (HMULV2006; see Weber 2011, for details). It is a fusion of a formerly state-financed site-
specific grassland extensification scheme (‘HELP’) and a farm-related general extensification scheme 
which already had been co-financed by the EU (‘HEKUL’) in the previous funding period (HMULV 
2006). The scope of the intended area to be enrolled was reduced from 105,000 ha (HEKUL/HELP) to 
45,000 ha in HIAP (HMULV 2006). Several increases in payments were necessary to ensure a 
sufficient participation rate of 4000 farmers and approximately 42,000 ha in 2011, as HELP farmers 
faced an initial 30% lower payment and initially refrained from participation (HMULV 2008; 
HMUELV 2012). As it will be shown, future participation may also be affected, as the implementation 
within the EAFRD also affects farmers’ TCs.  
The study approach is explorative and positive; empirical evidence is derived from a document 
analysis of the relevant EU regulations and a content analysis of semi-structured interviews conducted 
with Hessian administrative units. The analytical framework (Section 2) connects the findings from 
the mentioned AES-related TCs approaches with positive theories from political science, which deal 
with the guiding effect of regulations. It also depicts the main regulations for EU reimbursement, and 
delineates resulting TCs typologies and their incidence at the regional level. Data and methods are 
described in Section 3. Section 4 depicts which tasks arise in AES implementation and how they are 
operated due to regulations. Resulting TCs are indicated and the main implications of the findings are 
discussed. Apart from supporting the assumptions, the results imply the existence of a trade-off 
                                                          
43
 HMULV was the name of the Ministry HMUELV until 2006. 
44
 HIAP is further co-funded by the federal task ‘Joint Action for Improvement of Agrarian Structures and for Coast 
Preservation (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der Agrarstruktur und des Küstenschutzes, GAK)’ that induces additional 
regulations. However, these are not included in this study. 
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between scheme-related and reimbursement-related TC expenses. Moreover, spillovers onto farmers’ 
TCs occur. A brief conclusion is provided in Section 5.  
2 .Analytical framework 
2.1. AES-related public TCs and the institutional environment 
TCs arise as design and implementation of AES induces several informational requirements: on 
the possible environmental benefits to be provided by the scheme; on the appropriateness of sites (e.g. 
heterogeneity in characteristics, in location-specific opportunity costs or in ecological value); on 
management agreements capable of providing these benefits; and on a difficult, often time-lagged 
observability of the outcome (Falconer and Whitby 1999). The latter is due to difficulties in assessing 
input to output, because stochastic environmental factors such as weather conditions also affect the 
output (Falconer and Whitby 1999). In this setting, opportunistic farmers may try to generate rents. 
This moral hazard is difficult to detect and induces monitoring costs (Ozanne, Hogan, and Colman 
2001).  
To meet these informational requirements, TC expenditure aims to identify site characteristics 
and possible transaction partners, e.g. the incidence of the habitats and their owners, to preserve 
management practices (Wätzold and Schwerdtner 2005), to negotiate AES contract terms in order to 
meet heterogeneous incentives and farmers’ opportunity costs, and to monitor compliance with the 
agreements, including pursuing deviations (Fraser 1995).  
Empirical evidence reveals that high informational needs in the case of heterogeneity (of sites as 
well as of farmers) indeed result in higher TCs, if this heterogeneity is met by precisely designed 
schemes (Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby 2001; Vatn, 2002; Rørstad, Vatn, and Kvakkestad 2007; 
Ollikainen, Lankoski, and Nuutinen 2008). In contrast, economies of scale due to a high number of 
participants and the scope of area enrolled can be achieved, reducing relative TCs especially in the 
case of high fixed costs (Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby 2001; Nilsson 2009). Moreover, learning 
effects due to experience are generally found to reduce TCs over the scheme’s life cycle (Falconer and 
Whitby 1999; Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby 2001; Rørstad, Vatn, and Kvakkestad 2007; Nilsson 
2009). A certain degree of constancy in scheme provision is thus recommended (Falconer and Whitby, 
1999).  
Apart from a distinction along the transaction stages, TCs can be divided into set-up and on-going 
costs, and into fixed (i.e. independent of scope, payments or participation rate) and variable (v.v.) 
costs (Falconer and Whitby 1999; Ollikainen, Lankoski, and Nuutinen 2008). 
 In addition to these empirical findings, several factors are concluded from a theoretical 
viewpoint. The likeliness of moral hazard behaviour of farmers is discussed from an economic (Becker 
1968) as well as from a social science perspective (Winter and May 2001). Farmers may either find no 
economic advantage in non-compliance or refrain from it due to social pressure. Moreover, farmers 
with positive attitudes towards the scheme are assumed to comply due to an intrinsic motivation 
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(Falconer and Whitby 1999). This is related to low enforcement costs (Mettepenningen, Beckmann, 
and Eggers 2011). Trust in farmers falls into the same category (Smits, Driessen, and Glasbergen 
2008; Mettepenningen, Beckmann, and Eggers 2011). Low enforcement costs are also assumed in 
cases where farmers have a good understanding of the scheme; therefore, more information provision 
could lead to fewer failures (McCann and Easter 1999; Falconer and Whitby 1999; Falconer and 
Saunders 2002). 
The influence of the institutional environment (IE), i.e. the broader set of rules and regulations in 
which the transaction takes place (Coggan, Whitten, and Bennett 2010), todate has mainly been 
assessed from a theoretical viewpoint
45. The IE contains the “formal rules of the game” (Williamson 
2000, 597), which comprise “rules, laws and, constitutions… and their enforcement characteristics” 
(Hagedorn 2008, 360). They aim to structure incentives in human interaction and thus “affect the 
performance of the economy by their effect on the costs of exchange and production” (North 1990, 5). 
In brief, the particular IE sets the frame in which a particular transaction may take place and influences 
transaction costs and transaction outcome by its impact on the terms of exchange. Thus, the IE may 
lower but also raise transaction costs (North 1990), which means that it is an important influencing 
factor. 
Regulations are an important part of the IE. They define a policy and its formal implementation 
(Bourblanc et al. 2012). However, the delegation of implementation from the legislator (principal) to 
an executive administration (agent) may induce agency losses due to the administration’s information 
advantage concerning its actual work and the absence of comprehensive monitoring possibilities 
(McCubbins 1999). This is labelled ‘bureaucratic drift’ and may reduce the socially desired outcome 
as formulated in the policy (Moe 1997). 
In economic relationships, the principal counteracts agency losses by offering incentives to 
comply, e.g. a share of residual gains (Moe 1984). However, such reward mechanisms are limited in 
political principal-agent relationships (Moe 1984). Consequently, political principals favour the use of 
hierarchical control mechanisms (Moe 1984, 2005). 
One possibility is to limit administrative discretion (i.e. “the power or the right of deciding 
according to one’s own judgment” (Langbein 2009, 84) by specifying structural and procedural 
requirements already in the underlying legal framework (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989). This 
is labelled the structure-and-procedure approach (Carrigan and Coglianese 2011). Prerequisites may 
include “structural choices, including defining the agency’s mission, establishing its internal 
organizational structure, and choosing its location within the larger executive branch” (Spence 1999, 
415). This allows the creation of a framework where a frequent intervention of the principal may not 
be necessary if the deterring effect of the sanctions is high enough (Huber and Shipan 2000). 
These requirements cause TCs; set-up costs arise for the legislative in policy formulation and 
enactment as well as for the implementing administration, which has to set up the required structures 
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and secure the required procedures. In cases when these requirements are policy-specific, the 
upcoming TCs bear the characteristics of specific investments (Williamson 1979; Fernandez 2007), 
and may create path dependence to offset high set-up costs (North 1990). 
Moreover, required structures and procedures may reduce but not replace the expense of ex post 
costs, as monitoring, e.g. by regular visits, hearings, reports, checks on performance indicators etc. still 
remains necessary (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Heinrich and Marschke 2010). These costs 
also represent TCs, namely enforcement costs, which also arise for both the legislator and the 
implementing administration. However, by imposing procedures upon the administrations, legislators 
shift a substantial part of TCs to the implementing administration. Recommended structures and 
procedures also determine the level of discretion left for administrative agents to act. From an 
economic viewpoint, there is a trade-off between costs and gains of delegation (Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999). While the legislator’s information on administrative performance might increase 
due to tight structural and procedural prescriptions, distributive losses may occur on the regional level 
due to uniform standards (Huber and Shipan 2000). 
If the policy area is complex, gains from leaving discretion could be achieved due to a greater 
knowledge of the administration (Langbein 2009), while too little discretion may have a hampering 
effect (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Stephenson 2011; Gailmard 2012). In connection with 
deterrence, an administration might also be kept from testing alternative methods or procedures for 
creating administrative innovations (Whitford 2002). With little discretion, the possibilities of an 
administration to respond to changing circumstances and new information are reduced (Huber and 
Shipan 2000). Moreover, administrative employees might also be driven by intrinsic motivation such 
as attitudes or ideology (Heinrich and Marschke 2010); its negligence may lead to unnecessarily tight 
regulations, implying inefficiently high TCs.  
Positive evidence on the scope of how much is left to discretion reveals that legislators leave 
more discretion if they assume the administration’s preferences are close to their own (‘ally principle’, 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). Heterogeneous administrative preferences – resulting in little discretion 
– are also assumed if a central legislative decision is implemented by different administrations in 
particular regions (Moe 1997). In addition, the type of policy pursued plays a role; in the EU context, 
Franchino (2001, 2004) showed that distributive policies – where large sums of money are 
redistributed between the member states – are implemented with less discretion. He argued that a high 
level of specific rules, procedures and criteria provide proof for the donor states that recipient states do 
not deviate from the policy aims agreed upon. This constitutes a form of credible commitment (Huber 
and Shipan 2000) between donor and recipient states. In this case, the IE is an institutional response to 
the policy area pursued (Huber and Shipan 2000).  
Thus, in addition to set-up and running costs, centralised regulations leaving little discretion may 
induce adaptation costs as well as distributive losses in the region according to a deviance from its 
own preferences (Huber and Shipan 2000; Hagedorn 2008). In contrast, economies of scale and the 
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implementation of uniform standards in terms of credible commitment can be achieved by central 
approaches (Huber and Shipan, 2000).  
These aspects reveal that the IE may also have distributional effects on the incidence of TC, 
especially in cases where gains from and expenses of TCs are allocated at different administrative 
levels. Within an IE, economies of scope are assumed to reduce TCs when one transaction can be 
linked to another, e.g. when the same regulations require the same tasks (Hagedorn 2008; 
Mettepenningen, Beckmann, and Eggers 2011). Conversely, efforts at co-ordination may raise TCs. In 
addition, incorporating a policy programme into an already existing one may lower the costs of one 
programme relative to another, especially if property rights concerned remain unchanged (McCann 
and Easter 1999; McCann et al.2005). This may also lower costs for information and adoption 
(Coggan, Whitten, and Bennett 2010). In contrast, frequent changes in the prevailing rules raise TCs 
(Mettepenningen, Beckmann, and Eggers 2011). Thus, the formulation of particular institutional rules 
influences the level and distribution of TCs and the governance outcomes (Paavola and Adger 2005).  
To answer the question about which regional TCs result from required structures and procedures, 
the main regulations of the EAFRD have to be investigated.  
2.2. Requirements of the EAFRD  
Co-financing AES is regulated in the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD) (European Council 2005b), which constitutes the so-called ‘second pillar’ of the CAP. 
While the ‘first pillar’, the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), regulates the financing of 
market and income support measures for farmers, the EAFRD stipulates the terms and conditions for 
co-financing rural development measures (European Council 2005a). AES are considered to be an 
important part of rural development by “supporting the sustainable development of rural areas and 
responding to society’s increasing demand for environmental services” (Art. 35). Technically, the EU 
co-finances AES by partially reimbursing payments upon declarations of expenditure submitted by the 
national administration in charge (European Council2005a). Regionally differentiated percentages of 
reimbursement, which range from 50–75%, imply distributive effects on the regional public budgets 
(European Council 2005a, Art. 74). A high number of structural and procedural requirements for 
reimbursement can be found:  
First, member states have to implement the EAFRD via Regional Development Programmes 
(RDPs) that comprise the regional development strategy for the whole funding period of six years 
(European Council 2005a). RDPs encompass all aims, strategies, measures, finances, the nomination 
of administrative units and their responsibilities (Art.16). Measures not specified in the RDP cannot be 
reimbursed.  
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Measures also have to be in line with content-related requirements; area-related AES, i.e. those 
that require management agreements on particular sites
46
, have to meet criteria for design such as 
minimum commitment standards, a duration of at least five years, and criteria for payment calculation 
(European Council 2005a, Art. 39). RDPs and any future amendments have to be approved by the EU 
Commission (Art. 18, 19). Annual evaluations and progress reports have to be submitted (Art. 83). In 
addition, detailed ex ante, ex post and mid-term evaluations are obligatory (Art. 85f.). Since the RDP 
is set up for an entire six-year funding period with the mentioned limits on amendments, AES and 
their implementation are more or less fixed.  
Second, the EU requires EAFRD implementation via a specified administrative structure of three 
regional units with different responsibilities and mutual control functions (Art. 74):  
A Managing Authority (MA) in charge of running the whole RDP “in an efficient, effective, and 
correct way” (Art. 75), referring to the technical aspects of the RDP.  
A Paying Agency (PA), responsible for EU-compliant RDP processing, which involves checking 
and documenting the required procedures before payments are authorised (European Council2005b, 
Art. 6; European Commission 2006a).  
A Certification Body (CB) that checks and certifies the PA by annually inspecting its work in a 
formal procedure (European Council 2005b, Art. 7). 
Third, the EAFRD requires processing the AES via an Integrated Administration and Control 
System (IACS) as its primary database (European Commission 2006b, 2009).IACS data enables the 
identification of farmers, the identification of payment claims and the complete traceability of 
payment entitlements. It also provides the required monitoring data. It contains detailed GIS-based 
area-related information on agriculturally used plots and is the base for the selection of the control 
samples in various measures (Nitsch et al. 2012). 
Implementing provisions of the Commission further specify the practical implementation of AES 
(European Commission 2006b). Farmers have to submit applications of participation and payment 
claims due on the same deadlines as their Single Payment Application (Pillar I) (Art. 8-9) at the latest 
on 15 May each year (European Commission 2009, Art. 15). A system that provides objective 
eligibility of sites has to be used. Applications have to contain precise, site-specific spatial plot 
information. Payment applications have to be checked via administrative (off-site) and on-the-spot 
checks (Art. 10) before payment processing. Standards for both types of checks are specified in 
European Commission (2006b, Art.11–16), with a focus on the sites’ eligibility criteria and the 
correctness of the spatial data rendered by the farmer. 
On-the-spot checks include the survey of plots and have to be conducted on a minimum sample of 
5% of participants. Deviations from the area-related data presented have to be fined according to the 
percentages given in Art. 16. While member states have some discretion in how to deal with non-
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the latter are not included in the analysis since their processing differs strongly and the Hessian budgetary focus 
is on area-related measures (cf. HMULV 2006). 
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compliance of management commitments (Art. 18), the treatment of area-related infringements (i.e. an 
over-declaration of plot size) is prescribed by the EU (Art. 16, 22 ff.). 
The treatment of payments eligible for reimbursement is regulated in Reg. (EC) 1290/2005 and 
applies for both pillars of the CAP. It contains details on the procedural requirements of fund 
management, including financial management details, deadlines, penalties, the treatment of paybacks 
and reporting commitments (European Council 2005b). It also lays down the principles for payment 
calculation, processing, and payment caps (Art. 39). Those expenditures eligible for reimbursement 
are depicted in Art. 70f., as well as the prerequisites for accounting and reimbursement (European 
Commission 2006a). 
Finally, the Commission is obliged to monitor the financial processing via regular checks of 
management and control systems, reports or by on-the-spot checks conducted by Commission officers 
(Art. 36, 37). In the case of deviations, reductions or the suspense of reimbursement can be applied, 
and further sanctions are possible. 
This depiction shows that the terms for reimbursement highly regulate the structure and 
procedures of AES implementation. Consequently, administrative discretion at the member states’ 
level is limited. The rather strict requirements with their focus on a correct calculation base seem to 
form a credible commitment according to the distributive component of the policy, giving proof to 
donor member states that their money is spent in accordance with the policy aim, and misuse of funds 
is prevented (Beblavý 2009). Moreover, the instrument ‘reimbursement’ itself shifts the risk of 
obtaining co-funding to the regional level and creates an important incentive to comply (Beblavý 
2009). It is important to note that member states have to bear all costs induced by the implementation 
and management of the structures and procedures (Osterburg and Stratmann 2002). This already 
indicates distributive effects. 
2.3. TC typologies and their incidence 
The set-up and running of the required structure and procedures requires the expense of TCs by 
the member states. Specifying measures and their later evaluation aim to control the environmental 
policy aims; monitoring and control requirements aim to accomplish payments correctly as a basis for 
latter reimbursement. Therefore, taking the particular source of informational needs into account, 
upcoming TCs can be distinguished in scheme-related TCs, which aim to pursue the environmental 
goals and are related to the scheme’s objectives and attributes themselves (Mettepenningen, 
Beckmann, and Eggers 2011), and reimbursement-related TCs, which have to be expended in order to 
meet the criteria for obtaining reimbursement.  
Since the reimbursement is hectare-based, the EU focuses on the correctness of spatial 
information and the stream of payments rather than on environmental results. The spatial information 
forms an important indicator of (regional) scheme performance, as it determines the sum of the 
reimbursement. Table 1 depicts the resulting TC categories arising in Hessian AES implementation 
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from both relationships and conceptualises them either as scheme or reimbursement related.  
It becomes obvious that TCs resulting from the administration-farmer relationship are part of 
overall AES implementation costs. Thus, the transactional relationship between administration and 
farmer is nested (Williamson 2000) within the wider IE of the EAFRD. Table 1 also shows that a 
substantial number of tasks are at least partially reimbursement-related.  
From the EU point of view, this regulatory framework offers economies of scope, as the use of 
the IACS has proved useful in its application to direct payments (Nitsch et al. 2012) and now also 
serves as a database for the EAFRD. In addition, standardised monitoring requirements across the 
whole EU may create economies of scale at the EU level. However, distributive losses due to under-
use of regional knowledge, a missing ability to react to changing circumstances and an out-crowding 
of intrinsic motivation may occur at the regional level. TC-reducing effects, such as regional 
economies of scale or scope, learning effects and taking farmers’ attitudes or trust into account might 
also be affected. Further, co-ordination efforts between the various actors and due to the various 
regulations are likely to be necessary.  
Prior to presenting results in Section 4, materials and methods are briefly described in Section 3.  
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Table 1. Allocation of tasks in transaction stages and categories according to the PA relationships.  
  
EU - Hesse Hesse - Farmers 
Scheme (S)/ 
Reimbursement (R) 
Information stage   
 Gathering information on EU regulations  S 
Negotiation stage    
 AES design within RDP design 
 
S/R 
 Submission of RDP to EU  S 
 Amendments upon EU request S 
Implementation stage   
 Set-up and running of MA, PA, CB  R 
 AES processing Information stage  
 Acquisition of participants S 
Negotiation stage  
 contract specification and contracting S  
Implementation stage  
 Administrative checks R 
 On-the-spot checks S/ R 
 Contract adjustments S 
 Processing of payments S 
 Imposing sanctions R 
 AES amendments 
 
 
- Review of suggested amendments by all 
involved departments 
S/ R 
- Major cases: Re-submission of RDP to 
EU 
S/ R 
- Minor cases :Statement of EU 
compliance by PA 
S/ R 
 Stating compliance to be eligible for 
reimbursement 
 
 
 
- Delivery of monitoring data R 
- Attending Commission’s control visits R 
- Correction of failures etc. R 
- Annual check by the CB R 
 Reimbursement upon declaration of 
expenditures 
 S 
 Evaluation  S 
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3. Materials and methods 
This study provides an explorative insight into practical AES implementation at the operative 
level. Its aim is to reveal how operative tasks are influenced by the IE and which corollary effects 
occur in terms of transaction costs. Thus, the approach is positive and not designed for comparison 
with other institutional settings. I chose a qualitative interview approach suited to explore unknown 
relationships and causalities (Witt 2001). 
As in previous studies (e.g. McCann and Easter 1999; Mettepenningen, Beckmann, and Eggers 
2011), I took staff working time as proxy for TCs, albeit in a qualitative sense. For data gathering, I 
conducted semi-structured expert interviews. Experts are persons who have privileged access to the 
information necessary to answer the research questions (Meuser and Nagel 1991). As with structured 
interviews, semi-structured interviews follow an interview guideline but leave some discretion for the 
interviewer to follow leads that arise during the interview (Bernard 2000). This approach allows a 
fuller understanding of the issues than asking for pre-defined standardised answers (McCann and 
Easter 1999) and is common in policy implementation analysis (e.g. McCann and Easter 1999; 
Conteh, 2011; Liefferink, Wiering, and Uitenboogaart 2011; Bourblanc et al. 2012). 
The interview guideline covered the particulars of work content, modes of labour division, 
communication modes between the different administrative units, difficulties occurring in the scheme 
implementation process and their influencing factors. Starting points were the implementation steps 
described in previous studies (e.g. Falconer and Whitby 1999; Ollikainen, Lankoski, and Nuutinen 
2008). 
I conducted seven interviews between January and March 2011 with Hessian desk officers from 
the involved administrative units, focusing on SSGES implementation. In 2011, the AES had already 
been implemented for four years, which means that the phase of learning and adaptation due to 
establishing the new AES regulations was over. 
Since Hesse had already implemented EAFRD-AES in previous funding periods, the 
recommended administrations also existed (HMULV 2006). Consequently, the interviews refer to a 
mature phase of implementation (Falconer, Dupraz, and Whitby 2001; McCann et al. 2005) with 
established agents. I began by asking the interviewee to describe her/his function. The interviews were 
narrative and did not necessarily follow the order of the guideline. They lasted from 1–3 hours and 
took place in the respective administrations. All interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim in 
German. In order to present quotations in the result section, I translated the sentences correspondingly. 
Expert interview analysis aims to reveal supra-individual commonalties and to identify action-
guiding dicta (Meuser and Nagel 1991). Consequently, the main analytical approach is interpretative 
and deducts particular aspects from the data by using theory-based categories (Meuser and Nagel 
1991). For analysis I used the computer-based qualitative analysis software MAXQDA (Kuckartz 
2010). The initial categorising followed the guideline sections but then developed further in an 
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inductive and recursive process during several stages, when possible corollary effects were identified 
and investigated further (Strauss and Corbin 1990; Meuser and Nagel 1991). The main reason is that 
answers given exceed the initial questions and in turn provoke further questions, which are then 
readdressed to the data (Witt 2001). This subsequent category refinement allows systematic 
data exploitation and the discovery of underlying relationships (Bernard 2000). 
The final code system refers to the stages of AES processing, the actors involved, its influencing 
factors and resulting effects. Multiple-coded sequences depict inter-code relationships (Meuser and 
Nagel 1991). References to the interviews are given in parentheses (Interview no.: paragraph no(s)). 
However, the caveat remains that the results are based upon the perceptions of respondents and need 
not necessarily reflect actual situations (Egeberg and Trondal 2009). 
4. Results and discussion 
This section first depicts the organisational structure set up in Hesse as stated in the Hessian RDP 
and related documents. It also depicts resulting TCs. Next, influences on the AES implementation 
process as derived from the interviews are illustrated. 
4.1. The Hessian administrative structure and interaction 
Hesse established the MA in the Ministry of Environment, Energy, Agriculture, and Consumer 
Protection (HMUELV), where one department is responsible for AES design, the formulation of 
technical implementation regulations, and submission of the annual progress reports and evaluations 
(HMULV 2006). The CB is also located in the HMUELV (HMULV 2008). 
The function of the PA was outsourced from the HMUELV in 2008 to several departments of the 
Wirtschafts- und Strukturbank Hessen (WIBank), a state-owned yet privately acting entity (HMUELV 
2010). The main reason for outsourcing was a policy of privatisation pursued by the former premier 
(I1:40). The PA delegated the acquisition of scheme participants, eligibility checks, contracting and 
off-site checks to the 16 agricultural administrations of the 22 Hessian counties, the Ämter für den 
ländlichen Raum (ALRs). The ALRs process the actual contracts and interact with the farmers 
(HMULV 2006).  
4.2. TCs resulting from the administrative structure  
This administrative structure causes co-ordination efforts between HMUELV and WIBank and 
creates different lines of hierarchies for the ALRs. The HMUELV provides budget and designs 
measures (scheme-related aspects), while the PA implements regulations and provides technical 
facilities to meet reimbursement necessities (reimbursement-related aspects). In brief, the institutional 
setting is characterised by multi-level processes and frequent interactions between the different actors. 
In addition to the specific investments in the set-up and running of the organisational structure, 
coordination costs between the different units arise.  
Moreover, task delegation heightens the costs for maintaining compliance. First, outsourcing put 
the PA in the focus of EU audits (I7:159). Next, delegating part of its functions to the ALRs increases 
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the frequency of EU audits due to the number of agents involved; in addition, the EU Commission 
recommended an increase in the number of internal checks by the PA (I3:257, 261).  
Figure 1 shows the administrative structure and the occurrence of tasks as stated in the interviews. 
Bold letters indicate reimbursement-related tasks. Arrows indicate the units involved.  
 
Figure 1. Administrative structure and interactions in Hesse.  
In order to reduce complexity and exploit possible economies of scope to offset these highly 
specific investments, standardisation in processing is attempted. The HMUELV adjusted state 
regulations to align with EU regulations in order to harmonise the different funding possibilities 
(I2:48, 50). The WIBank also conducts financial processing of AES, apart from the EAFRD, in order 
to use synergies. Moreover, joint processing often occurs, as processing discretionary tasks cannot 
often be separated from processing mandatory tasks (I1:74). Thus, the EU-required structure seems to 
create path dependency (North 1990), at least in the use of the administrative structure.  
In addition, the implementation provisions of the PA for the ALRs greatly standardise procedures 
to secure a homogenous implementation throughout Hesse (I3:9). The PA determines deadlines for 
particular processing steps (I6:234–236, 335, I7:67) and provides the IACS standard data system 
management, which serves as the common database for all units and all processing tasks (I3:34–39).  
High set-up costs might yet become efficient if they decrease over time, e.g. by lowering running 
costs, due to economies of scale or learning effects etc. (Ollikainen, Lankoski, and Nuutinen 2008). 
However, this depends on whether the achievement of such effects is possible within the 
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administrative procedures. This is explored in the next section.  
4.3. Influences on TCs in AES design and amendments  
The current AES was designed by the HMUELV as part of the Hessian RDP. During the funding 
period, AES amendments might be recommended upon political decisions (I2:98), poor AES 
performance (I2:98), upon evaluators’ reports (I2:68) or changes in EU regulations (I2:30). However, 
the six-year validity period of the RDP narrows the discretion to react, and amendments have to be 
approved. While some amendments only require the PA’s statement of EU compliance (foremost to 
meeting IACS requirements, I3:195), others require re-submitting and re-approval by the EU. This 
demands coordination and causes TCs. As a consequence, the HMUELV avoids marginal 
amendments, and collects minor changes over several months to submit them in total (I2:60).  
Hessian desk officers frequently take part in round table discussions of the Länder in order to 
discuss and formulate proposals on EU regulations. This is stated to allow collective negotiation 
power to be exerted (I2:142, 154). Furthermore, information can be gathered on how to maximise 
funding by regulation application (I1:241; I2:16, 24, 32, 160; I4:113). These meetings resemble TCs; 
however, their expense aims to prevent TCs at other stages.  
If amendments concern operational or farmer-related tasks, the HMUELV asks the ALRs to give 
a statement (I2:88, 102, 182). However, the ALRs state that the PA often withdraws their suggestions 
later on, due to a failure to comply with EU regulations (I6:616; I7:137). Despite the fact that the 
HMUELV would like to activate regional or ‘street-level’ knowledge (Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 
1997), this only seems possible in a limited way. In general, agreement finding with the PA is said to 
be difficult. 
The general perception is that the PA does not use its full scope of discretion but rather behaves 
in a risk-avoiding manner in order neither to jeopardise the reimbursement nor itself become subject to 
inspections (I1:121; I2:82). The following quotation stresses the PA’s view:  
Interviewer: But discretion, that’s not a bad thing in principle, is it?  
Interviewee PA: Well, for the EU, it is a bad thing, because it says: ‘Discretion is also the 
opportunity to manipulate’. (I3:262-263)  
In general, implementing AES within the EAFRD is said to be a take-it-or-leave-it decision, as 
reimbursement requirements are independent from its particular sum (I2:211-212):  
“As soon as you get one Euro from the EU, you have to stick [completely] to the rules” (I2:214, 
corresponding addendum by author).  
While substantial discretion on technical environmental aspects is stated, this, however, is 
reported not to be exploitable due to the compulsory use of the IACS and strict sanctioning rules 
(I1:65, 252; I2:164). This implies a trade-off between environment-related and reimbursement-related 
design aspects and a possible shift in regional preferences. Indeed, concessions in scheme design and 
an abandonment of particular environmental aims were reported (I2:206, 224), an effect that has been 
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observed in other Länder as well (Osterburg and Stratmann 2002; Eggers, Laschawski, and Schleyer 
2004; Eggers 2005). Therefore, Hesse seems somewhat locked-in; its budgetary situation allows 
neither the eschewal of EU cofunding nor the set-up of additional state-financed schemes. The latter is 
reported to be a prominent way to obtain EU money as well as pursue one’s own policy goals, 
practised by other Länder (I2:230).  
4.4. Influences on TCs in AES implementation 
The IACS and its monitoring and control requirements also influence the implementation process 
because they shape the implementation rules given by the PA and determine the required technology 
(I7:11).  
4.4.1. Application and contract specification 
Processing AES applications, concluding contracts, checks and payment delivery follow 
standardised procedures. First, the submitted application is entered into the database. Farmers have to 
mark sites they have applied for on aerial photos rendered by the PA. Formal checks are conducted to 
avoid double application and to ascertain eligibility (I7:13, 15). Scoring is used to assure objective 
eligibility criteria, as objectivity is also monitored by the EU (I1:226; I7:13; I6:20). ALR officers may 
override the system when they consider a site valuable despite a low score (e.g. due to personal 
knowledge), but they have to submit a statement of justification (I6:212; I7:31–33). As the officers are 
held responsible in case of EU checks, this option is taken ambivalently (I6:212; I7:33). Scheme-
related aspects may be traded-off against EU compliance, and deterrence hampers the utilisation of 
regional knowledge.  
The parallel submission of single payment, AES participation and payment applications are 
required in expectance of synergy effects on operations (HMUELV 2010). However, working peaks 
and an extended processing time are reported (I6:42; I6:339). The software frequently generates 
failure messages during the application and payment processing, since the particular applications rely 
on different programming basics. Therefore, the system frequently declares part of the applications to 
be ‘not EU compliant’ (I3:71, 275; I6:299ff, 363, 587), which causes internal checks and frequent 
repair efforts (I6:363; I7:83) and thus seems to have the opposite effect on regional TCs.  
Specifying management agreements on the sites is up to the ALRs. The ALRs make proposals 
based on habitat characteristics, discuss and agree upon them in consensus with the farmers (I6:61-63, 
84, 187; I7:15, 25, 39, 45–49). However, ALR officers state that the reported working peaks do not 
allow for substantial on-the-spot assessments of sites to identify the most suitable management 
agreements (I7:49). The lead officers, who have an ecological training background, regret this shift 
towards administrative tasks (I7:49).  
This increase in administrative tasks has been observed ever since IACS was made compulsory 
for AES implementation (Osterburg and Stratmann 2002). Contract signing does not usually occur 
before the following year due to lags in procedures (I1:175, 183; I6:44, 90, 140, 225, 353, 580; I7:65, 
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99). However, since the contract period begins on 1 January, farmers have to comply with the 
management agreements on every applied plot prior to contract signing (I7:58–59), as they do not 
know which plots will finally be approved (I7:60–61). Some farmers apply for all their plots in order 
not to miss the deadline and specify their actual preferences afterwards (I3:13; I7:27, 39–41). This 
induces implementation and compliance costs on behalf of the farmers, which would resemble sunk 
costs in case the particular plot was not eligible. Moreover, it induces later adjustment effort in the 
ALRs.  
Changes in tenancies or personal circumstances during participation may cause adjustments in the 
contract scope or management agreements (I6:52; I7:53). While adjustments in the contract scope 
prior to signing are possible, later amendments are problematic, for the EU requires the maintenance 
of a five-year commitment (I6:168, 193). Scope adjustments are therefore executed only up to the 
deadline of the first payment application (I6:193; I7:51). Thus, the farmer receives no payment, even 
though he has already managed his sites according to the agreements for several months (I6:193, 195), 
which means that participation costs for the farmers are sunk costs. Technically, the farmer has to 
resign, the ALR has to reset the whole contract with all procedural requirements and a new contract 
has to be concluded (I7:53) which severely affects the ALRs’ workload (I6:96, 100, 102; I7:53). 
Adjusting management agreements is even more problematic; regardless of the reasons, the farmer has 
to resign, pay everything back and re-sign a new contract (I7:149). This procedure requires more 
effort, for both the administration and the farmer, than a mere adjustment.  
4.4.2. Administrative checks 
Before payments are released, the ALRs conduct administrative checks. Farmers again submit 
information on the plots’ exact location and scope by marking them on aerial photos. The contract area 
is approved due to exact location, scope and possible usage restrictions by comparing it with layers 
deposited in the database (I3:49). Deviations of more than 2% in size induce a contract adjustment 
with a reduced scope (and consequently reduced payments) (I6:331; I7:93) and require the process 
described above. The PA implements the layers in order to provide a high degree of standardisation 
and make the complex monitoring requirements manageable (I3:298). However, the ALRs report that 
benefits from standardisation are partly offset by upcoming failures:  
A persistent problem is that the system itself is error-prone, and many manual corrections have to 
be made (I6:292-294, 306, 340; I7:71, 75). False information in the layers by the PA induces severe 
repairing effort in the ALRs. A substantial number of stated deviations also results from unintended 
imprecision; the scale on the photos (1:5000) is approximate compared to the scale used in the system 
layers and in on-the spot checks (I1:103; I3:73; I6:20, 305). From a compliance point of view, these 
deviations are area-related infringements that reduce payments and induce possible sanctions (I6:303-
305). The use of GIS-based data became compulsory during the last funding period and is said to have 
increased the procedures’ complexity and error-proneness (I3:73) because its application does not 
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match farmers’ possibilities.  
Changes in the environment may actually have happened, reducing plot size. However, the 
system cannot distinguish between permanent (e.g. construction of a shelter) and temporary reductions 
(e.g. piles of firewood), which requires additional manual control or on-site checks (I7:83). Permanent 
changes in the environment cause paybacks, sometimes even for previous years, even when they are 
not caused by the farmer, and agricultural use (e.g. pasturing instead of mowing) might still be 
possible (I6:427ff.). Moreover, the aerial photos themselves are error-prone (e.g. shadows of cows 
mistaken for non-agricultural features)(I1:83, 87;I7:75, 85) and may lead to erroneous adjustments to 
the disadvantage of the farmer. This causes TCs in terms of ‘repairing effort’ in the administration as 
well as for the farmers, who are forced to formally complain.  
These aspects influence the amount of monitoring costs. As checks refer to the single plots, the 
realisation of economies of scale in monitoring costs seems to be difficult. Moreover, the EU requires 
a control scope of 100% in each participation year. TC-reducing effects such as trust or learning 
cannot be utilised.  
4.4.3. On-the-spot checks 
Parallel to the administrative checks, the PA conducts on-the-spot checks. EU inspection criteria 
are crucial in control procedures “if one cent of EU-money is involved” (I5:83). The regulation 
recommends a selection of 75–80% of controlees for a risk analysis with annually assessed criteria 
(I5:45, 51, 57, 69) and upon random sampling (I5:45). The focus of on-the-spot checks clearly is on 
spatial correctness (I5:141) and farmers’ compliance with documentation duties (I3:136; I6:253). 
Management agreements are scrutinised according to seasonal possibilities and may take place at 
several times (I5:103–105). The scope of the scrutinised area per farm depends on the percentage of 
deviations found in field surveying (I5:87, 171). The number of 100% checks is reported to be high 
(I5:93); however, as mentioned above, deviations do not necessarily occur due to intended cheating.  
Since the compulsory control scope of 5% of participants cannot be inspected by visits, part of 
the checks is conducted via remote sensing by satellites (I3:145; I5:177). This also may cause 
erroneous results (I5:197). If area-related deviations are stated, the farmer is asked to give a statement 
before paybacks or sanctions are imposed (I5:187). If he does not agree with the result, an on-the-spot 
survey is conducted (I5:187; I6:394). In the case of erroneous initial results, additional monitoring 
actually represents correction costs. Deviations found raise the probability of becoming part of the 
control sample in the following year (I5:45ff), and a high total number of deviations increases the 
required total control scope in the next year (I3:147). Both aspects increase Hesse’s monitoring costs, 
although the deviations found might stem from error-prone monitoring.  
Post-processing these inspection results is the duty of the ALRs and concerns both the rightly and 
wrongly stated results (I5:187, 217; I6:255; I7:117). Actual area-related deviations are approved 
(I5:143; I7:119), data correction is made (I5:183), and the contract is adjusted (I7:83) in accordance 
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with the processing described above. If deviations from management agreements were stated, the 
farmer is contacted and given time to react (I7:117). The possibility to adjust contracts and deal with 
deviations smoothly will supposedly soon be abolished by the PA, as it was found to be non-compliant 
with EU regulations (I7:151). This will probably increase monitoring costs for administrations and 
farmers. Farmers would be sanctioned every year for area deviations (I7:151), and the probability of 
being chosen for on-the spot checks would rise (I3:147). ALRs fear that this will severely affect 
farmers’ willingness to participate (I7:151).  
Increasing sanctions not only influence the percentage of on-the-spot checks. The EU 
Commission might assess the frequency of sanctions as consequence of a systematic implementation 
failure and will probably raise her inspection frequency as well. In turn, this would affect the 
administrations’ compliance costs. Abolishing the present regulation could thus induce a chain 
reaction of additional monitoring, resulting in an increase of TCs.  
4.4.4. Processing of payments 
The calculation of payments is based on the particular regulation valid at the time of application; 
since these are frequently revised, the calculation bases vary and complicate the calculation (I7:99). 
While these amendments are intended to improve scheme implementation conditions for the farmers, 
the ALRs  face a higher complexity with every new regulation because previous regulations remain 
binding for those contracts concluded during their validity (I2:174; I6:162,168–174,180–181; I7:129). 
One officer stated: “To date, I have three different EU regulations on how to deal with paybacks and 
sanctions in AES (I7:129) ..., and every one induces different calculation modes” (I7:131). Thus, in 
the case of a contract extension, a farmer may work under different regulations. This leads to different 
treatments of the same facts (I6:179–181, 184) and causes additional effort in the ALRs and 
incongruences for the farmers. Moreover, economies of scale and learning effects to reduce 
implementation costs cannot be achieved with frequent changes in regulations (Falconer, Dupraz, and 
Whitby 2001).  
The PA processes payments upon release by the ALRs. This does not usually take place before 
February of the following year (I4:9; I6:233). Thus, farmers face substantial income uncertainty, as 
they receive their first payment 1.5 years after entering the contract (I6:547, 285). Payment processing 
has to be completed by 15 October due to the end of the EU’s fiscal year, which is reported to be a 
substantial tightening constraint (I4:34). The PA aimed to standardise payment processing and 
subtracts paybacks or sanction fees from the payment (I4:127–129). While this generates economies of 
scope in the PA, it induces advisory efforts in the ALRs, as the resulting payment notes are said to be 
too complicated for farmers to understand (I6:522–547; I7:101–105).  
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4.4.5. EU-compliance requirements 
In addition to checks within the IACS, the CB regularly surveys and personally checks the PA 
(I1:133; I3:311). Inspections range over all administrative units and take place during the whole year 
(I1:141; I5:268; I4:101; I7:161). They cover the general organisation of AES processing and subjects 
such as IT security or financial management (I4:101–103; I3:311; I6:433). Results are reported to the 
Commission annually (I1:141). Stated failures are mostly technical, e.g. mistakes in system operations 
(I1:145). Divergences arise between the CB and ALRs on how to judge particular cases. The ALRs 
consider some practices of farmers in line with management agreements upon personal knowledge; 
however, these statements are questioned by the PA or CB, who favour a literal application of 
regulations (I3:104ff; I6:420ff). As a consequence, the ALRs refrain from using their knowledge. In 
addition, checks of the CB often are reported to be error-prone, as they do not take ALR particulars 
into account (I6:453, 462, 484; I7:179), inducing effort in the ALRs due to submitting a response 
(I6:453, 462). ALR officers draw attention to the fact that the focus of compliance is on procedural 
correctness and not on environmental results (I6:443).  
While the PA regards EU checks as part of quality management to enhance conformity with EU 
requirements (I3:301–303), the ALR officers’ perspective is rather on the inspection’s efficiency:  
Sometimes during the checks, it’s like counting peas. ...If there is only €2.50 of overpayment, 
then it seems questionable whether one has to talk about it for three hours. (I6:437). 
In addition to these checks, the Commission itself scrutinises scheme implementation by 
standardised IACS statistics on expenses, paybacks, checks, etc., which refer to each scheme 
participant and each cent (I3:167, 209–211; I4: 39–43, 55–73) and form the basis for the 
Commission’s selection of areas and farms for ‘on-the-spot inspections’ (I3:211). These take place at 
least once a year (I3:217); additional visits may occur due to the CB report (I3:311). Controls are said 
to be very substantial. They refer to the whole process of implementation (I3:217; I4:89, 105) and to 
working conditions with respect to data security (I7:167). 
The outcome of these checks affects Hesse in many ways. The EU may declare failures as 
systematic, which indicates an inappropriateness of the control mechanisms or standards used 
(I3:229). Stated failures are extrapolated onto all Hessian participants. This induces sanctions and 
paybacks of reimbursements (I3:229). However, the extrapolation may overestimate the actual 
deviations, which in turn leads to overestimated paybacks. This would severely affect the regional 
budget. This view causes a high deterrent effect and makes the PA avoid any risky decisions on how 
to interpret the regulations (I1:117; I3:229). Likewise, the HMUELV formulates rules in a risk-
avoiding manner and conducts additional internal checks in view of EU visits (I1:89, 95).  
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4.5. Main implications and recommendations 
The study reveals that EU regulations are an important influencing factor on TC occurrence in 
AES implementation. Reimbursement-related TCs, especially those concerning monitoring 
requirements, reduce the net benefits obtained from co-financing. Structural and procedural 
requirements cause a high complexity of tasks, a high degree of mutual dependencies, and frequent 
interaction between the different regional agents. This affects set-up and running costs as well as co-
ordination costs. Monitoring requirements seem to dominate the process as a whole. Moreover, the 
required depth of control strongly influences TCs in AES processing; the subsequent correction effort 
is substantial.  
The high data-keeping standards induced by the IACS seem to be hard to meet in reality and raise 
the probability of failures. Error-prone inspection results also imply substantial TCs for farmers and 
affect the size of the required control sample and the control frequency by the Commission. Intended 
economies of scope by using the IACS seem not to occur on regional but rather on EU level in terms 
of standardised monitoring and resulting comparability between the member states. Mettepenningen, 
Beckmann, and Eggers (2011, 648) even suggested that EU regulations can be understood “as a 
conscious strategy to save TCs at the EU level”. TC-reducing factors such as trust between the 
transaction partners or an intrinsic motivation to comply are not integrated in the regulations. Learning 
effects that may decrease TCs over time also seem to be rarely exploitable due to frequently changing 
regulations. Instead, adaptations in regulations – although intended to be a response to changed 
circumstances – may have an increasing effect on TCs.  
Attempts to exploit economies of scope or scale in order to reduce TCs in one administration 
often have negative spillover effects onto TCs of subsequent units. This also applies to failures or time 
lags occurring in a particular unit. The interplay between the actors and resulting implementation rules 
is further influenced by the diverging preferences of MA and PA. As obtaining full reimbursement is 
the declared goal, the PA seems to be the dominant agent, and its risk-averse decision making affects 
the whole implementation process. Changes in the farmers’ environment cannot be easily absorbed 
due to strict application of regulations, and require substantial adaptation effort at the ALR level. The 
deterrence of losing the reimbursement effects not only causes existing discretionary scope to be not 
utilised, but also offsets regional knowledge. Administrative agents are afraid of audits that may arise 
due to decisions on regional necessities. This implies distributional losses on a regional level and 
distortions in preferences (Heinrich and Marschke 2010). Scheme-related aspects seem to be traded-
off against EU compliance.  
A shortage of staff is stated to be a problem throughout all administrative units and leads to the 
prioritisation of mandatory tasks and to the negligence of discretionary (although important) ones 
(I1:220; I1:185, 204f.; I3:333). However, the compulsory tasks are mostly reimbursement-related. 
Thus, scheme-related tasks crucial for scheme effectiveness (Mettepenningen, Beckmann, and Eggers 
2011) might even be crowded out. Providing additional personnel could solve the problem, but this 
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would also increase TCs. Obviously, AES implementation within the EAFRD requires a certain level 
of staffing.  
EU regulations also seem to affect farmers’ future scheme acceptance. The EAFRD already 
requires TC expense by participating farmers due to compulsory documentary effort (Falconer and 
Whitby 1999; Mettepenningen, Verspecht, and Van Huylenbroeck 2009). However, as shown, farmers 
additionally face substantial TCs due to wrong control statements. Moreover, they bear a relatively 
high risk with respect to income security. Substantial TCs on behalf of farmers are an important 
hampering factor for scheme participation, which endangers intended environmental results (Falconer 
2000; Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck 2009).  
Features of Hesse, for example a low budget and scarcity of personnel, may also be found in 
other regions. Consequently, the main implications of this study may also apply, which draws the 
focus onto the general features of the IE.  
The postulate not to waste public money, which justifies the compliance effort put upon agents, 
disregards that these compliance costs are also borne by the public. Consequently, compliance should 
be subject to cost-benefit reasoning, i.e. weighing the marginal costs of compliance against their 
marginal gains (Stigler 1970). This implies several recommendations.  
First, to date, the EU offers only a partial reimbursement of payments (50–75%) but requires 
100% regulation implementation at the expense of the member states. While a 75% share might justify 
a high degree of interference, this is questionable at a 50% level. Besides, uniform requirements do not 
take into account the regional willingness to comply. Instead, they omit the occurrence of intrinsic 
motivation. As argued above, administrations may vary in their commitment. Both aspects imply that 
monitoring regulations should differentiate between regions. However, what seems reasonable from an 
economic point of view may not be enforceable in the political sphere.  
Second, providing the co-funding by an ex post reimbursement shifts the risk to the member 
states. In this context, the choice of using spatial data as the basis for reimbursement is disputable. 
Unlinked to ecological data, spatial data as main performance indicator may evoke a distorted agent 
response, i.e. administrations tend to focus on meeting the performance standard instead of the actual 
goal (Heinrich and Marschke 2010). This is intensified as the required mechanisms were found error-
prone, and substantial effort has to be spent in order to secure the reimbursement. In addition to 
affecting regional scheme implementation and acceptance, regional ecological goals might even be 
crowded out. Thus, hectare-based ex post reimbursement ought to be revised in favour of an ex ante 
budget share.  
Finally, the EAFRD creates an institutional environment in which – contrary to the principle of 
fiscal equivalence (Olson 1969) – payers and beneficiaries of compliance differ. The compliance 
requirements are justified by the necessity to protect the financial interests of the EU (European 
Commission 2006a, Art. 9), which makes limiting discretion and monitoring regional agents’ 
behaviour reasonable from their point of view (Franchino 2001; Beblavý 2009). Potential gains from 
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economies of scale and scope due to a centralised approach and the connection of the EAFRD to other 
funds of the CAP also seem to be achieved at the EU level. However, these distributive effects are 
rather problematic from a regional perspective. Under the current regulatory framework, the costs of 
the ex ante control mechanisms, as well as a substantial part of ex post control costs, are borne by the 
member states, while the benefits of control occur primarily at the EU level. In this setting, the EU 
does not need to take costs resulting from the regulations into account. An (at least) partial 
reimbursement of regional administrative costs would facilitate the situation of poorer member 
states/regions and provide for a more balanced occurrence of costs and benefits.  
5. Conclusion 
This study showed that the EAFRD as institutional environment has a substantial influence on 
which TCs arise in Hessian AES implementation. ‘EU-based’ TCs have to be expended due to the 
required implementation of additional administrative units, to additional interactions and due to co-
ordination. Moreover, a substantial number of TC-constituting tasks in AES processing are 
reimbursement-related. TC-reducing factors such as economies of scale or scope seem to be scarcely 
achievable at the regional level; trust or intrinsic motivation to comply cannot be taken into account.  
Decreasing effects on public TCs seem to be achieved rather at the EU level. Therefore, the 
EAFRD also implies important distributive effects. Further, a dependency on obtaining the 
reimbursement shapes the actual implementation focus and seems to shift the workload from technical 
to compliance issues. Even a trade-off between scheme-related and reimbursement-related tasks may 
exist. Moreover, reimbursement-related regulations have spillover effects onto those TCs borne by 
farmers and thereby possibly hamper future scheme acceptance. Therefore, EU-based public TCs 
partly erode the gains obtained from the reimbursement and should be taken into account in policy 
evaluation.  
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7 Implementing EU co-financed agri-environmental schemes: Effects on 
administrative transaction costs in a regional grassland extensification 
scheme47 
 
Anja Weber 
Abstract 
Implementing agri-environmental schemes that are co-financed by the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the European Union requires administrative compliance with 
several regulations. This affects the magnitude and composition of transaction costs 
incurred by agricultural administrations in terms of working time spent. Distinguishing 
between scheme-related tasks to reach the environmental goals of the scheme and tasks 
necessary to obtain the EU reimbursement, this study investigates a possible trade-off in 
working time allocation with the help of a multi-task principal-agent conceptual 
framework. Agricultural county administrations of the German state of Hesse serve as 
case study. Results show that the highly specified reimbursement-related tasks require 
most of the administrations’ working time. However, several factors exist that induce an 
enhanced provision of scheme-related tasks, foremost a higher share of professional 
farmers in the county and a certain level of staffing. Nonetheless, the study also reveals 
that part of the EU-related monitoring effort is fixed and thus increases per contract costs 
in counties with fewer participants. The findings imply that a reconsideration of the 
compliance regulations is needed, especially in light of more standardised compliance 
duties as expected for the upcoming funding period 2014-2020. 
Keywords 
Transaction Costs; Agri-Environmental Scheme; Multi-task Principal Agent Theory; 
Common Agricultural Policy; Germany. 
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7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 Problem statement and outline 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) have become a prominent instrument to enhance the delivery 
of environmental benefits from agriculture. Farmers receive payments when carrying out agri-
environmental commitments, such as reducing the use of pesticides or of stocking rates. AES are a 
contractual mechanism for the transaction of such environmental goods or services between the farmer 
(seller) and an agricultural authority as a representative consumer (Hagedorn et al., 2002). This 
transaction induces transaction costs (TCs) for both the administration and farmers (Falconer and 
Whitby, 1999). On behalf of the administration, such public TCs (Falconer and Whitby, 1999) are 
“costs of setting up and running the organisational and contractual structure” of a scheme (Beckmann, 
Eggers, and Mettepenningen 2009, p. 694).  
Technically, TCs depict “resource losses due to imperfect information” (Dahlman, 1979, p. 148). 
Imperfect information and resulting uncertainty give way to contractual hazards such as opportunistic 
behaviour or measurement problems, which affect the transactional relationship (Williamson 1998). 
TCs result from those actions the parties involved undertake to manage these deficiencies (Coggan et 
al., 2010). TCs comprise search and information costs to identify trading opportunities and suitable 
partners, negotiation costs to specify the agreements of exchange, and monitoring and enforcement 
costs to safeguard the outcome of the transaction (Dahlman, 1979). With respect to the provision of 
environmental goods, informational deficiencies mainly exist due to large heterogeneities in 
agricultural as well as farm business features which affect their quality and price of the desired 
environmental good (Falconer and Whitby, 1999; Wätzold and Schwerdtner, 2005). Moreover, gaps in 
observability and measurability of the farmers’ actions offer leeway for moral hazard by farmers 
(Coggan et al, 2010; McCann 2013). Thus; AES-related TCs comprise issues such as identifying and 
selecting appropriate sites and farmers, negotiating the contract agreements, and monitoring farmers’ 
compliance with these agreements (Moxey et al. 1999; Wätzold and Schwerdtner, 2005).  
With a focus on the transactional relationship between farmers and the implementing 
administration, several studies investigated public TCs coming up during AES design and 
implementation in terms of administrations’ working time spent (e.g. Falconer and Whitby, 1999; 
Falconer and Saunders, 2002; Rørstad et al., 2007; Ollikainen et al., 2008; Mettepenningen et al., 
2011; Jongeneel et al., 2012). Features related to the scheme itself, the actors involved, the natural 
environment in which the scheme is supposed to act, and the institutional environment – i.e. the 
broader set of rules and regulations in which the schemes are designed and implemented -  were 
identified as influencing factors (summarised in Mettepenningen et al., 2011). Moreover, the studies 
highlight that effort - constituting TCs - induced by issues related to the environmental aim of the 
scheme, such as properly identifying site characteristics, the incidence of important habitats and their 
holders and to specify adequate management practices increases with the specificity of a scheme 
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(Falconer et al., 2001; Vatn, 2002; Rørstad et al., 2007; Ollikainen et al., 2008). This might even result 
in a trade-off between scheme precision and transaction costs (Vatn, 2002). Furthermore, a 
relationship between information provision for farmers, farmers’ understanding of the scheme’s aims 
and principles, and their subsequent compliance has frequently been discussed (Falconer and Whitby, 
1999; Mettepenningen and van Huylenbroeck, 2009; Pannell et al., 2013). Thus, a sufficient 
proportion of administrative working time has to be spent on informational issues addressing the 
environmental aspects of the scheme (labelled scheme-related issues, see Weber 2014a) to ensure 
farmers’ understanding of the scheme and by that a high quality of scheme implementation.  
Within the European Union (EU), member states have the possibility to provide AES within the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), which is part of the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The EAFRD offers a partial reimbursement of national AES payments 
conditional upon compliance with its regulations (European Council, 2005). By this, the EU is able to 
pursue its own environmental policy goals and at the same time eases the member states’ budgetary 
constraints. In Germany, where design and implementation of AES is a duty of the Länder (States), 
those with a poor budget situation especially make extended use of this option (Osterburg and 
Stratmann, 2002; Eggers et al., 2004). However, the EAFRD reimbursement regulations contain 
substantial structural and procedural requirements that specify the regional administrations’ 
monitoring and reporting duties. They also specify the conditions under which payments to farmers 
can be granted and how they have to be calculated and processed (see Weber [2014a] for a broad 
discussion). These requirements have to be integrated in the scheme regulations. As a consequence, 
the EU regulations substantially affect the TCs of designing co-financed AES (Mettepenningen et al., 
2011; Weber 2014a) as well as TCs related to the implementation procedures (Weber, 2014a). Such 
‘reimbursement-related’ TCs affect regional TC composition (Weber, 2014a). Moreover, a 
dependency on the reimbursement seems to shift the focus of (limited) administrative working time 
towards such tasks in order not to jeopardize the reimbursement (Weber, 2014a). 
Given a fixed working time available, administrations may face a trade-off with respect to which 
tasks to perform. Focusing on reimbursement-related tasks as a consequence of both budgetary needs 
and the risk of losing part of the reimbursement may result in neglecting scheme-related tasks. This 
could endanger the environmental aim of the scheme. A crowding out of scheme-related tasks by 
reimbursement-related tasks may even occur. 
To investigate the existence of a crowding-out, I examine influences on working time allocations 
in county administrations in the State of Hesse, Germany, implementing a grassland extensification 
scheme with the help of a multi-task principal-agent conceptual framework. In particular, 1) I 
investigate the quantitative impact of EU-reimbursement –related tasks on actual time use allocation in 
the agricultural county administrations and 2) identify factors influencing the share of time expended 
on the particular cost categories. Costs assessment is based on a conceptual framework that 
distinguishes between scheme-related and reimbursement-related costs. Influences are tested with 
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Generalised Equations Estimations. Thus, this study is a quantitative complement to Weber (2014a). 
The paper is organised as follows: in the following subsection, scheme implementation structures, 
details, and upcoming transaction costs are briefly described. Data stems from a direct interview 
approach and is depicted together with the methods applied in Section 2. Section 3 presents the 
conceptual framework as well as the hypotheses. Results are presented and discussed in Section 4. 
Some implications of the findings are presented in Section 5. A brief conclusion (Section 6) completes 
the paper. 
7.1.2 Scheme implementation structure and details 
Hesse is one of the larger states of Germany, located in its centre. In 2010, agriculturally utilised 
area covered about 36% of the total area, one third being permanent grassland (Hessisches 
Statistisches Landesamt, 2012). The area was managed by 17,805 agricultural holdings, one third of 
them run full-time (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012). Structural change leads to a continual 
decrease in the number of farms, especially in the sub-mountainous areas of Hesse, which are 
characterised by marginal productivity but at the same time account for a substantial share of 
environmentally valuable grassland sites protected by the EU Habitats’ Directive (HMULV, 2006). 
Moreover, a high number of such valuable grassland sites are managed by part-time farmers 
(HMULV, 2006).  
Both closing down cattle farms in such areas and land use intensification in more productive 
areas reduce the scope of grassland in Hesse. To counter this trend and prevent environmental 
damages such as water pollution, erosion, and habitat losses are major policy goals (HMULV, 2006). 
Consequently, the grassland scheme was established in 2007 to prevent grassland from being 
abandoned; furthermore, it serves as an instrument to secure grassland sites protected by the Habitats’ 
Directive (HMULV, 2006). It is co-financed by the EAFRD with a share of 50% (HMULV, 2006). 
The scheme is a synthesis of two predecessors; a site-specific scheme to maintain landscape based on 
individual agreements (state financed) and a standardised grassland extensification scheme 
encompassing the total grassland of a farm (EU co-financed, HMULV 2006). However, its 
implementation regulations and related duties differ substantially from the antecedent ones, and so the 
scheme is treated as newly set up.  
Actual scheme implementation takes place at the county level. The 16 agricultural 
administrations of the 22 counties of Hesse, the Ämter für den ländlichen Raum (ALRs) recruit 
participants, conclude and process the actual contracts, and interact with the farmers (HMULV, 2006)
 
48
.This makes them the main (public) acting agent in scheme implementation.  
The ALRs derive specifications of tasks and duties on the one hand from the Hessian State 
Ministry of Environment, Energy, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection (HMUELV) and on the other 
hand from the WIBank, which acts as Paying Agency and thus enforces the application of EU 
                                                          
48 The ALRs are also involved – but to a minor degree- in scheme design issues (see Weber 2014a). However, 
these issues are not considered in this article. 
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regulations (HMUELV, 2010). The ministry provides technical, scheme-related implementation 
regulations. The WIBank provides regulations concerning the prerequisites of reimbursement, i.e. 
those that specify monitoring and reporting duties of both farmers and the administrations themselves. 
Both types of regulations govern the related administrative processes by specifying the ALRs’ tasks 
and duties (HMUELV, 2010; Weber 2014a). Therefore, both types of regulations constitute 
transaction costs (North, 1990; Weber, 2014a). Besides the issues they address, the major difference 
between both types of regulations is that reimbursement-related issues are specified in far more detail 
with respect to structural and procedural requirements than scheme-related issues (Weber, 2014a).  
Priority for participation in the grassland scheme is given to farmers managing habitats specified 
by the EU Habitats’ Directive; sites protected by other nature protection laws may also be eligible. 
When farmers apply for participation, the eligibility of the proposed sites is checked, and contract 
details are specified. These refer to management agreements as well as to payment composition. 
Contracts contain fixed and negotiable management agreements. Fixed agreements refer to the 
prohibition of grassland conversion, the prohibition of chemical or synthetic pesticides, and the 
prohibition of surface irrigation or amelioration. Negotiable agreements comprise the choice of either 
a grazing or a mowing agreement on each site (HMULV, 2009). 
Payments consist of a basic premium for each type of agreement, which is fixed state-wide, and 
payments for exceptional effort (“ecologically valuable special services,” EVSS), which is negotiable 
and contains several payment elements. Grazing agreements are paid a higher premium (200 €/ha) 
than mowing agreements (110 €/ha). EVSS payments are calculated as a presumed extra effort due to 
specificities of the contracted area, such as slope, wetness, or difficult accessibility and can be 
specified in three levels of intensity. These are linked to three levels of additional payment (HMULV, 
2009). According to EU requirements, farmers have to apply annually for the payment within the 
application form for the single farm payments (HMULV, 2009). Payments are calculated and 
processed after the EU required administrative checks. These checks do not apply to management-
related compliance but rather refer to the correctness of area declaration submitted by the farmers. 
This spatial information not only serves as a proxy for the environmental outcome of the scheme but 
also constitutes the calculation base for the payment to farmers; these payments, in turn, form the basis 
for the latter EU reimbursement (Weber, 2014a). The scope of administrative checks is 100% of plots 
(and thereby also 100% checks of participating farmers). 
In addition to these administrative checks, a minimum of 5% of participants are checked on-the 
spot with respect to area declaration (that is, the contract plots are surveyed geophysically to assess 
their exact acreage) as well as to management related compliance by a separate audit team sent out 
from the Paying Agency. In case the team traces area-related or management-related deviations, the 
ALRs have to post-process the results, that is, correct the spatial plot information in the system 
(again), correct the contracts, induce paybacks, or impose sanctions. However, inspection results are 
reported to contain a number of erroneous statements, which constitute additional costs due to the 
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correction efforts of both farmers (Weber, 2014b) and administration (Weber, 2014a). 
Additionally, the ALRs’ are themselves subject to various checks of their performance by their 
supervising administrative units as well as by the EU Commission itself. Such checks comprise 
inspection visits, file checks, and reporting duties (Weber, 2014a) 
7.2 Material and methods 
For analysis, I use working time allocation information obtained from the ALRs in Hesse. Time 
use information has formed the database for several TC studies in an AES context (e.g. McCann and 
Easter, 1999; Mettepenningen et al., 2011). 
The respective administrative staff of all 16 ALRs was asked to state the percentage of working 
time allocated to the particular implementation steps defined by specified tasks (see Table 1) in a 
standardised, closed, self-reported questionnaire ex post for 12 months (McCann et al., 2005). Tasks 
were identified from previous interviews (Weber, 2014a). 
Monthly data were required for two reasons: first, to capture potential variances of task 
occurrence throughout the year, e.g. according to deadlines; second, such an approach is assumed to 
facilitate the estimation of workload ex post (McCann et al., 2005) and to alleviate potential 
measurement errors of stylized ex post time reports (Juster and Stafford, 1991; Juster et al., 2003; 
Mettepenningen et al., 2009). Percentages instead of the absolute time value were requested, as the 
level of staffing and consequently the available working hours vary substantially between the ALRs 
(see Table A1 in Appendix). Moreover, the statement of percentages instead of working hours avoids 
tendencies to over-report (Singell et al., 1996; Juster et al., 2003), as the plausibility of answers - 
answers had to add up to 100% of AES-related working hours - could be easily checked by the 
interviewees. Additionally, the share of working time spent on non-AES-related tasks was requested
49
.  
A ranking of tasks within the categories based on the frequency of their occurrence was also 
requested. However, this was stated to be too complicated by most of the officers and was 
incompletely filled in, so this part could not be taken into account in the later analysis. 
The reference year for the statements was 2011; sampling took place between December 2011 
and May 2012. Because the reference year 2011 is in the middle of the current EU funding period 
(2007-2013), one could assume that the phase of learning and adaptation that might influence TCs 
(Falconer et al., 2001) is over. Nonetheless, scheme implementation was not in a phase of mere 
maintenance (Falconer et al., 2001), as new participants were still gathered. However, according to the 
one-year approach, neither dynamic effects nor TCs for particular contracts (along their life cycle: 
Falconer et al., 2001) could be captured in this manner. 
Based on this data, TCs were quantified as average weekly working time spent on AES 
processing. For that purpose, the reported percentages were multiplied first with the respondents’ 
average weekly working hours spent on scheme implementation. Next, these particular results were 
summarised for the whole ALR. The aggregation was necessary due to the functional organisation of 
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task sharing in most ALRs. According to this constraint, only those ALRs were added to the sample 
when the whole administrative staff in charge of grassland scheme processing answered a 
questionnaire. 
However, since participation in the study was voluntary, some ALRs refrained from participation, 
for they feared the results could be used to compare their work conduct with other ALRs or even be 
subject to performance assessments. Due to these concerns, it was also agreed that no personal factors 
(attitudes, statements, etc.) would be asked for. Finally, monthly data from eight (out of 16) counties 
were included in the sample so that the total sample size n is 96. 
In a first analytical step, analyses of variances (ANOVAs) including post hoc tests (Scheffé) 
revealed that no significant differences existed between the particular months but rather between the 
particular ALRs. This was a first hint for existing differences between the ALRs despite the common 
setting. 
For regression, I used a Generalized Estimations Equation Model (GEE), since the structural 
characteristics of the counties remain fixed over 12 months and thus the monthly observations are not 
independent (Garson, 2012). GEE models allow the regression of such correlated data (Hanley et al., 
2003). The item “county” served as subject variable and the particular months (1-12) as within-subject 
variables. The chosen working correlations matrix is “independent”, as it offered the best goodness-of-
fit. The monthly particular share of a TC category (time spent on TC category/total time spent on 
implementation) serves as the dependent variable. Coordination effort (see table 1) could not be 
allocated to particular cost categories, as it occurs in any process stage. Therefore, it was treated as 
overhead effort, and because it would not influence the relative shares of the remaining cost 
categories, it was left out from the regressions. 
Structural characteristics of the particular counties were either derived from or calculated based 
on official statistics (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012), or on data provided upon the author’s 
request by other administrative units (Hessen-Forst, Forsteinrichtung und Naturschutz FENA, DE-
Giessen)
 
. Scheme performance indicators, such as the area entered into the scheme and the number of 
EVSS agreed upon were obtained from the State Ministry of Agriculture. In case an ALR administers 
more than one county, indicator variables were either summarised or calculated as a weighted average. 
All variables were transformed into their natural logarithm in order to meet the conditions of normal 
distribution and make the effect sizes comparable.  
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7.3 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework of this paper is developed in three steps. First, upcoming transaction 
costs are conceptualised and sorted into different categories. Second, insights of the multi-task 
principal-agent model are presented and applied to the Hessian context. Third, testable hypotheses are 
developed. 
7.3.1 Upcoming transaction costs 
The conceptual framework is based on differences in the regulatory depth and the related 
incentives to perform the required administrative tasks. At the root of these differences are distinct 
transactions or contractual relationships that induce the upcoming administrative TCs.  
One transaction is established by the AES contract between the State of Hesse and Hessian 
farmers, which regulates the provision of environmental benefits by the participating farmer. This 
transaction governs the environmental concern of Hesse, here e.g. fulfilling the goals of the Habitats’ 
Directive, by voluntary AES participation. Accordingly, related tasks - or scheme-related costs
50
 - aim 
to fulfil the environmental goals by achieving a sufficient scheme participation rate and thus 
encompass tasks directly related to policy (content)delivery (cf. Weber, 2014b). In particular, these 
costs aim to find potential participants by providing information, and specifying management 
agreements and premium components, thereby ensuring both the provision of environmental goods 
and the participation of farmers. 
The second relationship is established by the EAFRD, which constitutes a transaction between the 
EU and the member state’s administrative level in charge. This transaction governs the financial 
support of regional AES by the EU.  
The contractual relationship between EU and regional authorities is that of principal and agent: 
the EU (principal) delegates the provision of AES to its member states (agents) in exchange for an 
(albeit partial) reimbursement of payments (Weber, 2014a). To avoid bureaucratic drift (i.e. to align 
the member states’ actions with the preferences of the EU) the reimbursement regulations contain a 
number of structural and procedural requirements that specify the regional administrations’ as well as 
the farmers’ monitoring and reporting duties. These have to be embedded in scheme design and thus 
directly affect both administrations and farmers’ TCs (see Weber 2014a for a broad discussion).Given 
that monitoring requirements are specified by the EAFRD, the transaction between the administration 
and farmers is embedded in the transaction between the EU and the State of Hesse. Thus, this 
transaction creates a general institutional environment (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000; McCann, 
2013) for the transaction between the regional administration and the farmer (Weber, 2014a). From the 
perspective of the EU, a high level of specific rules, procedures, and criteria gives proof for the donor 
states that recipient states do not deviate from the policy aims agreed upon (Franchino, 2001). This 
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constitutes a form of credible commitment (Huber and Shipan 2000) between donor and recipient 
states. 
Consequently, related administrative tasks constitute reimbursement-related costs and aim to 
prove that Hesse fulfils the requirements for obtaining the reimbursement; specifically that it sets up 
and run the required administrative structure and procedures (Weber, 2014a). Since the reimbursement 
is related to the area enrolled in the scheme, the EU focuses on the correctness of area declarations as a 
prerequisite. Consequently, spatial information forms one important part of (regional) performance 
measurements; moreover, it determines the sum of the reimbursement. For the ALRs, these 
requirements comprise administrative checks to trace area-related infringements, to post-process the 
results of the audit team conducting the onsite checks, and to impose and process sanctions in case of 
deviations. Sorting both types of monitoring costs into this category is due to its procedures being 
highly specified in the reimbursement regulations; moreover, the focus of monitoring is not on 
environmental outcomes but on correct spatial area declaration as basis for the reimbursement
51
. 
However, this does not imply that monitoring farmers would not take place if the scheme would not be 
co-financed by the EAFRD. However, monitoring farmers in the only AES that Hesse offers without 
EU co-financing explicitly focuses on management compliance, not on area declaration (HMULV, 
2010). Moreover, monitoring procedures in this state financed scheme are described in much less 
detail and offer substantially more discretion to the ALRs (HMULV, 2010). 
Table 1 depicts the TC-constituting tasks as conducted in the ALRs. The sorting of TCs into the 
two types distinguishes the tasks mainly according to the particular transaction from which they 
originate and which are at the root of the task-specifying regulations (Weber, 2014a). Specifying 
measures and their later evaluation aim to achieve the environmental policy aims, whereas monitoring 
requirements mainly aim to accomplish payments correctly and give proof to the EU. The category 
“coordination” comprises tasks for solving general problems, e.g. from communication failures. They 
occur in every implementation step and were thus denoted as overhead costs. 
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Post-processing the results of onsite checks might also refer to management-related infringements. Thus, their 
assessment as reimbursement related costs might be less clear despite their regulatory depth and their origin from 
EU regulations. However, as the results are obtained separately for the different cost types within the overall 
categories, possible distortions due to this prior sorting are avoided. 
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Table 3 
Transaction cost categories and their constituting tasks 
S
ch
em
e-
re
la
te
d
 
Information and acquisition costs   
 Organising information meetings etc. for 
farmers 
 Personal acquisition and extension of farmers 
 Pre-selection of sites 
(including on-the spot visits) 
Negotiation costs   
 Registration of applications and first 
eligibility check 
 Ecological evaluation of applied sites 
 Contract specification with farmers 
 Setting up and sending out contracts 
 Adjustments due to farmers’ request before 
signing 
 Acquisition report to HMUELV 
R
ei
m
b
u
rs
em
en
t-
re
la
te
d
 
Implementation costs 
Administrative 
checks and 
payment 
processing  
 Check of payment application 
 Administrative checks 
 Release of payments and processing of 
payment notifications 
 Adjustments upon farmer’s request 
 Impose penalties 
 Post-processing of on-site and remote control 
results in database 
 Communication with farmers upon results 
Post-processing 
on-site checks 
 Post-processing of on-site and remote control 
results in database 
 Impose penalties 
 Communication with farmers upon results 
Stating compliance with EU regulations 
 Prepare and submit monitoring data for 
Paying Agency and HMUELV 
 Effort due to internal audits 
 Effort due to legal and technical oversight by 
Paying Agency 
 Effort due to checks by EU units 
 
Coordination 
 Attending working groups and internal 
meetings, skill enhancement 
 Communication with Paying Agency (Effort 
to solve reimbursement-related 
problems/questions) 
 Communication with HMUELV (Effort to 
solve technical problems/questions) 
Own compilation upon Weber (2014a). 
As described above, the two task blocks differ with respect to the underlying regulatory depth. 
Scheme-related procedures are specified in much less detail than reimbursement-related EU 
regulations and leave discretion to the ALRs as to and how much of them to provide. For instance, 
ALRs decide themselves how many public informational meetings they offer or if they specify 
management agreements based on an on-site inspection or just from a desk. Moreover, ALRs are not 
subject to immediate sanctions in case the outcome (in terms of area under contract) does not meet the 
intended level. 
Reimbursement-related tasks, however, are specified in high detail and leave little discretion to 
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the ALRs (Weber, 2014a). Frequent monitoring and control – also checking of administrative 
compliance - takes place by the EU, and deviations induce immediate consequences, e.g. in the form 
of payback requests of the reimbursement, increases in monitoring frequency, and probably tightened 
working and monitoring standards for officers (Weber, 2014a).  
To sum up, the main distinctive feature between scheme- and reimbursement-related tasks is the 
detail to which the related processes are specified and prescribed and/or their execution is measured. 
Moreover, the particular consequences in case of non-observance differ. Given that ALRs have a fixed 
amount of working time for scheme implementation, staffing shortages and resulting time restrictions 
might induce trade-offs between performing scheme-related and reimbursement-related tasks. Such a 
setting can be conceptualised as a multitask principal-agent setting (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). 
The following section presents an application of this analytical concept in order to investigate the 
ALRs’ time allocation decisions.  
7.3.2 The multi-task principal-agent approach 
In the implementation setting just described, ALRs face two different blocks of tasks. Their 
effort, i.e. their working time, has to be allocated between them. As time can only be spent on one task 
or the other, they are assumed to be competing. Moreover, each task block is endowed with particular 
incentives. Such a setting can be investigated with the help of the multi-task principal-agent model 
Principal-agent theory serves as a theoretical framework to analyse problems and solutions occurring 
in delegations characterised by information asymmetry and uncertainty in private as well as in public 
relationships (e.g. Whynes, 1993; Tirole, 1994; Heinrich and Marschke, 2010). The central concern of 
principal-agent theory in such a moral hazard context is to develop an appropriate contract structure 
that ensures that the agent’s actions result in those outcome levels the principal requires (Walker, 
2000; Dixit, 2002). Such contracts usually offer a payment schedule with a share of the residual gain 
to incentivise the agent and additional monitoring and or performance measurement (Bolton and 
Dewatripont, 2005). 
A number of works (e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Whynes, 1993; Tirole, 1994; 
Dewatripont et al., 2000; Walker, 2000; Courty and Marschke, 2003; Dixit, 2002) extend the basic 
single-task principal-agent model to situations where the principal either requires several tasks from 
one agent or the required task has more than one dimension; additionally, these different tasks exhibit 
different degrees of observability and measurability (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Whynes, 1993; 
Tirole, 1994). In multi-task situations, the agent has to allocate his effort among competing tasks. The 
agent’s effort allocation decision now depends on his particular costs of effort on both tasks, the 
variances of the particular risk of both tasks, and the particular incentives – the share of the residual - 
offered by the principal. Moral hazard behaviour comes up due to differences in the observability of 
both tasks, which may lead to an under-provision of the unobserved or unmeasured task. 
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Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) assess that 
“Incentives for a task can be provided in two ways: either the task itself can be rewarded 
or the marginal opportunity cost for a task can be lowered by removing or reducing the 
incentives on competing tasks. Constraints are substitutes for performance incentives and 
are extensively used when it is hard to assess the performance of an agent.”(p.27). 
They also show that increasing the marginal incentives to increase the output of task 1 draws 
effort away from task 2. Therefore, incentives help direct the agents’ allocation of attention among 
multiple tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).The decision for any time allocation between 
substitutive tasks is thus also a consequence of which task is more valued by the principal (Tirole, 
1994). 
In public agencies, incentive payments are less prevalent for enforcing the agents’ effort, often 
due to difficulties in specifying all outcome dimensions
52
 (Tirole, 1994). Instead, rules and procedures, 
compliance monitoring and performance measurement aim to guide the agents’ effort (Moe, 1984, 
1997; Whynes, 1993; Tirole, 1994). Furthermore, lacking possibilities of outcome specification lead to 
linking monitoring and performance measurement to input or output instead of outcome (e.g. Wilson, 
1989; Tirole, 1994; Dixit, 2002). Applications of the principal-agent model are widely found on 
design and implementation of performance management in public administration studies (see Heinrich 
and Marschke [2010] for a review). 
Tirole (1994) points out that “a government official will pursue mission 1 if the 
government or private labor markets, or else voters, pay attention mainly to his performance 
on task 1. Accordingly, he will neglect task 2” (p.10). Based on these insights, the ALRs’ time 
use allocation can be perceived as being subject to the particular disutilities of the task blocks, 
which, in turn, are a consequence of the particular incentives provided by the principal.  
To sum up, the main implication of multitask models is that incentives - respectively monitoring 
or performance measurements - must be balanced across the tasks in order not to induce a crowding 
out (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Dewatripont et al., 2000). 
Transferring these insights to this study, the situation can be perceived as follows: the ALRs are 
mandated to implement an AES that encompasses several tasks, allocated in two blocks. The desired 
outcome in terms of environmental benefit is observed by the number of enrolled hectares as proxy; 
actual effects on environmental quality are not measured thoroughly. The required task blocks vary 
due to their particular depth of procedural specification as well as in their consequences of non-
fulfilment. Remuneration (partial reimbursement) is granted upon the measured outcome dimension. 
Although work performance affects the overall ALR budget and not the personal income of the 
particular ALR officers, a multi-task principal-agent framework can be applied (see e.g. Heckman et 
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According to Wilson, (1989, p. 158), output consists of the work agents undertake (actions), whereas outcomes 
can be thought of as the results of agency work, or in Wilson’s words “how, if at all, the world changes because 
of the output.”.  
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al. 1997 for officers in job training agencies). Accomplishing this outcome correctly is subject to 
procedural requirements; the related actions of the ALRs are monitored. In setting up performance 
standards and/or monitoring measures, the EU reduces the total amount of resources controlled by the 
agent; it thus reduces bureaucratic discretion. Achieving the required outcome dimensions induces 
effort (costs) for the ALRs in terms of the share of working time spent on the particular task. 
Nonetheless, performing scheme-related tasks cannot decrease to zero, because then the scheme would 
not be implemented at all, but the relative effort spent on scheme-related tasks may decrease. As 
discussed above, this may affect the quality of scheme implementation.  
Theory predicts that partial monitoring is unlikely to yield an outcome superior to that resulting 
from an absence of monitoring, because monitoring/measuring only a part of an agent’s performance 
leads to strategic adjustments in agents’ task fulfilment, with a shift towards the monitored tasks 
(Whynes, 1993; Dixit, 2002). Agents “simply respond to controls in monitorable areas by reductions 
in output in non-monitorable ones” (Whynes, 1993, p. 441). Such adjustments may even create 
information asymmetry rents for the agent, because the reduction of producing the unmonitored output 
dimension may not be noticed (Walker, 2000). 
However, recent research highlights that intrinsic motivation, attitudes, ethical purposes and/or 
aspects related to professionalism may also induce agents to provide unmeasured/unmonitored tasks, 
thereby reducing the necessity of monitoring (Heckman et al., 1997; Dixit, 2002). Weber (2014a) 
emphasises that most ALR officers have a training background in ecology and also care about quality 
aspects of the environmental outcome aspired by the scheme. She also finds that officers regret 
neglecting environmental issues in the implementation process. 
Given that the regulations are identical for all ALRs, variances in time allocation are argued to 
rely on differences in incentives
53
 to perform scheme-related tasks. The next section presents 
hypotheses as well as testable variables. 
7.3.3 Hypotheses and variables 
Incentives to perform scheme-related tasks are argued to stem from three main sources: (1) 
agriculture-related, structural county characteristics, mirroring the importance of the scheme in a 
particular county, (2) scheme performance, and (3) ALR features. Acronyms for the variables are 
presented in parentheses. Due to the limits mentioned in section 2, intrinsic factors, such as personal 
attitudes or motivation could not be integrated into the hypotheses. However, a general positive 
attitude towards environmental goals can be assumed due to the training background of most officers.  
(1) Agricultural structure and land use varies strongly between the counties. Grassland is 
predominant in the low mountain ranges of Eastern and Central Hesse, where farms are characterised 
by lower productivity. Arable land predominates in the south. The distribution of ecologically valuable 
grassland also varies (HMULV, 2006). Given such structural differences, the scheme can be 
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Note that in the remainder of the article, the term incentive is applied to any tool suited to guide the agent’s 
behaviour. 
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considered to be of varying importance for both farmers and ALRs in the particular counties; ALRs 
face different levels of necessity to pursue environmental goals, and farmers may value income 
derivable from scheme participation differently according to varying opportunity costs. 
(1a) The magnitude of grassland sites protected by the Habitats Directive (FFH) should positively 
influence the time share spent on scheme-related tasks. 
As argued above, on the side of the administration, scheme-related tasks aim to ensure a 
sufficient participation rate to meet the goals of the Habitat’s Directive. To pursue this goal, ALRs 
have to communicate their knowledge of the scheme’s features, the eligibility of sites, etc., as well as 
the particular participation regulations to the farmers by providing informational material and 
meetings or via personal communication (Weber, 2014a). Moreover, they have to negotiate on the 
particular feasible management agreements, EVSS, and per-hectare premiums. Pursuing this goal and 
performing the related workload can be assumed to be of more importance the higher the scope of 
protected grassland in the particular county is. 
(1b) The magnitude of utilised agricultural area (UAA) should positively influence the time share 
spent on scheme-related tasks. 
The importance of agriculture in a county can be assumed to influence the performance of 
scheme-related tasks. Weber (2014a, 2014b) shows that farmers are also a source of administrative 
work, as they may request the ALRs’ working time. Such requests are likely to increase with the 
number of farms or the magnitude of UAA
54
 in a county. 
(1c) The share of fulltime-run farms (FULLTIME) should positively influence the time share 
spent on scheme-related tasks. 
Wilson and Hart (2000), Siebert et al. (2006), and Ruto and Garrod (2009) find farmers’ 
participation decisions to be positively influenced by farm size, educational level, and a positive 
attitude towards conservation. Defrancesco et al. (2008) observe that farmers’ participation decisions 
are also influenced positively by a high dependency on farm income. Weber (2014b) finds for farmers 
participating in the grassland scheme that whether or not farms are run full-time (indicating high 
dependency on farm income) also determines whether they expend more time obtaining information 
on scheme conditions. Therefore, variables that influence the participation decision of farmers may 
also be related to TC expense
55
. 
(2) Next, scheme performance may affect the ALRs’ working time allocation. 
(2a) The scope of area (HASCHEME) should have an impact on the share of working time 
allocated to scheme-related tasks, although its direction is unclear. 
Falconer and Whitby (1999), Falconer et al. (2001), and Nilsson (2009) find scale effects for 
implementation and monitoring costs when the number of participants or the scope of hectares under 
contract increases. If monitoring tasks increase sub-proportionately, a higher share of working time 
was available for scheme-related tasks. 
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Both variables were almost perfectly correlated positively, so one of them was omitted. 
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Data on educational level as well as differentiated information on farm sizes were not available. 
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However, because scheme-monitoring regulations prescribe 100% administrative checks of plots, 
scale effects seem not to be achievable in this setting (Weber, 2014a). Moreover, a high number of 
hectares already enrolled in the scheme may lead to saturation; the necessity to invest in acquisition or 
negation for the ALRs decreases. 
(2b) The number of ha with EVSS (HAEVSS) should positively affect the working time share 
spent on scheme-related costs. 
Besides the scope of participation, contract specificity also affects TCs. Generally, a high degree 
of scheme specificity was found to increase absolute TCs (Rørstad et al., 2007; Ollikainen et al., 
2008). Custom-tailored contracts increase information and negotiation costs but need not necessarily 
increase monitoring costs (Falconer and Saunders, 2002), as the latter depend on the modes of 
monitoring. 
In the grassland scheme, different degrees of specificity exist due to the amount of EVSS/ha 
agreed upon for particular sites. EVSS agreements do not affect the spatial characteristics of a plot; 
consequently, they should not affect the time spent on administrative checks. 
(3) As a last source, ALR-related features may affect the time share spent on scheme-related 
tasks. 
The total time available for scheme-implementation (TTLTIME) should have a positive impact 
on the working time share spent on scheme-related tasks. 
The endowment of the ALR with personnel
56
 may affect time allocation decisions. If 
reimbursement-related tasks were prioritised (resulting in a rather fixed amount of necessary time, 
binding human resources), less time could be spent on scheme-related tasks whenever fewer personnel 
were available. 
7.4 Results and discussion 
7.4.1 Descriptive results 
The descriptive results (Table 2) show that administrative checks and negotiation costs require 
the highest share of weekly working hours (left results’ column), mirrored also in the average 
percentage (29% respectively 24%, right column). Acquisition costs (9%), costs for post-processing 
on-site checks (11%) and coordination costs (10%) require lower shares of working time; effort on 
stating the ALRs own compliance with EU regulations requires about 16% of working time on 
average. Sorting these costs into the two task blocks, the findings show that reimbursement-related 
costs form the major share of total TCs; scheme-related costs require a minor part of working time. 
These results confirm the qualitative results of Weber (2014a).  
  
                                                          
56
 Note that TTLTIME indicates the time actually spent on scheme implementation and is therefore a proxy for 
the level of staffing. Moreover, as ALR officers sometimes also conduct tasks apart from scheme 
implementation, in  the first regressions, a variable indicating capacity shifts was tested. However, as it showed 
no significant results, it was omitted from the final regressions.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive results 
  Weekly hrs. % of working time 
  Mean σ Mean σ 
Scheme-related Acquisition costs  6.60 5.093 9.14 4.383 
 Negotiation costs  18.13 15.776 23.85 13.086 
Reimbursement-related Administrative checks/payment 22.48 18.5742 29.17 0.1734 
 Post-processing on-site checks  6.39 6.023 11.04 0.1201 
 Administrative compliance costs   11.13 8.935 15.81 12.512 
Overhead Coordination costs 6.53 4.777 9.98 6.659 
Ratio Scheme/reimbursement costs   0.77 0.776 
Own calculation. 
However, the descriptive results reveal that both weekly working hours spent on particular tasks 
as well as their relative share varies at large. The following section depicts the results of the 
regressions and explores the underlying reasons for these variances in detail. 
7.4.2 Regression results 
Table 3 
Regression results for factors affecting particular costs 
a)
 
 Acquisition Negotiation Administrative 
checks 
Post-
processing on-
site checks 
Reporting 
effort 
Ratio of 
scheme/ 
reimbursem
ent related 
costs 
Intercept 4.349* 
(4.819)
 b)
 
-13.493*** 
(32.009) 
-9.315*** 
(27.413) 
0.056 
(0.001) 
19.319*** 
(184.881) 
-9.726*** 
(10.208) 
FFH -1.118*** 
(10.708) 
0.764
(
*
)
 
(3.255) 
-0.434 
(1.656) 
0.134 
(0.097) 
0.197 
(0.617) 
0.499 
(0.874) 
UAA -1.488***
 
(23.082) 
1.718*** 
(14.764) 
-0.032 
(0.009) 
0.066 
(0.023) 
-0.663** 
(6.423) 
1.224* 
(4.823) 
FULLTIME -1.945*** 
(23.082) 
0.780
(
*
)
 
(2.541) 
2.307*** 
(35.671) 
-2.192*** 
(20.891) 
-2.594*** 
(74.348) 
-0.803 
(1.688) 
HASCHEME -0.328 
1.266) 
-1.103** 
(9.771) 
1.347*** 
(24.251) 
0.154 
(0.207) 
-2.310*** 
(118.502) 
-1.503*** 
(11.175) 
HAEVSS 0.803*** 
(16.761) 
0.551** 
(9.771) 
-0.354
(
*
)
 
(3.648) 
-0.391
(
*
)
 
(3.009) 
0.140 
(0.935) 
1.022*** 
(11.460) 
TTLTIME 0.473** 
(9.484) 
0.245 
(1.730) 
0.454** 
(8.756) 
-1.029*** 
(29.151) 
0.384 
(1.007) 
0.294 
(1.505) 
QICC 31.927 39.752 27.681 33.419 22.996 56.280 
Significance levels: (*) = 0.1; *= 0.05; **= 0.01; ***= 0.001.  
a) 
Note that both dependent and independent variables were investigated as their natural logarithms. 
b) 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the particular Wald-Chi
2
 value. 
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The regression results depicted in table 3 reveal that all variables show significant effects in 
particular cost categories; however, their particular impacts vary. Moreover, the effect of the intercept 
coefficient is large and significant in most regressions. This indicates a substantial impact for 
additional, non-observed variables. 
7.4.2.1 Influences on the overall ratio 
To begin with, a look at the overall ratio of scheme-related to reimbursement-related cost 
categories (last column in table 3) reveals that the scope of UAA has the highest positive effect on the 
ratio, closely followed by the number of EVSS/ha. Thus, the importance of agriculture in a county 
seems to foster the provision of scheme-related tasks. The positive influence of EVSS/ha corroborates 
previous findings of a positive relationship between scheme specificity and the requirement for 
information and negotiation effort at the implementation level (Falconer and Saunders, 2002; 
Mettepenningen et al., 2011). 
FFH and the level of staffing also have a positive effect, yet below significance. 
The total contract area has a significant negative impact on the ratio. This means that if ALRs 
have to process a large number of hectares under contract, administrative working time seems rather to 
be fixed on reimbursement-related tasks. Scale effects, as found by Falconer and Whitby (1999), 
Falconer et al. (2001), and Nilsson (2009) cannot be concluded. However, as discussed above, their 
occurrence is unlikely due to the 100% scope of monitoring.  
The impact of FULLTIME is also negative but below significance.  
So far, the significant results are in line with the hypotheses, and a concrete crowding out of 
scheme-related by reimbursement-related tasks is not evident. Interestingly, both county 
characteristics and scheme performance indicators show a large effect on scheme-related tasks. This 
indicates that external as well as internal factors affect task performance and may compensate the low 
regulatory control. 
The following section investigates whether these results on the aggregate costs also hold for the 
particular cost categories. 
7.4.2.2 Influences on particular scheme-related costs 
In line with the findings for the overall ratio, a high number of EVSS/ha and the level of staffing 
(here significant) positively influence the share of the time budget spent on acquisition, although with 
a relatively low effect size. 
Nonetheless, negative effects prevail; remarkably, the share of full-time farms has the largest 
significant negative impact on acquisition costs, followed by UAA and protected grassland. At first 
sight, the latter findings contradict the results for the overall ratio. 
However, contrary to their negative effect on acquisition, county characteristics have a significant 
positive effect on the share of the time budget spent on negotiation. UAA has the largest impact, 
followed by FULLTIME and FFH.  
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The number of EVSS/ha also positively affect the time share spent on negotiation. Staffing also 
shows a positive effect, yet below significance. Interestingly, the effect size of the EVSS/ha is larger 
than the effect size of the staffing level, which is comparatively low for both cost categories. 
These results imply an opposing effect of county characteristics on scheme-related cost 
categories; the results indicate a time shift from acquisition tasks towards negotiation tasks. However, 
this does not necessarily imply that ALRs neglect information provision; the ALRs may benefit from 
fixed cost effects due to the modes of information provision (Falconer et al., 2001).The effort to 
prepare an information meeting, for example, is rather independent from the number of attendants. 
Moreover, a lower share of time spent on information provision does not necessarily imply reduced 
information quality. Instead, this shift towards negotiation efforts might be induced by the farmers 
themselves. Professional farmers seem to prefer an individual, bilateral setting for discussing scheme 
particulars they consider important instead of a non-personal situation in a general information 
meeting (Weber, 2014b).  
Reversing this argument also supports this explanation: ALRs in counties characterised by a 
higher share of part-time farmers, less UAA and fewer hectares under contract increase the time share 
spent on acquisition. ALRs might take initiative in counties where agriculture is less important in 
terms of area as well as in terms of income, especially since the Hessian agricultural authorities have 
to rely on part-time farmers to maintain grassland use. 
In brief, ALRs allocate the remaining time between both scheme-related cost categories in order 
to respond to particular county circumstances. 
7.4.2.3 Influences on specific reimbursement-related costs 
Results on the particular reimbursement-related cost categories also reveal a mixed picture; 
particular costs categories are subject to different drivers. 
For the time share spent on administrative checks and payment processing, FULLTIME shows a 
significantly large positive effect, followed by the area under contract (HASCHEME). The latter 
indicates that effort for administrative checks can be directly related to scheme performance. 
Moreover, the comparatively large effect size does not support the existence of economies of scale. 
The effect of TLTIME is also positive, but with a substantially lower effect size. Interestingly, this 
positive impact indicates that additional manpower was even spent on these tasks. From an isolated 
point of view, this is rather puzzling. However, as argued below, there might also to be some opposing 
effects between reimbursement-related tasks. 
In line with the hypotheses and the findings for the overall ratio, the number of EVSS/ha show a 
negative impact. 
The findings for both HASCHEME and EVSS/ha are comprehensible in the light of the 
regulations for administrative checks and payment processing. The reimbursement regulations of the 
EAFRD require a mandatory monitoring scope of 100% of the contracted plots in order to verify the 
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spatial plot information (see above). Therefore, the number of hectares increases the amount of 
information to be checked per se and irrespective of deviations. 
The number of EVSS/ha does not affect the spatial plot characteristics and therefore does not 
affect the monitoring effort. Thus, it is possible to reduce the upcoming monitoring effort at least 
partly by scheme design. 
The impact of FFH and UAA is negative but below significance. 
Regarding the share of working time spent on post-processing on-site checks, all significant 
effects are negative, with the largest impact  found for FULLTIME, followed by the level of staffing 
and the number of EVSS/ha. 
As the effort for post-processing on-site inspection results can be related directly to the scope of 
deviations found, the large effect of FULLTIME indicates that professionalism in farming goes along 
with a higher degree of compliance. This is in line with the findings of Fraser (2002) or Wilson and 
Hart (2000), who highlight that compliance may be a result of risk management: a high dependency on 
farm income induces farmers’ compliance in order not to jeopardise the AES payment Moreover, the 
relatively low effort to post-process the inspection results might be a consequence not only of the 
effort previously spent on negotiation but also of the comparatively high effort full-time farmers spend 
on documentary tasks (Weber, 2014b). Thus, higher TCs incurred by farmers seem to produce lower 
public TCs, which denotes an important spill-over effect.  
For the magnitude of contract area (HASSGES), no significant impact was found. A possible 
explanation is that the selection of controlees is due to other criteria (Weber, 2014a). Furthermore, on-
site inspections are conducted by a separate audit team, and neither inspections nor results can directly 
be influenced by the ALRs. This might also explain the substantial and significant negative effect 
found for the level of staffing. 
To sum up, effort due to deviations found in on-site inspections might not be subject to a 
deliberate time use decision but rather a spill-over effect from the audit team’s monitoring results; 
nonetheless, a positive internal spill-over due to a preceding investment in negotiation as well as from 
farmers’ TCs seem likely. 
For the share of working time spent on stating administrative compliance, all significant 
coefficients show a negative sign. FULLTIME has the largest effect size, followed by the magnitude 
of contract area and UAA. Especially the latter indicate possible fixed costs effects; reporting and 
compliance-related duties seem to constitute a kind of baseline effort for the ALRs. This implies that 
ALRs with fewer areas under contract are relatively more affected by EAFRD-based compliance 
issues, despite the fact that the magnitude of co-financing they will obtain later on is comparatively 
low. 
The effect of FFH is positive but below significance; this is also true for the level of staffing. 
Subsuming the main results reveals that - in absolute terms - the ALRs prioritise reimbursement-
related tasks in their time use allocation decisions. However, the regression results reveal that drivers 
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to perform scheme-related tasks exist, although these tasks are less controlled by the underlying 
regulations. 
Moreover, the differences between the effects within the cost categories show that neither 
scheme-related nor reimbursement-related costs can be lumped together. Instead, they are subject to 
different drivers. Scheme-related costs’ categories especially seem to be traded off against each other. 
The next section discusses some implications of these findings. 
7.5 Discussion and Implications 
The results show that the main part of public TCs in the ALRs aim to mitigate possible moral 
hazard of both farmers and the implementing administrations themselves in order to prevent a misuse 
of EU funds. The results also reveal that such a focus tends to produce several distortive effects on 
time use allocation in ALRs. Additionally, the findings highlight the role of information provision and 
direct interaction between farmers and ALRs for implementing the scheme with a low level of 
deviations. In line with the multi-task principal-agent-setting, the results imply a more balanced 
regulatory control of the several tasks needed to ensure a more homogenous implementation of the 
scheme.  
Within the current regulatory framework, the most important external drivers are county 
characteristics. Interestingly, the number of full-time farmers shows the largest impact with respect to 
effect size and significance, while the magnitude of protected grassland shows the lowest impact. 
Therefore, the ALRs’ working time decisions seem at least partly to be requested by particular farmers 
rather than by the environmental concerns of the ALRs themselves. This implies that part of the ALRs 
working time decisions seem to be extrinsically decided. 
Interestingly, a high share of individual negotiation in counties characterised by a high degree of 
professionalism in farming seems to be a spill-over effect from farmers’ time expenses to ALRs’ time 
expenses. In contrast, a high share of acquisition in counties with less professional farming seems to 
be induced by the ALRs’ attempts to secure a sufficient participation rate. 
County characteristics also seem to create spill-over benefits for the ALRs within scheme 
processing; the relatively high investment in negotiation in counties with a high degree of professional 
farming leads to fewer deviations found in on-site inspections. Such positive interdependencies were 
already highlighted by Falconer and Whitby (1999) and McCann et al. (2005) and seem to at least 
partly outweigh the mandatory effort related to the administrative checks in such counties. While this 
highlights the role of the natural/structural environment in which the scheme is implemented 
(Mettepenningen et al., 2011), these findings also imply that ALRs in counties with no such structural 
features are at a disadvantage with respect to scheme compliance by farmers. However, a substantial 
number of counties have to rely on part-time farmers to keep plots in agricultural use (HMULV, 
2006). It therefore seems reasonable to increase the incentives for the ALRs to provide and for the 
farmers to make use of bilateral information and negotiation – e.g. by defining a minimum level of 
Article 3 
 109 
extension services, supported by an increase in staff. This could reduce the later effort due to farmers’ 
non-compliance.  
The influence of scheme performance variables at least partly represent the result of previously 
conducted effort on acquisition and negotiation. It could be shown that scheme design may elude part 
of the mandatory monitoring effort induced by the EAFRD; implementing and processing high-quality 
contracts with at least partly individual features is possible without increasing monitoring effort. 
However, this applies only to the effort spent on monitoring farmers, and does not affect the 
compliance effort of the ALRs themselves. 
Regarding the overall monitoring effort of ALRs (including stating their own compliance) the 
findings revealed distortive effects induced by the EAFRD compliance regulations: ALRs with less 
contract area are relatively more affected by EU checks, despite the fact that their share of the total 
reimbursement is lower. As a result, the total administrative costs per ha under contract are higher in 
such counties. However, these costs are paid from the Hessian budget, while the benefits of these 
checks occur at the EU level (Weber, 2014a). In light of this finding, either a modification of reporting 
effort in terms of relating it to the particular share of the reimbursement or an at least partial 
reimbursement of reporting effort by the EU should be considered.  
Finally, results have shown that staffing matters: the more personnel are available, the less 
restricting is the necessity to prioritise reimbursement-related tasks. Staffing thus supports the effects 
of the other incentives to perform scheme-related tasks. This also implies that ALRs with little human 
resources might actually face a crowding out problem. Thus, EU co-financed schemes seem to require 
a certain degree of staffing.  
The now confirmed EU regulations 1305/2013 and 1306/2013 governing the EAFRD in the 
funding period 2014-2020 have addressed part of these issues (European Parliament and European 
Council, 2013a, 2013b). Regulation 1305/2013 recognises an extended need for agricultural extension 
services. It requires but also co-finances the establishment of agricultural extension services to 
improve farmers’ information on agri-environmental issues, which must be made available for all 
farmers (Art. 28). Although this currently addresses mainly the so-called greening measures to be 
implemented within the direct payments of pillar 1, spill-over effects onto AES offered within pillar 2 
are intended, expected, and also likely to occur (ibid.). However, claiming such services increases 
those TCs incurred by farmers (Weber, 2014b). Especially part-time farmers, who would have to ask 
for such services in their leisure time, would probably require compensation for their additional effort 
or would otherwise refrain from participation. 
This again brings up the issue of compensating farmers for their TCs incurred due to 
participation. Although a compensation of TCs could in principal be included in the payments to 
farmers, this option currently is not used in most German States (see Thomas et al., 2009). With 
respect to the frequency and depth in monitoring farmers, the new regulation 1306/2013 seems 
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to withdraw the previous postulate of extensive monitoring in favour of more regional 
adaptability (Art. 59). Potentially
57
, the administrations can exert more discretion in 
determining the particular scope of farmers and plots to be monitored and thus reward 
previous compliance. Furthermore, this would allow for realizing economies of scale and 
time, which were hampered in the funding period investigated. Overall, this would improve TC 
efficiency of both farmers and administrations by reducing allocative distortions.   
However, the new regulations do not seem to alleviate the distortive effects due to the reporting 
effort of the implementing administrations. Regulation 1306/2013 even seems to increase the 
standardization and harmonization of procedures, such as how to apply rules on participation 
applications, deadlines, accounting, payment processing, as well as which and how monitoring and 
control statistics have to be submitted to the Commission (Art. 56ff.). Furthermore, the regulation 
explicitly postulates deterrence as the main strategy in order to protect the financial interests of the EU 
(ibid.), and the Commission threatens member states with a prompt termination or suspension of the 
payments (ibid). However, whether the actual effects of these standardisations rather increase the 
allocative and distributive effects on the implementation-related TCs on regional level or whether such 
effects are at least partially outweighed by the increased discretion (e.g. in how much to monitor 
farmers) cannot be judged upon in advance. Much depends on how these regulations are concretised 
by the implementation rules of the Commission yet to be decided on and whether the regional 
authorities will use the discretion offered (Weber, 2014a). 
7.6 Conclusion 
This study has investigated time use allocation of county administrations in the German state of 
Hesse for implementing an EU co-financed AES. Based on a multi-task principal-agent conceptual 
framework that distinguishes between scheme-related tasks to reach the environmental goals of the 
scheme and tasks necessary to obtain the EU reimbursement, this study investigates a possible trade-
off in working time allocation. The results show that the regulatory depth of monitoring regulations 
induces a prioritisation of reimbursement-related tasks in absolute terms. However, county, scheme 
and ALR features exist that foster the provision of scheme-related tasks despite the fact that these are 
much less prescribed. In order to secure a more homogenous scheme implementation, balancing the 
incentives for conducting the particular tasks required for scheme implementation it was suggested. 
Second, the study revealed that EU co-financed AES require a certain level of staffing; crowding-
out effects between reimbursement-related and scheme-related tasks are most likely to occur in ALRs 
with fewer human resources. A third important result is that part of the EU-related monitoring effort is 
fixed and thus increases the per contract costs in counties with fewer participants. 
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For the actual funding period, some of the new regulations concerning the implementation of the 
EAFRD increase the discretion of the regional administrations towards their interacting with farmers, 
while at the same time the reporting duties to the Commission seem to be severed.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Sample Descriptives 
Variables mean σ Min/max 
Structural county variables    
Agriculturally used area (ha) 
(UAA) 
49,912.45 13,793.14 16,842/69,136 
Fulltime run farms (%) 
(FULLTIME) 
29.45 0.05 19/42 
Share of protected per total 
grassland (%) 
(FFH) 
15.36 0.07 0.04/0.28 
Scheme performance variables    
Scope of existent contracts (ha) 
(HASCHEME)  
3,082.54 1,073.09 3,13.00/4,799.00 
Scope of high-quality contracts 
(ha) 
(HAEVSS) 
796.62 368.93 344.00/1,328.00 
ALR structural variables    
Total time spent on scheme 
implementation (weekly hrs.) 
TTLTIME 
71.59 35.51 17.55/161.40 
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8 Concluding Discussion 
The results of this thesis shed light on some unaddressed aspects of transaction costs coming up 
in AES implementation. In particular, this thesis aimed to explain intra-scheme variances in magnitude 
and composition of public as well as private TCs in an action-oriented
58
 Hessian AES offered within 
the regulatory framework of the CAP. The articles constituting the main research outcome of this 
thesis addressed different aspects of private and public TCs In particular, they investigated the 
following: 
 Reasons for differences in private TCs (Article 1, see chapter 5). 
 Influences of the CAP/EAFRD regulations on public TCs and resulting spillovers onto 
private TCs (Article 2, see chapter 6). 
 Differences in local public TCs (Article 3, see chapter 7). 
Overall, the results revealed that a) the EAFRD regulations set the framework for AES design and 
implementation and thus influences the magnitude of both public and private TCs, b) the EAFRD 
causes allocative and distributive effects on both public and private TCs in Hesse and thus affects TC 
composition and incidence, and finally c) the degree of this impact varies subject to foremost 
structural, actor-related factors, which d) provides an explanation for intra-scheme TC variances. In 
light of the prominent role AES play as CAP instrument to provide agri-environmental benefits, the 
findings help provide a more comprehensive picture of AES-related TCs, show the impact on TCs if 
offering an AES within the CAP framework, and thus potentially help to design regulations on both 
European and regional levels that alleviate the mentioned allocative and distributive effects and lead to 
more TC efficiency. 
A number of implications have already been discussed within the articles. These dealt with issues 
of balancing costs and gains of scheme implementation among the different actors involved and raised 
the question whether farmers (article 1) or regional administrations (article 2 and 3) should be 
reimbursed for the TCs they incur. All articles also discussed aspects of allocative losses, addressing 
the trade-off between the EU’s aim to protect its financial interests via harmonisation and 
standardisation and particular regional needs. So, in the following, only the overall implications of the 
findings as presented in chapter 4 are briefly discussed in a synthesised manner. In addition, a number 
of impacts on TCs expected due to changes in the EAFRD regulations in the current funding period 
2014-2020 are presented. 
  
                                                          
58
 Note that the results obtained are discussed with respect to action-oriented AES and may not directly be 
transferred to result-oriented schemes. For a recent review on result-oriented schemes see Burton and Schwarz 
(2013), for a viewpoint see Moxey and White (2014).  
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8.1 Summary of implications 
For the funding period investigated, the EAFRD framework draw the focus of actual contractual 
design – concerning both the contractual relationship between EU and Hessian administration and 
between Hessian administration and farmers – to counteracting potential opportunistic behaviour in a 
more or less ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.  
As a consequence, allocative effects occur with respect to the particular cost categories. The focus 
on monitoring issues in contractual design is resembled in the high proportion of monitoring costs 
among total TCs. This accounts for both the administration and farmers during actual scheme 
implementation as well as for the substantial share of reporting costs found to state the 
administrations’ own compliance with the EAFRD regulations. 
Allocative effects also occur between particular administrations and between particular ‘types’ of 
farm businesses. In case these differences result from differences in farmers’ opportunity costs of time 
(see chapter 5), a correction of the allocative effect would not be required in principle. In that case, 
TCs would be the expression of particular farmers’ preferences respectively their willingness to pay 
for participation. 
However, the amount of time spent by farmers on negotiation and documenting issues is crucial 
for another reason: higher negotiation and documentation expenses go in line with fewer deviations 
found and thus lower costs on behalf of the administrations for tracking farmers. For the Hessian 
administrations, this indicates scheme success and in consequence requires less supervisory control by 
the EU. 
Two recommendations come up from these insights. First, as the decision on how much to invest 
in negotiation and documentary issues is currently up to the farmers themselves – and, as shown, 
practised very differently by different ‘types’ of farmers – providing incentives particularly for part-
time farmers’ to increase their effort on bilateral negotiation and  their documentary duties seems to be 
a crucial issue. This could be pursued either by the ALRs in a regulatory approach or by providing 
incentives for the farmers. As article 3 has revealed, inducing the ALRs to increase their effort on such 
scheme-related tasks requires an increase in the incentives provided. Following the multi-task PA-
approach, either an increase in regulating the provision of scheme-related tasks or a decrease in 
regulating reimbursement-related tasks should take place. With the help of such a regulatory approach, 
a specified level of information and negotiation would be made obligatory for farmers prior to scheme 
participation. Of course, this would mean an increase in farmers’ TCs, which, however, would be 
partially weighed out by the subsequent lower effort to correct deviations, and fewer payment 
subtractions. This leads to the second recommendation:  
Actually, farmers incur substantial TCs without being compensated while the administration also 
participated from the related gains. Consequently, Hessian scheme regulations should integrate a TC 
reimbursement component into the payment calculation. In addition to a more balanced allocation of 
transaction costs and gains, such a compensation of TCs might provide an incentive for part-time 
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farmers to invest more of their time in negotiation and documentation issues, particularly if these are 
more enforced by the ALRs. 
Finally, a number of allocative losses were found because actual scheme regulations do not 
account for variances in compliance, neither on the side of the administration nor on the side of the 
farmers (see section 2.2.2.1). A large amount of theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that TCs 
can be saved by allowing for different treatments of different types of farmers – an argument that also 
applies to different types of administrations (see article 2). Moreover, within the structural features 
investigated, scheme design and implementation regulations hamper the ability to obtain economies of 
scale, scope, and time for both the administration and farmers. Furthermore, article 2 (see chapter 6) 
highlighted a number of TCs related to the lacking adaptation possibilities of contracts with farmers 
during the participation period.  
Apart from these allocative effects, the article results revealed also a number of distributive 
effects occurring between EU and Hessian administrative levels as well as between single county 
administrations. In the funding period 2007-2013, the state of Hesse had to bear the full costs for 
implementing the EAFRD while only receiving a partial reimbursement of payments to farmers. 
Setting up and running the structure and procedures required by the EAFRD induced a number of 
fixed costs. As a consequence, counties with fewer contracts bear a higher share of these costs. To 
mitigate such distributive effects, a (co)-financing of regional administrative costs for EU-related 
issues by the EU was recommended in article 2 (see chapter 6). An at least partial reimbursement of 
regional administrative costs would facilitate the situation of poorer member states or regions and 
provide for a more balanced occurrence of costs and benefits and thus result in better TC efficiency. 
Such cost sharing should easily be integrated into the given reimbursement structure. 
Besides such practical implications, an important result of this thesis from a theoretical point of 
view is a relationship between TCs incurred and particular risk management attempts for both public 
and private actors. In particular, TCs incurred – especially those incurred on ‘voluntary base’ - seem to 
resemble the actors’ ‘willingness to pay’ in order to secure income (for farmers) or the budget (for 
Hesse). This finding should be corroborated by future (empirical) research to mitigate the limits of this 
case study approach (see section 1.2). Attention of future research should also be drawn on a 
relationship between participation motives of farmers and related TC expenditure. While a number of 
studies have investigated participation motives of farmers (see e.g. Siebert, Toogood, and Knierim 
[2006] for an overview), little is known about whether such motives are mirrored in participation-
related TCs. In addition, such a relationship might also exist for the administrations in the EU member 
states: It would be interesting to know whether particular budgetary needs and a related need to 
receive the (full) EAFRD reimbursement are mirrored in the related public TCs. 
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8.2 Needs for future research 
A number of issues have been raised in the course of the articles that could not be explored 
further within this thesis but should also be addressed in further research. 
One point is a deeper empirical exploration of the cost effectiveness of the performance 
measurement and the monitoring techniques as used in actual scheme implementation, given that they 
tend to produce erroneous results. As pointed out in section 2.2.2.1, this topic is also rarely addressed 
in theory. A related gap is that little research investigates the (welfare) consequences resulting from 
the choice of performance indicators or monitoring techniques59, despite the notion that any kind of 
monitoring requires some form of performance measurement (Slangen, 1997; Latacz-Lohmann and 
Van der Hamsvoort, 1998)
60
. Given that imperfect monitoring – in connection to the choice of 
performance measurement and of monitoring techniques – seems to be a non-trivial issue in scheme 
implementation as it raises the social costs of AES implementation, more (empirical) attention should 
be spent on cost effectiveness assessments of monitoring costs and monitoring gains in future 
research. 
8.3 Outlook on the new funding period  
For the now begun funding period 2014-2020, both European Commission and Parliament state 
that “agri-environmental climate payments should continue to play a prominent role in supporting the 
sustainable development of rural areas and in responding to society’s increasing demands for 
environmental services.” (European Parliament and European Council 2013a, recital 22). In order, 
AES-related TCs will remain an important issue. The recently decided regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 
and No. 1306/2013 on the new EAFRD (European Parliament and European Council, 2013a, 2013b) 
contain a number of aspects suitable to counteract some of the mentioned deficiencies which might 
improve the TC efficiency of scheme implementation. 
First, regulation 1305/2013 allows for more flexibility in how to adapt contracts in response to 
business changes, also ex post. This might decrease TCs for correction for both the administration and 
farmers, enhance participation and prevent cut-offs in participation as depicted in figure 9 (see 
chapters 3 and 6). Maintenance in scheme participation could result in better ecological effects due to 
long term preservation and help to fulfil the goals of the Habitats’ Directive (Wilhelm, 1999). 
Second, regulation 1306/2013 seems to withdraw the previous postulate of extensive monitoring 
of farmers in favour of more regional adaptability (Art. 59). Potentially
61
, the administrations can exert 
more discretion in determining the particular scope of farmers and plots to be monitored and thus 
reward previous compliance. Exerting such discretion would also allow for realizing economies of 
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 Choe and Fraser (1999), for example, mention a weaker monitoring accuracy of remote sensing versus on-the-
ground inspections, which were also cheaper. 
60
 An exemption is Zabel and Roe (2009), who discuss several performance measurements like single indicator, 
multiple indicators, and relative performance measurement. 
61
 This yet depends on what will be decided by the Commission in the related implementation regulations. 
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scale and time, which were hampered in the former funding period, and overall lead to more TC 
efficiency for both farmers and administrations by reducing allocative distortions. 
Third, regulation 1305/2013 requires but also co-finances the establishment of agricultural 
extension services to improve farmers’ information on agri-environmental issues, which must be made 
available for all farmers (Art. 28). Although this currently addresses mainly the implementation of the 
so-called greening measures within pillar 1, spill-over effects onto AES offered within pillar 2 are 
intended and expected (ibid.). 
Finally, regulation 1306/2013 on financing the CAP explicitly postulates that member states have 
to bear the administrative costs for running the CAP funds just for pillar one (Art. 19). Furthermore, 
article 51 of reg. 1305/2013 also seems to extend the applicability of the budget share offered within 
the ‘technical aid’; parts of the administrative effort related to implementing the EAFRD might also be 
reimbursed. This implies an alleviation of the distributive effects between the EU and the State of 
Hesse mentioned above. 
However, some of the mentioned effects on TCs are likely to persist in the new funding period: 
First, double funding, between both different funds and different measures, is still prohibited 
(Reg. 1305/2013, Art. 28). The lower TC efficiency of farmers participating in the SSGES and the 
organic farming scheme (see article 1 in chapter 5) can thus only be met by either utilizing the full 
payment caps (which was not the case during the period investigated) or by integrating a 
reimbursement of additional TCs into the payments. 
Second, regulation 1306/2013 even seems to increase the standardization and harmonization of 
procedures mentioned in article 2. This, for example, concerns how to apply rules on farmers’ 
applications, deadlines, accounting, and payment processing, as well as monitoring and control 
statistics (Art. 56ff.). Furthermore, the regulation explicitly postulates deterrence as main strategy in 
order to protect the financial interests of the EU (ibid.), and the Commission threatens member states 
with a prompt termination or suspension of the payments (ibid). However, whether the actual effects 
of this increase in standardisation rather increase the allocative and distributive effects mentioned 
above or whether they are at least partially mitigated by the increase in regional discretion offered with 
respect e.g. to monitoring farmers depends on how these regulations are concretised by the 
implementation rules yet to be decided on. Moreover, as highlighted throughout this thesis, the risk-
avoiding behaviour of the Hessian administrative units might avoid the utilisation of such effects. 
To sum up, the new regulations seem to reduce TC-related allocative distortions mainly in the 
relationship between the administration and farmers, while an effect on TCs in the relationship 
between the EU and member state remains questionable. Given that the transaction between EU and 
member state is superposed, the increase in standardisation might also reduce the positive effects 
assumed for the relationship between regional administration and farmers. However, as this thesis has 
revealed, the impact on the related TCs depends not only on how their actual regulations will be 
enforced by the EU but also on how ‘risk-avoiding’ these will be processed by the regional actors.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 
Questionnaire for article (1) 
 
Transaktionskosten im Vertragsnaturschutz –  
Fragebogen für Landwirte im HIAP-Förderverfahren „Standortangepasste 
Grünlandextensivierung“ 
 
 
Name:   ________________________________________ 
 
Anschrift:   ________________________________________ 
 
Tel. (für Rückfragen): ________________________________ 
Lfd Nr:   ____ 
 
Mit meiner Unterschrift erkläre ich, dass ich freiwillig an dieser Umfrage teilnehme. Ich bin damit 
einverstanden, dass zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken Einsicht in meine Vertragsunterlagen beim 
zuständigen Landwirtschaftsamt genommen wird. Mir wurde versichert, dass meine Angaben 
vertraulich behandelt werden. Ich stimme einer Weiterverarbeitung meiner Angaben in anonymisierter 
Form zu. An einer Information über die Ergebnisse dieser Befragung bin ich interessiert. 
   Ja               Nein    
 
      Ort, Datum      Unterschrift 
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Fragen zum Grünland  
Lebensraumtyp: Flächland-Mähwiese 
    Berg-Mähwiese  
Wie viele Flächen bewirtschaften Sie im HIAP-Förderverfahren?  
Anzahl Schläge: __________ 
Gesamt-(ha):_______________ 
Durchschnittliche Größe der Vertragsflächen: _________ha 
Durchschnittliche Bodenzahl der Vertragsflächen (falls bekannt): __________ 
Durchschnittliche Höhe der Vertragsflächen ü. NN: _____________m 
Sind auf einzelnen Schlägen nur Teile eines Schlages unter Vertrag?  
   Ja               Nein    
 
Falls ja, wie viele Schläge betrifft dies? ________ (Anzahl) 
Auf wie vielen Vertragsflächen gäbe es alternative Nutzungsmöglichkeiten, wenn kein Vertrag 
zustande käme? ________ (Anzahl) 
 
Details über die Teilnahme am HIAP-Grünlandextensivierungsprogramm 
Aus welchem Grund nehmen Sie an diesem Programm teil? 
 Umweltschutz      
 Finanzieller Vorteil 
 Schläge müssten sonst aufgegeben werden 
 aus Gewohnheit 
 Sonstiges:____________________________ 
Haben Sie davor schon an HEKUL oder HELP  teilgenommen? 
(Falls ja, bitte Programm nennen)   ________________________ 
Wurden Flächen aus HEKUL oder HELP ins HIAP-Programm übernommen? 
   Ja               Nein                Teilweise  
 
In welchem Teilnahmejahr des laufenden Vertrags befinden Sie sich? Bitte ankreuzen: 
1 2 3 
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Haben Sie schon früher an anderen Agrarumweltprogrammen teilgenommen (außer HEKUL und 
HELP)?  
   Ja               Nein    
 
Wenn ja, an welchem?_____________________ 
Nehmen Sie derzeit noch an anderen Agrarumweltprogrammen teil (außer HIAP-B6):  
   Ja               Nein    
Wenn ja, an welchem? 
______ _____________ 
 
Angaben zu den Vertragsbedingungen: 
Mahdverpflichtung auf _____ Vertragsflächen (Anzahl) 
Gesamter Umfang:_____ ha 
Weideverpflichtung auf _____ Vertragsflächen (Anzahl) 
Gesamter Umfang:_____ ha 
NSL auf _____ Vertragsflächen (Anzahl) 
Gesamter Umfang:_____ ha 
Wie hoch ist die vereinbarte jährliche Gesamtprämie lt. Vertrag? __________ 
Glauben Sie, dass die vereinbarte Prämie über/genau auf/ unter Ihren Produktionskosten liegt? 
(Nichtzutreffendes bitte streichen) 
Planen Sie, nach Ablauf des Vertrags erneut am Förderprogramm teilzunehmen? 
   Ja               Nein            Weiß noch nicht  
 
Falls Sie nach Ablauf des Vertrags wieder zur ursprünglichen Bewirtschaftung zurückkehren wollen, 
rechnen Sie mit hohen Umstellungskosten? 
   Ja               Nein    
 
konkrete Vertragsvereinbarungen (bitte Anzahl Schläge angeben): 
bei Mahdverpflichtung: 
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vorgegebener Mahdtermin  
 vorgegebener Mahdzeitraum  
 zusätzliche Beweidung 
 zusätzliche Mahd  
 
bei Weideverpflichtung: 
 zusätzliche Mahd  
 Festlegung der Beweidungsdauer 
 
bei NSL (bitte Anzahl der Flächen angeben): 
       St. 1  St. 2  St. 3 
Erstnutzung 
     Relief 
     Aufwuchs 
     Standortverhältnisse 
          Verkehrslage/Flächenzuschnitt 
                Technik / besondere Nutzungsverfahren 
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Angaben zu veränderten Kosten und Erlösen durch die Teilnahme am HIAP-
Grünlandextensivierungsprogramm: 
Bei Mahdvereinbarung: Ja 
Keine 
Ände-
rung 
Inwiefern? 
Gibt es einen Rückgang des Ertrags?    
Gibt es eine Einschränkung in der 
Nutzung? 
   
Ist eine Nutzung des Mahdguts als Futter 
möglich? 
   
Falls nein, ist eine sonstige Nutzung des 
Mahdguts möglich? 
   
Haben Sie 
Bewirtschaftungsschwierigkeiten durch 
die Festlegung des Mahdtermins/des 
Mahdzeitraums? 
   
Hat sich durch die Teilnahme der 
Verbrauch an Düngemittel reduziert? 
   
Gibt es durch die Teilnahme 
Veränderungen bei der Kalkung der 
Flächen? 
   
Besteht ein erhöhter Arbeitsaufwand 
(Mäher wieder anhängen, zusätzliche 
Mahd etc.)? 
   
Besteht ein verminderter 
Arbeitsaufwand (z.B. weniger Mahdgänge 
auf Vertragswiesen o.ä.)? 
   
Ist durch die TN die Anschaffung 
spezieller Maschinen nötig? 
    
Ist eine Nutzung über Maschinenring o.ä. 
möglich? 
   
Fortsetzung: Ja 
Keine 
Ände-
rung 
Inwiefern? 
Werden die Maschinen selbst 
angeschafft? 
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Werden die Maschinen zusammen mit 
anderen LW angeschafft? 
   
Wie hoch sind die Mehrausgaben für 
Maschinen? 
   
Sind durch die Teilnahme spezielle 
Schulungen nötig (z.B. Umgang mit 
neuen Maschinen) 
  
Aufwand in Zeit: 
Aufwand in Euro: 
 
Bei Weidevereinbarungen  Ja 
Keine 
Ände-
rung 
Inwiefern? 
Ist durch die Programmteilnahme 
eine Änderung der 
Viehbesatzdichte notwendig 
geworden? 
   
Ist bzw. war durch die 
Programmteilnahme eine 
Umstellung auf andere Tierrassen 
notwendig? 
   
Ist durch die Programmteilnahme 
die Futterqualität gesunken? 
   
Ist deshalb eine Zufütterung nötig?    
Gibt es durch die Teilnahme eine 
Nutzungsänderung (z.B. Schafe 
statt Milchvieh ) 
   
Besteht ein erhöhter 
Arbeitsaufwand (z.B. häufigere 
Umtriebe, Zäune umstecken etc.)? 
   
Besteht ein verminderter 
Arbeitsaufwand (z.B. ing. weniger 
Weidegänge etc.)? 
   
Ist eine spezielle Schulung für die 
Weidehaltung notwenig gewesen? 
   
 
Zeit- und Kostenaufwand im Zusammenhang mit der Teilnahme am Förderprogramm  
Zeitaufwand im Zusammenhang mit Information  
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 Häufigkeit Gebühr 
Aufwand in 
h/min pro Mal  
Aufwand für Fahrten in 
km (einfache Fahrt) 
Internetrecherche     
Zeitschriften lesen     
Informationsbroschüren 
lesen  
    
Teilnahme an 
Veranstaltung des 
ALR/Sonst. 
    
Telefonat mit dem ALR      
Beratungsgespräch im 
ALR 
    
Gespräche mit ldw. 
Beratern 
    
Gespräche mit and. LW      
 
 Aufwand in h/min Falls anfallend. Gebühr 
Aufwand für Fahrten in 
km  
Auswahl möglicher 
Vertragsflächen 
   
Einholen der Erlaubnis des 
Eigentümers (falls nötig) 
   
Berechnung der 
Produktionskosten für 
Teilnahme („reicht die 
Prämie zur Deckung der 
Kosten?“) 
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Wie berechnen Sie die Produktionskosten (Deckungsbeiträge) für die extensive 
Grünlandbewirtschaftung? 
 KTBL      
 Sonstige Grundlage (Software) 
 Eigene Kalkulation genau 
 Eigene Kalkulation überschlägig 
 Keine 
 Berater     Sonstige          _________________ 
 
Wie berechnen Sie die vermutlichen Mindereinnahmen durch die Vertragsauflagen? 
 KTBL      Berater  
 Sonstige Grundlage (Software)  Sonstige          _________________ 
 Eigene Kalkulation genau 
 Eigene Kalkulation überschlägig 
 Keine 
Welcher Zeitaufwand entsteht für die Beantragung der Teilnahme: 
 
durch Fahrten zum ALR , z.B zum Vereinbaren weiterer Prämien (NSL)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Wie oft? 
Aufwand 
in h/min 
km pro Besuch 
(einfache Fahrt) 
Fahrten zum 
ALR 
   
Telefonate 
mit ALR 
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Für das Ausfüllen des Erstantrags:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In welcher Form wird der Antrag abgegeben? 
Persönlich   per Post  
 
Erforderlicher Zeitaufwand in h/min:___________ 
 
 
Wie viele Rückläufe gab es bis zur endgültigen Abgabe? _______ 
Wichtigster Grund für den Rücklauf:_________________________ 
Entsteht Ihnen Aufwand durch rechtliche Neuregelungen (z.B. Änderung der Beihilfesätze):  
 
   Ja               Nein    
 
 
Wenn ja, in welchem Umfang ?   
 
 
 
 
  
 
Aufwand 
in h/min 
Mantelbogen   
Flächennachweis  
Nachbesserungen/ 
Fehlerkorrektur 
 
 
Aufwand 
in h/min 
Mantelbogen   
Flächennachweis  
Neuberechnung von 
Produktionskosten 
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Entsteht Ihnen während der Laufzeit des Vertrages Aufwand durch betriebliche Veränderungen (z. 
B. veränderte Pachtverhältnisse)? 
   Ja               Nein    
 
 
Wenn ja, in welchem Umfang ?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finanzielle Entschädigung des Vorpächters/Vorbesitzers: 
   Ja               Nein    
 
Wenn ja, in Höhe von: ____________€ 
 
Entsteht Ihnen während der Laufzeit des Vertrages Aufwand durch eine stärkere 
Dokumentationspflicht als für die „gute fachliche Praxis“ (CC)? 
   Ja               Nein    
 
Aufwand für Schlagkartei:  
    
   
 
 
 
 
Welcher Aufwand entsteht Ihnen 
im Zusammenhang mit der 
 
Aufwand 
in h/min 
Zus. 
Fahrtkosten/ 
Telefonkosten 
Mantelbogen    
Flächennachweis   
Übernahmeerklärung   
Neuberechnung von 
Produktionskosten 
  
 
Wann führen 
Sie die 
Schlagkartei? 
täglich (T) 
wöchentlich 
(W) 
monatlich (M) 
Wie oft? 
Aufwand 
in h/min 
pro Mal  
Schlagkartei    
Weidetagebuch    
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Prämienbeantragung? 
 
Für das Ausfüllen des Antrags   _______________________h/min 
Für das Abgeben des Antrags   _______________________h/min 
 
Wie oft (in wie vielen Jahren) haben Sie bereits Auszahlungen erhalten? 
_______________________________________ 
 
Wenn ja: Brauchen Sie von Jahr zu Jahr mehr/weniger/genauso viel Zeit für die 
Prämienbeantragung? (Nichtzutreffendes streichen). 
 
Können Sie in etwa angeben, wie viel Zeit mehr/weniger Sie brauchen? __________h/min 
 
Zeitaufwand im Zusammenhang mit Kontrollen: 
Ist Ihr Betrieb schon einmal im Zusammenhang mit der Teilnahme am HIAP-Grünlandprogramm 
(oder HELP) kontrolliert worden?  
   Ja               Nein    
 
 
Wenn ja:   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Aufwand 
in h/min 
 
Vorbereitung des Kontrollbesuchs   
Dauer des Kontrollbesuchs   
Nachbereitung des Kontrollbesuchs   
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Gab es Beanstandungen?  
   Ja               Nein    
 
Welche? ________________________________________________________________ 
 
Welcher zeitliche Aufwand war mit den Beanstandungen verbunden? _____________h/min 
 
Entstand Ihnen darüber hinaus finanzieller Aufwand (Rückzahlungen, Anwaltskosten)_______€ 
Betriebsstruktur bezogen aufs Jahr 2008/2009 
Planen Sie langfristig über einen Zeitraum von 10 Jahren hinaus? 
   Ja               Nein    
 
Ausstattung: 
Betriebsgröße: _____________(ha) 
-davon eigene Fläche ____________ (ha) 
- Pachtpreis für  Grünlandpachtflächen (Ø): ____________€/ha 
 
Art der Nutzung (ha): 
- Ldw. Ackerfläche _____________ha 
- Dauergrünland: ______________ha 
- Nawaro: _________________ha 
- Dauerkulturfläche _____________ha 
 
Arbeitskräfte auf dem Betrieb (Anzahl): ___________ 
Davon: nicht entlohnte Familienmitglieder: __________ 
Lehrlinge _________ 
Meister ___________ 
Arbeiter: ___________ 
Appendix 
 140 
Saisonale AK:_________ von-bis ____________(bitte Monate angeben) 
 
Produktionsstruktur 
Betriebsschwerpunkt: _____________________ 
 
Erntefläche Obst/Gemüse: __________(ha) 
 
Vieh (Ø,Stück): 
- Milchkühe: __________ 
- Mutterkühe : ____________  
- Sonst. Rinder: __________ 
- Geflügel: __________ 
- Schafe, Ziegen: _________ 
- Sonstige:_______________ 
 
Erträge im Wirtschaftsjahr (alles, was nicht selbst genutzt wird, z.B. als Futter): 
Ackerbau (dt), dar.: 
Grünland (dt): __________ 
Milchleistung (l) : ________ 
Erträge aus Mutterkuhhaltung: _____________ 
Erträge aus Fleischproduktion:______________ 
Erträge aus Obst-/Gemüseanbau (kg? ): _____________ 
Erträge aus NAWARO (dt):________________ 
Erträge aus sonstiger landwirtschaftlicher Produktion: _____________ 
Sind die jährlichen Erträge starken Mengenschwankungen unterworfen? 
   Ja               Nein    
 
Welche Erträge betrifft dies am meisten? __________________ 
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Wie hoch ist der Wert des Anlagevermögens (€) lt. Buchführung _____________€ 
Land : ________ 
Wirtschaftsgebäude : ________ 
Bauliche Anlagen : ________ 
Technische Anlagen und Maschinen : ________  
Tiervermögen : ________ 
Welche Umsatzerlöse haben Sie im Wirtschaftsjahr erzielt? _____________€ 
Pflanzenproduktion: _____________€ 
Tierproduktion: _________________€ 
Lohnarbeit, Maschinenmiete: __________€ 
Biogas u.ä: _______________€ 
Direktzahlungen, AGZ, Beihilfen? ______________€ 
Sind die jährlichen Umsatzerlöse starken Preisschwankungen unterworfen? 
   Ja               Nein    
Welche Umsatzerlöse sind am meisten betroffen?____________________ 
Welchen Aufwand hatten Sie im Wirtschaftsjahr? _________________€ 
Pflanzenproduktion: ______________€ 
Tierproduktion:  
Energieproduktion: _______________€ 
Sonst. Materialaufwand, davon ___________€ 
Personalaufwand : ______________€ 
Betriebsergebnis im Wirtschaftsjahr: _________________€ 
Sozioökonomische Faktoren 
Betreiben Sie Ihren Betrieb im Haupterwerb?      Ja               Nein    
 
Wenn ja, haben Sie außerhalb des Betriebs noch weitere Einkünfte? 
           Ja               Nein    
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Geschlecht des Betriebsleiters: ________________ 
Wie alt sind Sie? ______ Jahre  
Welches ist Ihr höchster Schulabschluss? (Bitte ankreuzen): 
 Kein Abschluss     
 Volks- bzw. Hauptschule 
 Realschule 
 Fachoberschule/Abitur 
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Welche höchste Ausbildung haben Sie als Landwirt durchlaufen? 
 Keine Ausbildung     
 Lehre 
 Meisterprüfung/Techniker 
 Studium 
 
Haben Sie eine Ausbildung in anderen Berufsfeldern: 
 Keine Ausbildung     
 Lehre 
 Meisterprüfung/Techniker 
 Studium 
 
Sind Sie Mitglied in landwirtschaftlichen Verbänden? _____ 
 
Wenn ja, in welchen?    _____________________________ 
 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Mühe!! 
 
 
 
Raum für zusätzliche Bemerkungen: 
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Interview guideline for article (2) 
 
Interviewleitfaden für die Befragung der HIAP durchführenden Stellen  
 
Interviewziele: Influences of institutional presetting/ Scope of action possible within contractual 
governance mode  
1. Was machen Sie genau?  
 
- Ihre konkrete Aufgabe im Vertragsprozess?  
 
- Position der Aufgabe: Information LW, Durchführung, Kontrolle? Alles?  
 
- Was sind Ihre Arbeitsinhalte?  
 
- Inwiefern sind Sie autonom in der Entscheidung über Ihre Aufgabe(n)? Von welchen 
Stellen/Politiken werden Sie in Bezug auf Ihre Aufgabe beeinflusst?  
 
- Welche Berichtspflichten haben Sie?  
 
o Gegenüber Landesbehörden?  
 
o Gegenüber der EU direkt?  
 
- Wie wird Anpassungsbedarf ihrer Arbeit deutlich? Extern? Intern?  
 
- Wie wird Anpassungsbedarf kommuniziert? Formal/Informell? Auf welchem Wege?  
 
- Welche Problemfelder sehen Sie im Zusammenhang mit ihren Arbeitsinhalten?  
 
o In welchem Bereich gibt es die meisten Probleme?  
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o Wie zeigt sich das?  
 
o Worauf führen Sie diese Probleme zurück? EU? Landespolitik? Andere RL? Sonstiges?  
 
2. Wie läuft Ihre Arbeit/Aufgabe (n) ab?  
 
- Welche Arbeitsschritte umfassen Ihre Aufgabe(n)?  
 
- Wie laufen diese Arbeitsschritte konkret ab?  
 
- Inwiefern sind Sie autonom in der Entscheidung über die Durchführung Ihrer Aufgabe(n) bzw. die 
Gestaltung der einzelnen Arbeitsschritte?  
 
- Wer nimmt Einfluss auf Ihre Aufgabe/Arbeitsinhalte? Auf wessen Aufgaben/Arbeitsinhalte nehmen 
Sie Einfluss?  
 
- Mit welchen Stellen kommunizieren Sie während der Durchführung Ihrer Aufgabe? Wie ist diese 
Kommunikation gestaltet (formal/Informell)?  
 
- Wie oft kommunizieren Sie mit diesen Stellen?  
 
- Wie werden Ihnen Veränderungen in ihrer Aufgabe kommuniziert? Formal? Informell?  
 
- Wie kommunizieren Sie Veränderungen Ihrer Arbeit? Formal? Informell?  
 
- Wann werden Ihnen Veränderungen kommuniziert? Ex ante/Ex post  
 
- Welche Problemfelder sehen Sie im Zusammenhang mit den anfallenden  Arbeitsschritten?  
 
Appendix 
 146 
o In welchem Bereich gibt es die meisten Probleme?  
 
o Wie zeigt sich das?  
 
o Worauf führen Sie diese Probleme zurück? EU? Landespolitik? Andere RL? Sonstiges?  
 
3. Wer ist an Ihrer Aufgabe beteiligt?  
 
- Welche Stellen/administrative Einheiten Sind Ihrer Aufgabe vor- bzw nachgelagert?   
 
- Sind andere Stellen /administrative Einheiten an Ihrer Aufgabe direkt beteiligt?  
 
- Gibt es Abstimmungsbedarf mit diesen Stellen? Welchen?  
 
- Worauf ist dieser Abstimmungsbedarf zurückzuführen? Inwiefern?  
 
- Sind andere Politiken/RL (EU, Land, Sonstiges) ursächlich für die Beteiligung dieser 
Stellen/Einheiten? Welche? Oder ist das Ihre Entscheidung?  
 
- Welche Problemfelder sehen Sie im Zusammenhang mit Art und Anzahl der Beteiligten?  
 
o In welchem Bereich gibt es die meisten Probleme?  
 
o Wie zeigt sich das?  
 
o Worauf führen Sie diese Probleme zurück? EU? Landespolitik? Andere RL? Sonstiges?  
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4. Wann werden Sie tätig?  
 
- Gibt es externe (von anderen Stellen) bzw. interne (eigene Qualitätsstandards) Vorgaben, wann Sie 
tätig werden? Welche?  
 
- Kann man Ihre Aufgabe eher als Aktion oder Reaktion bezeichnen?  
 
- Inwieweit sind Sie autonom in Bezug auf den Zeitpunkt ihrer Aufgabe?  
 
- Welche Problemfelder sehen Sie im Zusammenhang mit dem Zeitpunkt ihrer Aufgabe?  
 
o In welchem Bereich gibt es die meisten Probleme?  
 
o Wie zeigt sich das?  
 
o Worauf führen Sie diese Probleme zurück? EU? Landespolitik? Andere RL? Sonstiges?  
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Questionnaire for article (3) 
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